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Chapter One 
Introduction  
 1.1  Introduction 
Two South African studies have documented the practice of forced or coerced sterilisation 
of women living with HIV.1  These studies have shown to some extent the possible 
prevalence,2 nature of and lived experiences3 of this rights violation of women with HIV.  
One of the issues identified by affected women has been their desire for legal relief.4  
Women who were interviewed felt that their bodies had been violated and that they ought 
to be compensated through the payment of compensation and have access to medical 
procedures to reverse the sterilisations.5  An under researched issue is whether the affected 
women are entitled to any legal remedies and whether such remedies would meet their 
identified needs.  Further, whether these existing remedies would facilitate access to justice 
for them.  This is done through measuring the existing remedies against five core elements 
of access to justice namely; functionality of the justice system, affordability of legal services; 
accessibility to courts and knowledge of legal rights, acceptability of the remedies provided 
and finally the ability of the legal system to hold the wrongdoers accountable.6  
This chapter provides an introduction to the study of the possible legal remedies available to 
HIV positive women who allege that they have been the victims of coerced and forced 
sterilisation in South Africa.  This chapter will present background to the topic which 
includes the medical and social aspects of involuntary sterilisation, the relevant legal 
framework within South Africa and a critical review of the range of legal remedies available 
to affected women.  Core definitions, the problem statement, research questions and 
methodology are also provided. 
 
                                                            
1 These are the studies conducted by Strode, Mthembu and Essack which is documented in A Strode et al ‘‘‘She 
made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary sterilization in two South 
African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9 and the Human Sciences Research Council 
report ‘The people living with HIV stigma index: South Africa 2014’ (2015), available at 
http://www.stigmaindex.org/sites/default/files/reports/Summary-Booklet-on-Stigma-Index-
Survey%20South%20Africa.pdf accessed on 18 December 2017. 
2 Human Sciences Research Council The people living with HIV stigma index: South Africa 2014’ (2015), 
available at http://www.stigmaindex.org/sites/default/files/reports/Summary-Booklet-on-Stigma-Index-
Survey%20South%20Africa.pdf accessed on 18 December 2017. 
3 Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary sterilization 
in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9. 
4 Z Essack & A Strode ‘‘’I feel like half a woman all the time’’: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations 
on HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of 
the National Assembly and Others (CCT 143/15; CCT 171/15) [2016] ZACC 11; 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC); 2016 (3) 
SA 580 (CC) (31 March 2016) at para 52. 
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1.2  Background  
South Africa lamentably, has the largest incidence of HIV infections worldwide.7  Recent 
statistics in July 2017 revealed that an estimated 7 million people of our population are 
living with HIV.8  Approximately 21.17% of these persons are women in their reproductive 
age.9  The low status of women in our society combined with other factors such as poverty, 
inequality, social instability, illiteracy and limited access to good quality health care have 
been identified as some of the key contributors to the high rate of infection amongst 
women.10  HIV was at one time regarded as a death sentence however, with significant 
improvements in medical care it is now regarded as a chronic condition which is 
manageable.  It is not viewed like other chronic diseases and often does not carry with it the 
sympathy that other chronic illnesses enjoy.  Instead, it is generally accompanied by high 
levels of stigma and discrimination.11  
Despite these obligations the sexual reproductive health rights of HIV positive women has 
been neglected.  The focus of the national response to HIV has often been, particularly in 
the past, on curbing the spread of the virus rather than managing the illness.12  Ironically, 
HIV positive expectant mothers are identified by the prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission programme.  A combination of antiretroviral drugs and access to prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission programmes can ensure that HIV positive women live long 
productive lives.13  This would include delivering babies by caesarean section and 
encouraging HIV positive mothers to either exclusively breastfeed or feed their babies with 
infant formula which would have the effect of decreasing the risk of vertical transmission 
rates from mother to child.14  There has been criticisms of this programme and suggestions 
that it does not in reality promote women’s rights.  In that, women feel that they are 
coerced into being tested often at a time at which they are not ready for the potential 
results and following knowledge of their HIV status they face abuse and neglect from health 
care workers.  Research conducted by Amnesty International in two provinces in South 
Africa lends support to this allegation.  Women and young girls have recounted that they 
                                                            
7 UNAIDS ‘South Africa: Overview’ [2018], available at http://www.unaids.org/en/ regionscountries/ 
countries/southafrica accessed on 5 January 2018. 
8 Stats SA ‘Mid-year population estimates 2017’ (2017) 8, available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/ 
publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf accessed on 5 January 2018.  
9 Ibid.   
10 UNAIDS ‘South Africa: Overview’ [2018], available at http://www.unaids.org/en/ regionscountries/ 
countries/southafrica accessed on 5 January 2018. 
11 E Bell et al ‘Sexual and reproductive health services and HIV testing: Perspectives and experiences of women 
and men living with HIV and Aids’ (2007) 15 (29) Reproductive Health Matters 113-135. 
12 D Cooper ‘In pursuit of social development goals and HIV-infected women’s reproductive rights – South 
Africa as a case study’ (2008) 75 Agenda at p 7. 
13 Open Society Foundations ‘Against her will: forced and coerced sterilization of women worldwide’ [2012] 5, 
available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/against-her-will-20111003.pdf   
accessed on 2 November 2017. 
14 V Paiva et al ‘The right to love: The desire for parenthood among men living with HIV’ (2003) 11 (22) 
Reproductive Health Matters 91-100 at p91.   
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delayed testing for HIV and seeking antenatal care largely because of the ill-treatment that 
they were subjected to by health care workers and the poor infrastructure of the public 
health care system that they had to use.15  However, it may be submitted that the 
programme itself is invaluable but its current implementation is problematic as it 
contributes to the increased discrimination and stigma that HIV positive pregnant women 
and young girls have to face.16  
Although reproductive health choices for HIV positive women, such as deciding whether or 
not to be tested within pregnancy fall within their rights to autonomy and dignity, Cooper 
holds the view that decision making on this issue is complex.17  It requires the balancing of 
personal, interpersonal and social factors.18  Studies have shown globally that HIV positive 
women desire having their own biological children.19  This is evidenced by the testimony of 
an HIV positive woman who was coerced into being sterilised when she said that ‘’the 
decision to have a child, is an individual’s, it should not be up for debate.’’20  An array of 
reasons have come through the narratives of HIV positive women on why they desire their 
own biological children.  These reasons can be compartmentalised into reasons that come 
from the women themselves and for reasons that come from external sources like partners, 
husbands, family, religious prescripts and the community.  From experiencing the feeling of 
being pregnant to leaving something of themselves behind when they die is a common 
rationale for HIV positive women wanting to have children.21   In turn, motherhood often 
gives HIV positive women the motivation to remain healthy and to be hopeful about life.22   
Children give their HIV positive mothers a purpose to continue living.23  HIV positive women 
                                                            
15 ‘’The Struggle for maternal health, Barriers to Antenatal care in South Africa’’ available at 
https://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/2014/10/09/5f52326b55514f90a8bfc3cc49e4bb46.pdf?rel=mas, 
accessed on 16 July 2018 at p 2 and 4.   
16 Ibid at p 3-5. 
17 D Cooper ‘In pursuit of social development goals and HIV-infected women’s reproductive rights – South 
Africa as a case study’ (2008) 75 Agenda 7.  
18 Ibid.  
19 D Cooper et al ‘Life is still going on: Reproductive intentions among HIV-positive women and men in South 
Africa’ (2007) 65 Social Science and Medicine 274-283 at p 275-277; S Gruskin et al ‘Ensuring sexual and 
reproductive health for people living with HIV: An overview of key human rights, policy and health systems 
issues’( 2007) 15 (29) Reproductive Health Matters 4-26 at p 7; M G van Dijk et al ‘Health care experiences of 
HIV-infected women with fertility desires in Mexico: A qualitative study’ 2013 Journal of the Association of 
Nurses in Aids Care 1-9 at 1, 5-6; L Farlane ‘HIV-positive women have family planning needs too’  
(2008) 75 Agenda 31-37 at 31; J Godia ‘Dialogue with women living with HIV and AIDS: a case for reproductive 
and sexual health rights (2008) 75 Agenda 46-52 and V Paiva et al ‘The right to love: The desire for parenthood 
among men living with HIV’ (2003) 11 (22) Reproductive Health Matters 91-100 at 97-98.  
20 African Gender and Media Initiative ‘Robbed of choice: Forced and coerced sterilization experiences of 
women living with HIV in Kenya’ (2012) 10, available at http://kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/10/Report-on-Robbed-Of-Choice-Forced-and-Coerced-Sterilization-Experiences-of-Women-Living-with-
HIV-in-Kenya.pdf accessed on 1 July 2015 at 10. 
21 D Cooper et al ‘Life is still going on: Reproductive intentions among HIV-positive women and men in South 
Africa’ (2007) 65 Social Science and Medicine 274-283 at 277. 
22 M G van Dijk et al ‘Health care experiences of HIV-infected women with fertility desires in Mexico: A 
qualitative study’ 2013 Journal of the Association of Nurses in Aids Care 1-9 at 2. 
23 D Cooper et al ‘Life is still going on: Reproductive intentions among HIV-positive women and men in South 
Africa’ (2007) 65 Social Science and Medicine 274-283 at 277. 
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often view children as representing normality.24   In a nutshell, having children for these 
women makes life worth living for.   
According to Bell and Mthembu, ‘’all over the world HIV has been stigmatised and 
associated with shame, making it difficult for people to access HIV testing, treatment care or 
counselling for fear of being judged.’’25  This stigma has crept its way into the arena of 
sexual reproductive health rights of women living with HIV often, having dire consequences 
for this group of vulnerable women who have found themselves being forcibly or coercively 
sterilised.26  Stigma and discrimination can only be understood if we examine the many 
layers of disadvantage.27  Sifris refers to this as intersectional discrimination, in terms of 
which for example, a women may face discrimination because she is female, from a minority 
race group, is HIV positive, is living in poverty and illiterate.28  All of these layers of various 
forms of discrimination act in a cumulative fashion to add to her disadvantage and increase 
her vulnerability to the possibility of receiving poor treatment in the health care system.  In 
the current context, women living with HIV face discrimination based on amongst others 
their sex, gender, race, class and socio-economic status.  Generally, this vulnerable group of 
women access public hospitals where they often experience poor treatment, and a further 
exacerbating factor is the power differential that exists between them and health care 
practitioners.29   
Many women rely on voluntary sterilisation to control their fertility.30  Sterilisation is a 
permanent contraceptive method which can be carried out in three ways.  The first way is a 
surgical sterilisation which involves an operation in which the fallopian tubes are cut or 
blocked in order to prevent fertilisation.31  The second and third ways in which a woman 
may be sterilised are by inserting a coil in the fallopian tubes or by administering medication 
which both have the effect of causing the fallopian tubes to seal respectively.32   
The advantages of a sterilisation is that it does not affect breastfeeding, it is free from the 
side effects of some of the temporary contraceptive methods and it may provide some 
                                                            
24 S Gruskin et al ‘Ensuring sexual and reproductive health for people living with HIV: An overview of key 
human rights, policy and health systems issues’ (2007) 15 (29) Reproductive Health Matters 4-26 at 7.   
25 Bell et al ‘Sexual and reproductive health services and HIV testing: Perspectives and experiences of women 
and men living with HIV and Aids’ (2007) 15 (29) Reproductive Health Matters 113-135 at 114. 
26 P Patel ‘Forced sterilization of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38 (15) Public Health Reviews 1-12. 
27 R Sifris ‘The voluntary sterilisation of marginalised women: power, discrimination, and intersectionality’ 
(2016) 25 (1) Griffith Law Review 45-70 at 46. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid at 48. 
30 H Ratcliffe ‘Women and forced sterilisation’ (2012) A Global Voice for Women – Soroptimist International,  
available at http://www.soroptimistinternational.org/assests/med, accessed on 1 December 2014. 
31 Open Society Foundation ‘Against her will: Forced and coerced sterilisation of women worldwide’ [20100] 11 
available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/against-her-will-20111003.pdf 
accessed on 2 November 2017. 
32 Ibid. 
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protection against pelvic inflammatory disease and ovarian cancer.33  One of the 
disadvantages of a sterilisation as a form of contraception is that sterilisation in theory 
eliminates any further option to procreate.   
But for some women, sterilisation is not a choice; there are reports of women from across 
the globe who have been forced or coerced by medical personnel to submit to permanent 
and irreversible sterilisation procedures often for discriminatory reasons.34   According to 
Patel,35 this practice targets marginalised populations including poor women,36 racial 
minorities,37 disabled women,38 women with epilepsy39 and most recently HIV positive 
women.40  In South Africa, the forced and coerced sterilisation of women was linked to its 
apartheid policies.41  In some instances medical practitioners employed by government, 
even sterilised women simply to gain experience towards their specialisation in obstetrics 
and gynaecology and used minority women as the means to get that experience.42  Taking 
away a woman’s autonomy to choose her own form of contraception, if any, is considered a 
violation of her human rights and medical ethics and can be described as acts of torture and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.43  Several authors have described the forced 
and/or coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV as a human rights violation.44 
Currently, there is a focus on the coerced and forced sterilisations of HIV positive women. 
This human rights violation of a marginalised group appears to be a consequence of the high 
levels of stigma and discrimination faced by many persons living with HIV.45 Health care 
                                                            
33 Department of Health ‘National contraception clinical guidelines.’(2012), available at 
https://www.mm3admin.co.za/documents/ docmanager/3c53e82b-24f2-49e1-b997-5a35803be10a/ 
00037761.pdf accessed on 17 February 2015. 
34 Ratcliffe ‘Women and forced sterilisation’ (2012) A Global Voice for Women – Soroptimist International, 
available at http://www.soroptimistinternational.org/assests/med, accessed on 1 December 2014. 
35 P Patel ‘Forced sterilization of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38(15) Public Health Reviews 1-12 at 1. 
36 G Chamberlain ‘UK aid helps to fund forced sterilisation of India’s poor’ The Observer 14 April 2012, available 
at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/15/uk-aid-forced-sterilisation-india accessed on 1 
December 2014.  
37 V. C. v Slovakia Application no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/orig/11_6/V.C..pdf accessed on 1 July 2015. 
38 Ratcliffe ‘Women and forced sterilisation’ (2012) A Global Voice for Women – Soroptimist International, 
available at http://www.soroptimistinternational.org/assests/med, accessed on 1 December 2014.  
39 Patel ‘Forced sterilization of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38 (15) Public Health Reviews 1-12 at 1. 
40 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
41 Essack & Strode ‘‘’I feel like half a woman all the time’’: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34 at 25. 
42 J Lawrence ‘The Indian Health Service and the sterilization of native American women’ (2000) 24 (3) The 
American Indian Quarterly 400-419 at 410. 
43 Ratcliffe ‘Women and forced sterilisation’ (2012) A Global Voice for Women – Soroptimist International  
available at http://www.soroptimistinternational.org/assests/med, accessed on 1 December 2014.  
44 Essack & Strode ‘‘’I feel like half a woman all the time’’: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34, and Patel ‘Forced sterilization of women as 
discrimination’ (2017) 38 (15) Public Health Reviews 1-12,  A Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 
HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) 
Reproductive Health Matters 1-9.  
45 Human Sciences Research Council and South African AIDS Council ‘The people living with HIV stigma index: 
South Africa 2014’ (2015), available at http://www.stigmaindex.org/sites/default/files/ reports/Summary-
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workers in many instances mirror the prejudiced views of their communities and appear to 
feel that women living with HIV should not reproduce as they will amongst others; leave 
orphans, be unable to care for their children and in earlier days of the epidemic would infect 
their unborn children with HIV.46  Offering HIV positive women caesarean sections to lower 
the incidence and risk of HIV transmission to their children appears to have provided a 
vehicle for promoting sterilisations. Research in both South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland and 
Kenya shows that many pregnant HIV positive women were sterilised during caesarean 
sections.47  Further, these studies have shown that in most instances women were coerced 
into being sterilised whilst in advanced labour and being prepared for a caesarean section.48 
The concept of discrimination in South African law is broad and encompasses a number of 
grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against.  It even goes a step further 
and broadens the scope of discriminatory conduct to other grounds which have the ability 
to undermine one’s dignity and continues to perpetuate systemic disadvantage.49  In terms 
of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, any law, rule, 
practice, condition, situation, act or omission which directly or indirectly imposes burdens, 
obligations or disadvantage or conversely withholds benefits, or advantages from any 
person on a ground based on race, gender, sex, HIV /AIDS status, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, age, sexual orientation, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth is discrimination.50   
In light of this dissertation focusing to a large extent on discrimination against women, it is 
useful to keep in mind the definition of discrimination against women as offered by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women which includes gender-
based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or 
that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual 
harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.’’51   
In addition, some argue that classifying this type of discrimination as a form of violence 
against women helps to elevate the issue.  For example, Durojaye submits that Article 1 of 
the Maputo Protocol read together with Articles 4 and 5(d) broadly makes provision for the 
                                                            
Booklet-on-Stigma-Index-Survey%20South%20Africa.pdf available at http://www.stigmaindex.org/ 
sites/default/files/reports/Summary-Booklet-on-Stigma-Index-Survey%20South%20Africa.pdf accessed on 2 
January 2018. 
46  Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9.  
47 Patel ‘Forced sterilization of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38 (15) Public Health Reviews 1-12 at 2. 
48 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
49 Section 1 of Act 4 of 2000. 
50 Ibid.  
51 General Recommendations Adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/ 1_Global/ 
INT_CEDAW_GEC_3731_E.pdf accessed on 8 June 2018. 
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forced or coerced sterilisation of women to be regarded as an act of violence.52 Adding to 
his voice, Coomaraswamy, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, has asserted that the forced sterilisation of women is in violation of their 
physical integrity and constitutes violence against them.53  At the Fourth World Conference 
on Women in Beijing it was recognised that the forced sterilisation of women amounts to 
violence.54  A further resonation of contempt for the practice of involuntary sterilisations of 
HIV positive women is contained in the Resolution taken by the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights.55  It was declared that all forms of involuntary sterilisations 
violate a host of fundamental human rights that are enshrined in regional and international 
human rights instruments which include amongst others the rights to equality, dignity, and 
the best attainable state of physical and mental health.56  
The focus of this thesis is on the forced or coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV 
however, it acknowledges that this fits within the broader context of gender based violence 
against women and is potentially a form of obstetric violence.  Obstetric violence is not a 
term that is commonly used in South Africa at present.  However, it describes conduct that 
has been taking place during childbirth from time immemorial.  The offensive conduct takes 
the form of physical and psychological abuse that women across the world face during 
childbirth for example denial of treatment; dehumanising or rude treatment; discriminatory 
treatment based on race, ethnic or socio-economic background and HIV status and verbal 
abuse.57  The women in the case studies from Slovakia, Namibia, South Africa and Kenya 
have all experienced different forms of abuse and disrespect at the hands of health care 
personnel.    
Pickles offers a definition of obstetric violence to be ‘’conduct that violates autonomy, 
privacy, physical and psychological security and integrity, dignity and equality.  It is conduct 
that takes place without consent or with coerced consent.’’58  This is a very broad definition 
which highlights that obstetric violence can be both physical or psychological abuse.  It also 
links this abuse to the consent process.  It is submitted, that the practice of forced or 
coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women fits squarely within the definition of obstetric 
                                                            
52 E Durojaye ‘Involuntary sterilisation as a form of violence against women in Africa’ (2017) Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 1-12 at 7-8.    
53 Human Rights Watch ‘Sterilization of Women and Girls with Disabilities: A Briefing Paper’ available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/10/sterilization-women-and-girls-disabilities accessed on 8 June 2018. 
54 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action -The Fourth World Conference on Women, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf accessed on 8 June 2018. 
55 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘260: Resolution on Involuntary Sterilisation and the 
Protection of Human Rights in Access to HIV Services’ available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/ 
54th/resolutions/260/ accessed on 25 May 2018. 
56 Ibid.  
57 MTR Borges ‘A violent birth: Reframing coerced procedures during childbirth as obstetric violence’ (2018) 
67 Duke Law Journal 827 – 862 at 828, and C Pickles Eliminating abusive ‘care’ A criminal law response to 
obstetric violence in South Africa’ (2015) 54 SA Crime Quarterly 5 – 16 at 6. 
58 Pickles Eliminating abusive ‘care’ A criminal law response to obstetric violence in South Africa’ (2015) 54 SA 
Crime Quarterly 5 – 16 at 13. 
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violence as proposed by Pickles as it has the effect of robbing women of their autonomy to 
make reproductive health choices.   
Obstetric violence has been recognised as a human rights violation and in response it has 
been criminalised in some Latin American countries.  There are also proposals for this 
framework to be imported to the United States of America and for it to be adapted suitably 
to protect pregnant women in South Africa.59  It is argued by Borges that a key problem in 
the United States is that obstetric violence takes the form of a violation of a woman’s 
autonomy through compelling birthing mothers to have caesarean sections and have 
medication administered to them that accelerates labour, which is more painful for the 
mother, and contrary to her wish of having a natural vaginal delivery.60  It has been argued 
that the effect of forced procedures on women like sterilisations or caesarean sections 
provoke lasting psychological trauma even in instances where there are no physical or 
economic consequences attached to it.61  Pickles submits that this practices violates a 
number of the patient’s rights including their right to equality, dignity, privacy, bodily and 
psychological integrity and access to reproductive health care.62  In many instances, 
decisions taken at childbirth are often informed by a number of cultural, social and religious 
beliefs.  In the African culture for example, a high premium is placed on a woman’s 
childbearing capacity and therefore being sterilised for being HIV positive without her 
informed consent is an affront to her culture and inherent sense of social worth.63  
Two issues that are interlinked and strongly resonate from the treatment that birthing 
mothers are subjected to, are that of gender based violence and the conduct of health care 
personnel.  All the victims are women as pregnancy is a uniquely female experience.64  
Further, the act of denying women the opportunity to make reproductive choices reduces 
them to being treated like infants and perpetuates how they are perceived in patriarchal 
societies.65  The manner in which birthing mothers are treated correlates with the unequal 
social and economic position that they occupy within society, which serves to aggravate the 
intersectional discrimination that they face.66  Jewkes and Penn-Kekana submit that 
                                                            
59 Borges ‘A violent birth: Reframing coerced procedures during childbirth as obstetric violence’ (2018) 67 Duke 
Law Journal 827 – 862 at 827 and Pickles Eliminating abusive ‘care’ A criminal law response to obstetric 
violence in South Africa’ (2015) 54 SA Crime Quarterly 5 – 16 at 5. 
60 Borges ‘A violent birth: Reframing coerced procedures during childbirth as obstetric violence’ (2018) 67 Duke 
Law Journal 827 – 862 at 830. 
61 Borges ‘A violent birth: Reframing coerced procedures during childbirth as obstetric violence’ (2018) 67 Duke 
Law Journal 827 – 862 at 838. 
62 Pickles Eliminating abusive ‘care’ A criminal law response to obstetric violence in South Africa’ (2015) 54 SA 
Crime Quarterly 5 – 16 at 10. 
63 Essack & Strode ‘I feel like half a women all the time: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34. 
64 Borges ‘A violent birth: Reframing coerced procedures during childbirth as obstetric violence’ (2018) 67 Duke 
Law Journal 827 – 862 at 830. 
65 Borges ‘A violent birth: Reframing coerced procedures during childbirth as obstetric violence’ (2018) 67 Duke 
Law Journal 827 – 862 at 853-4. 
66 Pickles Eliminating abusive ‘care’ A criminal law response to obstetric violence in South Africa’ (2015) 54 SA 
Crime Quarterly 5 – 16 at 7. 
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women’s subordinate position in society devalues their lives and disempowers them which 
creates an enabling environment for them to be subjected to violence.67   
In South Africa, the forced and coerced sterilisations of women living with HIV are a 
particular concern. Two studies have shown that although no official policy exists which 
promotes this practice it appears to have continued until recently.68 Against this 
background, this dissertation explores possible legal remedies to address this gross violation 
of human rights.  It is submitted that a number of human rights issues emerge from this 
infraction including the right to bodily integrity,69 equality,70 dignity71 and access to sexual 
and reproductive health rights.72  This dissertation has narrowed its focus to the rights to 
bodily and psychological integrity, equality and dignity as these three rights will form the 
foundation for any of the proposed causes of legal action in this thesis.  The protection of 
these rights can be achieved through strategic litigation based on rights which are afforded 
constitutional protection.  There have been two cases in which the courts have had to deal 
with forced or coerced sterilisation, one in Namibia and one which was settled out of court 
in South Africa. In Namibia, there has been a recent decision of their Supreme Court on this 
issue.73 The facts briefly were that three women instituted action for damages in the High 
Court against the Government of the Republic of Namibia after they claimed that they were 
sterilised without their informed consent.  The court found that their informed consent was 
not obtained and found in favour of the three women.74  The Government of the Republic of 
Namibia subsequently appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Namibia75.  Chief 
Justice Chivute adjudicating on the matter stated that ‘’it is my considered opinion that 
none of the respondents gave informed consent because they were in varying degrees of 
labour and may not have fully and rationally comprehended the consequences of giving 
consent for the sterilisation procedure.  This is especially the case given that none of the 
respondents made any appointment or booking to confirm their intention’’.76  The case was 
                                                            
67 R Jewkes and L Penn-Kekana ‘Mistreatment of women in childbirth: Time for action on this important 
dimension of violence against women’ 2015 12 (6) PLOS Medicine 1-4 at 1.  
68 Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9 and see also ‘The 
people living with HIV stigma index: South Africa 2014’ (2015) note 22 above. 
69 Section 12(2) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.  
70 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.  
71 Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
72 Section 27 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.  This dissertation limits its focus to 
three rights, the right to bodily integrity, equality, and dignity.  The reason for this is that the jurisprudence in 
other similar jurisdictions like Namibia and Kenya has focused on these three rights.  In the recommendations 
made in this dissertation it is suggested that further research be undertaken on the usefulness or not of trying 
to rely on the sexual and reproductive health rights as a means of redress. 
73 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014). 
76 Ibid.  
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remitted back to the High Court for the determination of the amount of damages payable by 
the Government of the Republic of Namibia to the affected women.77 
In the South African case, Sithole was 28 years old when she was sterilised at the same time 
that she was giving birth by caesarean section.  Her legal representatives alleged that even 
though a ‘’purported’’ written consent for the sterilisation procedure was obtained it was 
done in violation of her right to bodily integrity and the Sterilisation Act.  It was also alleged 
that she was pressurised into signing the consent form because of her HIV positive status.78  
This matter was settled out of court with the parties coming to an agreement that the 
Minister of Health was ordered to pay Sithole damages in the sum of R 470 800-00.79  
Although litigation is possible, accessing justice through the courts is a more complex issue.  
Rights without access to justice can be meaningless.  South Africa’s Chief Justice Mogoeng 
Mogoeng paid homage to the concept of access to justice by stating that: 
 Access to justice is a fast growing concept and practice. It encompasses the rule of law, 
 administration of justice, good governance, and democratic ideals...It acknowledges and seeks 
 to address the gap that exists between citizens and the law, in terms of equality of opportunity 
 and approach in tackling issues, and providing an appropriate remedy. It attempts to 
 eliminate, or at least counter-balance, the impact of inefficient or expensive systems of 
 administration of justice that effectively deny the fullest protection and recourse of all 
 litigants to the law in order to redress their grievances and vindicate their rights. It also helps 
 to assert more precisely the scope of the role of the justice system and the courts in being 
 part of a strategy to address the issue of exclusion of the poor from a formal system of public 
 administration.80 
The theoretical framework for this dissertation is the concept of access to justice.  As 
eloquently stated by our current Chief Justice access to justice requires a system in terms of 
which litigants are able to ‘’redress their grievances and vindicate their rights.’’81  This 
dissertation critically reviews the South African legal framework to establish whether HIV 
positive women who have been the victims of involuntary sterilisations can claim 
compensation and vindicate their rights.   
 
 
                                                            
77 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014).  
Personal communication with U Rajcoomar revealed that the matter has been settled and details of the 
amount paid as damages to the three women remains confidential. 
78 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no.                               
19744/2012 – High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. 
79 Ibid. 
80 M Mogoeng ‘Speech by the Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa at the opening of the provincial case 
flow management workshop in Port Alfred 19 July 2012: Keynote address’ (2012) Office of the Chief Justice, 
available at http://www.judiciary.org.za/doc/Speech-CJ_19-July-2012_EL.pdf accessed on 5 January 2018.  
81 Ibid. 
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1.3  Definitions 
The term ‘coerced sterilisation’ refers to a situation whereby women are compelled to 
consent to undergo a surgical procedure to permanently end their ability to reproduce by 
the use of incentives, misinformation or intimidation tactics.82 ‘Forced sterilisation’ refers to 
a situation in which a woman is surgically operated on without her knowledge, or being 
given an opportunity to provide consent to the procedure.83  
This proposed dissertation will proceed from the basis that coerced sterilisation is the use of 
incentives, misinformation, or intimidation tactics to compel a HIV positive woman to 
consent to undergo a surgical procedure to permanently end her ability to reproduce. 
Whilst forced sterilisations occur when a HIV positive woman is sterilised without her 
knowledge or the opportunity to provide consent to the procedure.84 For example, 
participants in a recent South African study reported that heath care workers gave them 
one of four reasons for being sterilised, firstly, because they were HIV positive and therefore 
they were not allowed to have more children. Secondly, sterilisations would prevent more 
infants being born with HIV. Thirdly, it would lower the number of children left as orphans. 
Fourthly, as pregnancies had a negative effect on a positive women’s health she should be 
prevented from harming herself.85 This thesis argues further that the forced or coerced 
sterilisation referred to above is a form of unfair discrimination against HIV positive women.  
The types of women who are most likely to the victims of this human rights violation are 
those who are Black, poor, illiterate, young and HIV positive.86   
1.4  The forced or coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV 
Globally, women comprise 51% of all people living with HIV in low–and middle-income 
countries.87  The epidemic continues to be characterised by high levels of stigma and 
discrimination against people living with HIV.88 For example, the 2011 African Dialogue on 
HIV and the Law found that discrimination continues to be a key characteristic of the 
epidemic in Africa. 89 As stated above, one way in which discrimination has been manifesting 
itself is in the way in which health care workers approach the reproductive choices of HIV 
                                                            
82 CJ Badul & A Strode ‘LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia: The first sub-Saharan African 
case dealing with the coerced sterilisations of HIV –positive women – quo vadis’ (2013) 13 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 214-228 at 224. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Essack & Strode ‘‘‘I feel like half a woman all the time’: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34 at 25. 
85 Strode et al ‘‘’She made up a choice for me’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilisation in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9 at 5.  
86 Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9.  
87 UNAIDS ‘UNAIDS data 2017’ (2017), available at http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/ 
media_asset/20170720_Data_book_2017_en.pdf accessed on 5 January 2018. 
88 E Cameron Justice (2014) at 81. 
89 Global Commission on HIV and the Law ‘Overview of the Africa regional dialogue’ [2011], available at 
https://hivlawcommission.org/dialogues/africa/ accessed on 1 July 2015.  See also Cameron Justice (2014). 
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positive women. Many women living with HIV have complained that health care workers 
have forced or coerced them to be sterilised so that they cannot continue to reproduce.90 
The forced and coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV is not confined to South Africa 
and has been reported globally.  
The practice of sterilising women with HIV because of their HIV status appears to have its 
roots in the discriminatory perceptions of health care workers towards women living with 
HIV. This discriminatory practice plays out through the lack of concern for obtaining consent 
to sterilisation with health care workers either coercing or compelling women to be 
sterilised simply because they are HIV positive.  For example, Participants in a South African 
study related how their consent was obtained.  They made comments like ‘’they made me 
sign this paper after I had collapsed in the toilet’’.91  Or “I went back and she gave me a 
pen…if she wanted to give me an option she wouldn’t have to give me a pen.  You 
understand?  She would’ve [asked] me if I had thought about it…Or she could’ve said, ‘’Have 
you read it?’’92  Another relayed that ‘’He (doctor) was shouting at me while all were 
listening.  I did not have time to say anything as we were arguing.  He said all black people 
are careless.  I was embarrassed and I just signed without getting time to read the form.’’93  
The impact of sterilisation of women living with HIV has not been extensively researched 
however in a study by Essack and Strode94 the experiences of HIV positive women who were 
either coercively or forcibly sterilised in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal were documented.  
This found that women were profoundly affected in different spheres of their lives.  For 
example, Participant 9 stated ‘’[H]e doesn’t have a child like you know and he had just paid 
lobola (the bride price)…So he wants a child’’.95  Participant 15 noted that “I avoid 
conversations about children because they hurt me.  Uhm you avoid going to baby showers 
at all costs’’.96  Participant 4 reflected on how being sterilised had directly affected her 
sense of self-worth in that “it makes me feel incomplete that I am not a proper woman, first 
that I’m HIV-positive and secondly I cannot bear children.  Men don’t want HIV-positive 
women but the inability to have a child is an added problem’’.97  The study also found that 
participants experienced physical pain, including backache after their sterilisations98.  
Participants also narrated their devastating experience of trying to have the sterilisation 
reversed.  Participant 21 stated that “I went to another doctor who said I could get a child.  I 
                                                            
90 Strode et al ‘She made up a choice for me’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary sterilisation 
in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9 at 5. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Essack & Strode ‘‘’I feel like half a woman all the time’: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34 at 25. 
95 Ibid 28. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid 29.  
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kept paying and I thought I would eventually conceive.  At 8 months I went to the clinic and 
they said that the pills I had been taking were poisonous.’’99  Most significantly participants 
also expressed the feelings of not being able to disclose the fact that they had been 
sterilised to family and partners.  Participant 20 stated that ‘’I can understand being HIV-
positive but telling your partner that you cannot have children is too much.’’100   
The narratives of women who have been sterilised either forcibly or coercively clearly depict 
that women are being affected in more than one sphere of their lives which are inextricably 
linked.  Feelings of worthlessness, and being incomplete were clearly evident.  This in turn 
has impacted negatively on their psychological well-being.  Women have also experienced 
feeling physical pain101 and financial loss102 because of the forced or coerced sterilisation.    
Interpersonal relationships that the women shared with partners and family were also 
reported to have become strained.103  Women also had difficulty in disclosing the fact that 
they had been sterilised as it would be problematic as great value is placed on the ability of 
women to conceive in terms of the African culture.104   
This thesis proceeds from the basis that the violations described above are significant.  The 
law ought to provide legal remedies that would ensure that (a) the practice is stopped, the 
perpetrators responsible for committing involuntary sterilisations face legal consequences 
and (c) the victims of the sterilisation abuse are able to access relief.  As described below 
and in Chapters 5 and 6 the South African legal framework includes a number of specific and 
administrative legal remedies that could be used.  For example, our civil law allows for 
claims for patrimonial loss, pain and suffering and for violations of personality rights which 
encompass the right to bodily integrity and dignity.105  There is also a possibility of the use of 
the criminal law.106  Finally, a number of administrative bodies who have been granted 
certain legal powers to provide legal redress such as the South African Human Rights 
Commission.  A key question examined in this dissertation is whether any or all of these 
legal remedies if used by HIV positive women who have been involuntarily sterilised would 
result in justice for them.     
1.5  The legal and ethical framework for voluntary sterilisations in South Africa 
The Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa and all other laws and policies must 
comply with its provisions.   Flowing from the constitutional right to bodily integrity, equality 
and dignity, a number of general principles have been established.  There are also a number 
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of statutes which have been passed which detail when and how sterilisations may take place 
and describe the right to informed consent and equality.  In addition, this section discusses 
the principles set out in ethical guidelines issued by professional health care bodies.  
1.5.1.1  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996  
The Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 does not make specific reference to HIV, it contains provisions 
that lay the basis for persons living with HIV to be free from discrimination on this ground of 
HIV/AIDS.107   The most significant of these constitutional protections are found in the rights 
to equality, 108 human dignity,109 life,110 freedom and security of the person (bodily 
integrity),111 privacy,112 and health care, food, water and social security.113 Without 
derogating from the importance of the above rights, section 12(2)114 states specifically that 
everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity which includes the right to make 
decisions concerning reproduction.  This provision clearly illustrates a human rights based 
approach in dealing with reproductive choices of women.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation the rights that will be focused on are rights to equality,115 dignity116 and the 
right to bodily and psychological integrity.117  
1.5.1.2  The Sterilisation Act 44 of 1998 
The Sterilisation Act118 is clearly in keeping with the human rights based approach adopted 
by the Constitution.119  It requires written consent to be obtained before the procedure is 
carried out.  The component parts that make up consent is that it must be given freely and 
voluntarily by the woman after (a) she has been given a clear explanation and adequate 
description of the (i) proposed plan of the procedure; (ii) the consequences, risks, reversible 
or irreversible nature of the sterilisation procedure has been explained to her and (b) she 
has been made aware that she may withdraw her consent at any time before the 
procedure.120  Strict compliance with the provisions of the Sterilisation Act is evidenced by 
section 9 which views non-compliance with the provisions of the Act as a criminal 
offence.121  
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1.5.1.3  The National Health Act 61 of 2003 
The National Health Act122 also lends its voice to the issue of informed consent.  Section 6 
(1) (b) and (c)123 provides that every health care provider must inform a user of the range of 
diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to the user and the 
benefits, risks and consequences generally associated with each option.  In addition, the 
user or patient must be informed in a language that the user or patient understands.124   
1.5.1.4  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
A further statute that affords protection to women who have been subjected to forced or 
coerced sterilisation for a discriminatory reason is the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act.125  This important piece of legislation has recently included HIV 
as a prohibited ground of discrimination.126 For the purposes of this dissertation the other 
important grounds that have been recognised by the Act as being a prohibited ground of 
discrimination are the race group of a person and sex.127 The Equality Act enables 
complainants of unfair discrimination to approach the local Equality Courts for redress.    
1.5.1.5  Common law on informed consent 
There is a common law obligation on medical practitioners to obtain informed consent 
before treating or operating on patients.128  The courts have held that informed consent 
means that the patient has: (i) knowledge of the nature and extent of the harm or risk; (ii) 
an appreciation and understanding of the nature of harm or risk; (iii) consented to the harm 
or assumed the risk of harm and (iv) consented to the entire transaction, including all its 
consequences in totality.129  The duty to obtain informed consent rests with the treating or 
operating medical practitioner or treating health care practitioner.130 
The above principles relating to informed consent were accepted by the South African 
judiciary in the landmark case of Castell v De Greef.131  The effect of this decision is of 
significance with regard to the doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law, 
for the following reasons:  (i) importing and accepting the doctrine of informed consent into 
South African medical law; (ii) ousting medical paternalism in favour of patient autonomy; 
(iii) viewing the lack of informed consent as an issue of assault and not negligence and (iv) 
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establishing the yardstick of the ‘’reasonable patient’’ test for informed consent as opposed 
to that of the ‘’reasonable doctor test.’132 
1.6  Professional and other guidelines  
Medical guidelines serve as a yardstick for the professional conduct of all medical 
practitioners who are registered with their regulatory body.  According to Dickens and Cook, 
guidelines serve to guide medical practitioners in their daily clinical and ethical practice but 
are not a rigid set of rules.133  Failure to comply with ethical guidelines would be a factor 
that a court would take into account when assessing dolus or culpa.134  In addition it is 
submitted that guidelines although not directly legally binding have the effect of improving 
patient care if there is compliance with them to a great extent.135 
In South Africa, there are two sets of guidelines relevant to this thesis topic.  The first is the 
National Contraception Clinical Guidelines issued by the Department of Health and the 
second is the General Ethical Guidelines for Reproductive Health issued by the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa.  There are no guidelines specifically dealing with 
sterilisations that have been issued by the South African Nursing Council. 
1.6.1  Guidelines issued by the Department of Health 
The National Contraception Clinical Guidelines were amended in 2012 in light of the 
background of the HIV epidemic.136  The guidelines were drawn in consultation with the 
World Health Organisation and makes specific provision for contraception and HIV.137  Apart 
from discussing various contraceptive options available to HIV positive women it specifically 
states that sterilisation for males or females is appropriate only for individuals or couples 
who have been thoroughly counselled about the procedure and are certain that they never 
wish to have more children in the future and who have considered the implications 
thoroughly.  The decision to be sterilised should be voluntary and fully informed, with 
patients being cognisant of their sexual and reproductive health rights.  While HIV status 
may affect a patient’s decision to choose sterilisation, they should never be coerced into 
doing so.138 
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1.6.2  Guidelines issued by the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
The Health Professions Council of South Africa is a statutory body which regulates all health 
professions in the country.139  The Health Professions Council of South Africa has General 
Ethical Guidelines for Reproductive Health.140  The purpose of the guidelines is to guide and 
direct the practice of health care practitioners.141  It is important to note that misconduct by 
a registered health care professional will be measured against deviation from these 
guidelines.142  In summary, medical practitioners who are involved in the sterilisation 
procedure should encourage patients to include other appropriate persons in the 
counselling process, medical care should not be withheld from the patient in exchange for 
the patient’s agreement to undergo sterilisation, the personal beliefs of the medical 
practitioner should not play a role in urging a patient to be sterilised and the number of 
children that the patient has should not be a factor that is taken into account to coerce 
sterilisation.143  
1.7  Remedies for addressing the forced or coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV 
From the literature above it has been established that women are being sterilised forcibly or 
coercively in South Africa for a different number of reasons despite there being legislation 
and guidelines that protect women from being sterilised without their informed consent. 
The effects of a forced or coerced ending to a woman’s reproductive ability may lead to 
extreme social isolation, family discord or abandonment, fear of medical professionals, and 
lifelong grief.144  It is therefore necessary to consider the legal remedies available to them to 
ensure that the transgression of their rights do not go unnoticed and there is accountability 
on the part of the transgressor/s.   
1.7.1  Civil law remedies by claiming civil damages 
Women who have been sterilised forcibly or coercively may invoke the provisions of section 
12 (2) of the Constitution145 to seek redress by claiming damages.  A plaintiff who wishes to 
claim damages must establish liability under the actio iniuriarum for the invasion of their 
dignity and bodily integrity.146  They also have the option of instituting a claim under the 
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Aquilian action for patrimonial loss.  Finally, they could also proceed with a claim for general 
damages which includes damages for pain and suffering, as well as for future medical 
expenses.147  
The Equality Court may also be approached for relief.  Every High Court is an Equality Court 
for the area of its jurisdiction.148   Certain designated Magistrate’s Courts also function as 
Equality Courts.149  The Equality Courts have the power to order payment of any damages in 
respect of any proven financial loss, including future loss or in respect of impairment of 
dignity, pain and suffering or emotional and psychological suffering, as a result of unfair 
discrimination, hate speech or harassment in question.150 
1.7.2  Criminal law remedies 
A woman who has been forcibly or coercively sterilised also has recourse in terms of 
criminal law.  A charge of assault may be laid against a doctor who performed the procedure 
without informed consent of the patient.  Furthermore, a contravention of the provisions of 
the Sterilisation Act may attract criminal liability, in instances of a successful prosecution.151  
Further, the Equality Court can make an order directing the Clerk of the Equality Court to 
submit the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the possible 
institution of criminal proceedings in terms of the common law or relevant legislation.152 It 
is thus evident that a criminal prosecution may arise from a complaint that is lodged in the 
Equality Court. 
1.8  Administrative remedies 
1.8.1  Health Professions Council of South Africa 
Should misconduct on the part of the medical practitioner be alleged when a woman has 
been sterilised forcibly or coercively, a complaint may be lodged by the patient or their legal 
representative with the Health Professions Council of South Africa.153 An investigation into 
the complaint will then be undertaken by the Council and a finding made.   
1.8.2  South African Nursing Council 
Forcing a patient to sign a consent for a surgical procedure is regarded as an act of 
professional misconduct by the South African Nursing Council.154  A written complaint must 
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be made to the South African Nursing Council about the alleged misconduct on the part of 
the nursing sister.  An investigation into the complaint will then be undertaken by the 
Nursing Council and a finding made.   
1.8.3  South African Human Rights Commission 
A woman who has been forcibly or coercively sterilised may also lodge a complaint with the 
South African Human Rights Commission to obtain appropriate redress.  The South African 
Human Rights Commission is a state institution that supports constitutional democracy.155  
It can be said that the functions of the South African Human Rights Commission are 
threefold.  First, the Commission must monitor and assess the observance of human rights 
in the country.156  Second, it has the power to investigate the violation of human rights and 
take the necessary steps to secure appropriate redress for the complainant.157  Third, its 
function is to undertake advocacy.158 
1.8.4  The Commission for Gender Equality  
The Commission for Gender Equality is empowered by statute to entertain a complaint by 
women who have been forcibly or coercively sterilised.159  The functions of the Commission 
for Gender Equality are broad.  It includes the monitoring and evaluation of policies and 
practices of organs of state and other public bodies with the aim of promoting gender 
equality.160  Training and advocacy around gender equality is another core function of the 
Commission for Gender Equality.161  Complainants may be resolved through conciliation, 
negotiation, mediation or through referral to the Public Protector or South African Human 
Rights Commission.162   
1.8.5 The Public Protector 
The office of the Public Protector is established by section 181 (a) of the Constitution.163  
The Public Protector derives its independence from being subject to the Constitution and 
law only.164  In light of its autonomy, it is expected to carry out its work of investigating any 
improper, discourteous behaviour or abuse of power by a civil servant, without prejudice, 
fear or favour.165  Further, other organs of State are obliged to protect the effectiveness, 
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independence, impartiality and dignity of this office.166  The usefulness of this institution lies 
in the fact that orders of remedial action made by it, are binding in nature.167       
 1.9  Problem statement 
There are complexities associated with applying the civil, criminal and administrative law 
remedies to address the coerced and forced sterilisation of women living with HIV.  These 
complexities may impact on the ability of the women to access justice, they include: 
(i)  Prescription- in terms of section 11 (d) of the Prescription Act,168 a woman who has been 
sterilised forcibly or coercively has a period of three years from the date on which the claim 
arose to institute action.  The biggest challenge facing women who have been sterilised 
forcibly or coercively is that they are unaware that being sterilised without their informed 
consent amounts to a violation of their bodily integrity and hence most claims have 
prescribed.   
(ii)  Costs-the legal costs of instituting a civil action may be a deterrent to women who have 
been sterilised forcibly or coercively as they may not have the means to litigate in the High 
Court.  There is no state legal aid for this type of case.   
(iii)  Lack of legal literacy-the lack of advocacy specifically around the issue of forced or 
coercive sterilisation is evident from the narratives provided by the women who have been 
sterilised forcibly or coercively.  The affected women were unaware that this amounted to a 
violation of their human rights and further that a number of legal remedies exist to bring 
relief to them.  
(iv)  The lack of a precedent dealing with discriminatory sterilisations.  No civil case 
anywhere in the world has proven discrimination- In the case of LM and Others v 
Government of the Republic of Namibia169 the court was called upon to decide on two 
issues: firstly, whether the three plaintiff’s had given their informed consent to the 
sterilisation procedures and secondly,  whether they were discriminated against due to their 
HIV status.170 The second claim was summarily dismissed by the judge on the basis that 
there was no credible and convincing evidence that the sterilisation procedures had been 
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performed on them simply because they were HIV positive.171  No further reasons were 
given for dismissing the claim.172 
(v)  The use of the criminal law is burdened by the requirement of proving intention.  The                                                                                                                      
State is faced with the onerous burden of proving intention on the part of the doctor.  If the 
doctor is in possession of a signed consent form it is difficult to prove that the doctor had 
the intention to sterilise the patient without obtaining her informed consent.  Victory for a 
complainant in these types of matters may also be hollow as criminal courts do not readily 
order compensation in the form of damages. 
1.10  Research questions 
The key research question in this dissertation is: are the legal remedies to address the 
forced or coerced sterilisation in South Africa adequate to ensure that there is access to 
justice for affected women?  Sub-questions include: 
 
i) Which of the existing legal remedies are most appropriate to address the rights 
violations within this context? 
ii) What are the strengths, weaknesses and gaps within the current legal framework, 
which are exposed by this particular rights violation? 
iii) Is the law on informed consent adequate to address the coerced and forced 
sterilisation of HIV positive women? 
iv) Is it possible to prove that individuals or classes of women are being discriminated 
against on the basis of their HIV status when they are coerced or forced into being 
sterilised? and 
v) Is law reform needed to comprehensively address this rights violation?  
1.11  Research methodology  
This thesis will not be based on an empirical study. Instead, it will be based on a desktop 
review of the relevant legal materials and secondary sources. Interviews with experts for 
first-hand information was also sought.  The legal principles, rules and arguments set out in 
these materials will be analysed and discussed in a coherent, concise and critical manner. In 
other words, this thesis will be based on a qualitative review of the relevant literature. 
1.12 Limitations of the study 
The study will focus on the South African situation but will make some reference to Kenya 
and Namibia. These two countries have been selected as examples as they are both African 
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countries with similar health care systems and problems and they are the only other two 
countries in the continent in which litigation in issue has been undertaken and currently 
underway.  Whilst the legislative framework examined is that of South Africa, there is also 
reference to relevant regional and international instruments. 
1.13  Structure of the thesis  
Chapter 1 provides the introduction which sets the scene for the whole thesis providing a 
background to the topic of forced sterilisation. This background is followed by a 
presentation of the research problem statement, research questions and methodology, and 
limitations of the study.  Core literature and legislation are referred to. The legal responses 
to the forced and coerced sterilisation from selected jurisdictions make up the second 
chapter.  The right to bodily and psychological integrity, the right to dignity and equality are 
dealt with in chapters three and four respectively.  Chapter 5 focuses on the legal remedies.  
The extent to which these remedies provide access to justice is set out in chapter 6 and the 
conclusion is provided for in chapter 7.   
1.14  Conclusion 
Women with HIV form part of a marginalised group facing intersectional discrimination in 
society.  There is a need to address the difficulties that these women experience in trying to 
access justice when their rights are violated during childbirth.  This thesis aims to contribute 
to the debate on the forced and coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV by critically 
examining the legal remedies available to them.  Limited work has been done on assessing 
the most appropriate way forward, to firstly ensure that this practice stops and secondly by 
providing redress to affected women.    It also aims to contribute to this debate by assessing 
whether the current system would facilitate access to justice for the affected women. 
Although this study focuses on South Africa, it is argued that the framework it creates could 
be used to evaluate other legal frameworks and their ability to provide justice for affected 
women.  
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Chapter 2 
Legal responses to forced and coerced sterilisation from                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
selected jurisdictions 
2.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the sterilisation of women for an array of arbitrary and 
unconvincing reasons which were discriminatory in nature and undertaken without the 
obtaining of their informed consent, was introduced.  This unlawful act is a significant 
human rights violation against women particularly those who fall into marginalised groups.  
The core focus area of this dissertation is to examine the legal remedies available to HIV 
positive women who have been sterilised without their consent simply because they are 
infected with HIV.  In doing so, I will begin by discussing the international legal responses to 
this issue in Slovakia, Namibia, Kenya as well as South Africa. 
This chapter examines the experiences of Slovakian women who have used a wide range of 
advocacy and legal remedies to address the forced and coerced sterilisation of Romani 
women.  They ultimately used the regional human rights system by approaching the 
European Court of Human Rights.  Slovakia has been identified as a useful case study even 
though the women were sterilised not because they were HIV positive but because they 
belonged to a minority ethnic group.  It is a good example of the use of the civil law after 
protracted advocacy interventions failed.  The claims made in the successful Slovakian cases 
were based on the twin averments of a lack of informed consent and unfair discrimination.  
There were also attempts in Slovakia to use the criminal law as a means of redress but this 
was unsuccessful.   
This chapter also deals with legal responses in Namibia, Kenya and South Africa.  They have 
been selected as they deal directly with the forced or coerced sterilisation of women living 
with HIV.  In these countries three strategies stand out and will be focused on in this 
chapter.  They are firstly, the use of litigation, secondly, the establishment of commissions 
of enquiry and thirdly research and documentation of cases of forced and coerced 
sterilisation.     
2.2  Civil claims using regional human rights mechanisms  
The practice of forcibly or coercively sterilising women has also found favour with some 
countries where the underlying reason was to prevent women from procreating because of 
undesirable hereditary ethnic characteristics.   
2.2.1  Slovakia 
In 2002 a human rights fact finding mission was conducted by two Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) namely the Center for Reproductive Rights in conjunction with the 
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Centre for Civil and Human Rights.1 The fact finding mission was published as a 
comprehensive study.2  The data for this study was collected through interviews with 
approximately 230 Romani women in parts of eastern Slovakia where there are a large 
concentration of Romani settlements.3  The core areas covered in these interviews were the 
reproductive health rights of women focusing in particular on sterilisation practices; 
treatment of women at maternal health care facilities by health care professionals and 
access to information on reproductive health care.4 
The Body and Soul Report5 encapsulated the findings of the study.  It found that the 
discrimination of Romani women has spanned over several centuries and in modern times 
the discrimination has been in the form of a policy of forced sterilisations dating back to the 
Nazi regime.6  An example of this was a 1933 law passed by Germany during its occupation 
of  Czechoslovakia, which permitted the ongoing forced sterilisation of Roma women and 
others who were considered ‘’undesirable’’.7  This practice also found favour during the 
Communist times in Czechoslovakia8 when Romani women were targeted through 
government laws and programmes which provided monetary incentives and condoned the 
fact that women were being coerced into being sterilised by misinformation.9 There were 
also coercive methods used by successive governments and health care practitioners which 
can be divided into three broad categories.  The first being where the government offered 
financial incentives to Roma women in the form of money or coupons to buy furniture.10  
The second was where some doctors only agreed to perform certain medical services if 
there was agreement by the patient to be sterilised.11  The third category was where 
women provided their consent after being given misleading information regarding their 
health. The study showed that Romani women who were giving birth by caesarean section 
were sterilised under the false notion that having multiple caesareans would very likely lead 
to a ruptured uterus and the possible death of themselves or the baby.12    
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V. C. v Slovakia13  
In the case of V. C. v Slovakia14 the applicant became aware that a sterilisation did not 
amount to life-saving surgery after the publication and widespread release of The Body and 
Soul Report in January 2003.  She was made to believe by the health care personnel at 
Presov Hospital that her full and informed consent was not required as a pre-cursor to the 
sterilisation procedure.15   
(i)  Facts  
VC was 20 years old at the time that the sterilisation took place.  Her highest standard of 
education was grade 6 and she spoke a Roma language together with a local dialect.  The 
sterilisation took place in the year 2000 at the Presov Hospital during the delivery of her 
second child by caesarean section. VC was admitted to hospital just before 08h00 in 
prolonged labour and in a lot of pain.  The delivery record indicated that VC requested to be 
sterilised at 10h30.  The consent was obtained after she was informed by the doctor that in 
her next pregnancy either she or her baby would die.  In response to this, VC purportedly 
agreed when she said ‘’do what you want to do’’ as the delivery record had the typed words 
‘’patient requests sterilisation’’.  The delivery record also made reference to the fact that 
the ‘’patient is of Roma origin’’.  VC’s signature on the consent form was reportedly in an 
unsteady hand.  After the procedure VC was accommodated in a room where there were 
only women of Roma ethnic origin.  VC was prevented from using the same ablution 
facilities as non-Roma women.16   
(ii)  Issues before the court 
The following issues were raised before the European Court of Human Rights. 
a)  Whether the sterilisation performed on VC was in contravention of Slovakian legislation 
and international human rights standards that is, without her informed consent?17 
b) Whether the Slovakian Government acted in a discriminatory manner by coercing Roma 
women into being sterilised? 
                                                            
13 Application no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights available at http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/ 
orig/11_6/V.C..pdf accessed on 1 July 2015. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid at para 27.   
16 Ibid at paras 9-18. 
17 Ibid at para 28. 
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In advancing her claim that she was sterilised without her informed consent, VC relied on 
Articles 3,18 8,19 1220 and 1321 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter 
referred to the Convention)22. VC also relied on Article 523 of the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine24 and the domestic Slovakian legislation on sterilisation25. 
In putting forward the claim of discrimination VC relied on the provisions of Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights which makes provision for ‘’the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’’26   
 
                                                            
18 Article 3 states that ‘’no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.’’ 
19 Article 8 (1) provides that ‘’everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life and 8(1) states 
that there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except as in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interest of security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’’ 
20 Article 12 states that ‘’men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.’’ 
21 Article 13 makes provision for ‘’everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’’ 
22 Came into force in 1953 and gives effect to certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights available at http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts, accessed on the 26 December 
2016. 
23 An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and 
informed consent to it. This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and 
nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.  The person concerned may freely 
withdraw consent at any time. 
24 Available at  https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId 
=090000168007 cf98, accessed on 26 December 2016.   
25 The relevant legislative material from the Sterilisation Regulation, 1972 is section 2 and point XIV of the 
Annex to the 1972 Sterilisation Regulation.  Section 2 ‘’permitted sterilisation in a medical institution, either at 
the request of the person concerned or with that person’s consent where, inter alia, the procedure was 
necessary according to the rules of medical science for the treatment of a person’s reproductive organs 
affected by disease (section 2 (a)), or where the pregnancy or birth would seriously threaten the life or health 
of a woman whose reproductive organs were not affected by disease (section 2(b)).  Point XIV indicated the 
following as obstetric-gynaecological reasons justifying a woman’s sterilisation: 
i) During and after a repeat caesarean section, where this method of delivery was necessary for reasons which 
were most likely to persist during a further pregnancy and when the woman concerned did not wish to deliver 
again via Caesarean section. 
ii) In the event of repeated complications during pregnancy, in the course of delivery and in the subsequent six-
week period, where a further pregnancy would seriously threaten the woman’s life or health. 
iii) Where a woman had several children (four for women under the age of 35 and three for women over that 
age. O Lenczewska ‘The fine line between the ‘medically necessary’ and the degrading: A Study of the Case of 
V.C. v. Slovakia’, (nd), available at https://www.google.co.za/ 
search?q=v+c+v+slovakia&oq=v+c++v+slovakia&aqs=chrome..69i57.18021j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-
8#q=v+c+v+slovakia+olga+lenczewska accessed on 26 December 2016. 
26 European Convention on Human Rights.   
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(iii)  Prior Proceedings 
VC approached the European Court of Human Rights in 2007.  The lower courts found that 
there was no violation of certain of VC’s human rights.27 
(iv)  Judgment 
With regard to the first issue, which is the failure to obtain informed consent, VC relied on 
the alleged breach of Article 3 (to be free from torture) and Article 8 (the right to a private 
life) of the Convention.28  Even though the Court found that VC had given written consent to 
the caesarean section and sterilisation being performed on her it found that this was 
inadequate for a number of reasons which are explained below.   
Firstly, the consent was obtained two and a half hours after she had been brought into 
hospital, whilst in labour and lying on a stretcher.29  This trilogy of events, the court found 
was not compatible with the principles of respect for human freedom as embodied in the 
Convention and the requirement of informed consent as set out in other international 
treaties.30  In addition, the court found that the conditions under which the applicant had 
consented to be sterilised was not conducive to decision-making.31  It was further held that 
the behaviour of the hospital staff was paternalistic, since, in practice, the applicant was not 
offered any option but to agree to the procedure which the doctors considered necessary in 
view of her situation.32  The applicant’s informed consent, which was obtained whilst in 
advanced labour, could not be vitiated by the hospital staff’s assumption that she would in 
future act in an irresponsible manner with regards to her protecting her reproductive 
health.33  
The sterilisation procedure performed on her without her informed consent thus amounted 
to a form of violence against women.34  In response, the respondent maintained as it did in 
all of its submissions, that there was no practice of targeted discrimination of women of 
Roma ethnic origin in hospitals in Slovakia and that the sterilisation was performed at the 
request of the applicant who signed for the procedure.35 
The severity of the treatment that the applicant was subjected to by the hospital staff 
brought it within the ambit of Article 3, that is, the absence of obtaining informed consent 
                                                            
27 O Lenczewska ‘The fine line between the ‘medically necessary’ and the degrading: A Study of the Case of 
V.C. v. Slovakia’, (nd), available at https://www.google.co.za/ 
search?q=v+c+v+slovakia&oq=v+c++v+slovakia&aqs=chrome..69i57.18021j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-
8#q=v+c+v+slovakia+olga+lenczewska, accessed on 26 December 2016. 
28 Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts, accessed on the 26 December 2016.  
29 Ibid at para 111. 
30 Ibid at para 112. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at para 114. 
33 Ibid at para 113. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid at paras 172-173. 
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from her amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment.36  In concluding that the medical 
staff’s conduct towards the applicant was in violation of Article 3, the Court stated that 
although there was no indication that the medical staff acted with the intention of ill-
treating the applicant, they nevertheless acted with gross disregard to her right to 
autonomy and choice as a patient.37  The court looked in detail at what would qualify as 
being ‘’inhuman’’ and ‘’degrading’’ treatment in the context of medical treatment.  It held 
that the humiliation or suffering experienced by the person must go beyond that 
experienced by patients receiving a legitimate form of treatment.38  It was also held that 
where a mentally competent adult patient refuses medical treatment, even though this 
would be to their detriment, this decision must be respected as the imposition of such 
medical treatment on the patient would amount to a violation of that patient’s right to 
physical integrity.39  The court noted that: 
 Sterilisation constitutes a major interference with a person’s reproductive health status.  As 
 it concerns one of the essential bodily functions of human beings, it bears on manifold 
 aspects of the individual’s personal integrity including his or her physical and mental well-
 being and emotional, spiritual and family life.40  
Building on the above statement, the majority of the court held that the imposition of 
medical treatment on a mentally competent adult patient is in direct contrast with the 
fundamental principles of the Convention, that is, the respect for human freedom and 
dignity.41  In addition, the court held that in this instance the sterilisation could not be 
regarded as life-saving treatment and hence the consent of the applicant could not be 
dispensed with.42  The court held that there was no indication from the hospital records that 
the applicant was advised about her medical condition, the procedure to be performed on 
her and whether any alternatives to being sterilised existed.43   
In response to the applicant’s submission that she had been subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment, the Slovak Government denied the existence of any policy or practice 
aimed at the sterilisation of women of Roma ethnic origin.44  A further submission by the 
Slovakian Government was that the sterilisation was necessary in view of protecting the 
health of the applicant and that the applicant was informed of the situation orally and had 
confirmed this with her signature.45   
                                                            
36 Ibid at para 119. 
37 Ibid. 
38 V. C. v Slovakia Application no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights at para 104.   
39 Ibid at para 105. 
40 Ibid at para 106. 
41 Ibid at para 107. 
42 Ibid at para 110. 
43 Ibid at para 112. 
44 Ibid at para 92. 
45 Ibid at paras 93- 94. 
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The submissions made by an amicus the International Federation of Gynaecology and 
Obstetrics (FIGO) with the permission of the President of the Court is worthy of mention.46    
Its submissions were that it supported, in line with the relevant international instruments, 
informed and freely given consent of patients.  Where a patient is intellectually capable of 
reproductive self-determination their consent must be given prior to their treatment in 
accordance with the ethical requirements.47  The implications of the proposed treatment 
should be made clear to the patient’s satisfaction in advance of its performance, particularly 
when the proposed treatment had permanent effects on future child-bearing and the 
founding of a family.48  Further, the process of informed choice had to be preceded by 
informed consent to surgical sterilisation.49  The submissions also advocated for information 
being provided on recognised available alternatives, especially reversible forms of 
contraceptives which might be equally effective.50   
In evaluating the submissions made by the parties the court noted that the sterilisation of 
the applicant grossly interfered with her physical integrity as she was deprived of her 
reproductive functions at 20 years of age which is an extremely early stage in her 
reproductive life:51  
 The sterilisation procedure, including the manner in which the applicant was requested to 
 agree to it, was liable to arouse in her feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority and to 
 entail lasting suffering.  As to the last mentioned point in particular, owing to her 
 infertility, the applicant experienced difficulties in her relationship with  her partner and, 
 later, husband.  She indicated her infertility as one of her reasons for her divorce in 
 2009.  The applicant suffered serious medical and psychological  after-effects from the 
 sterilisation procedure, which included the symptoms of a false pregnancy and  
 required treatment by a psychiatrist.  Owing to her inability to have more children the 
 applicant has been ostracised by the Roma community.52  
The Court held that, taking into account the Conventions that Slovakia was bound to at that 
relevant time the prior informed consent of the patient could not be dispensed with unless 
there was an actual medical emergency.53     
The Court then turned to examine the impact of the failure to obtain informed consent to 
the sterilisation which had been argued was a violation of Article 8 (right to a private life) of 
the Convention.  The applicant submitted that her right to a family life was severely 
                                                            
46 FIGO’s aim is to promote the health and well-being of women worldwide and to improve the practice of 
gynaecology and obstetrics. Ibid at para 96. 
47 Ibid at para 97. 
48 Ibid at para 97. 
49 Ibid at para 98. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid at para 116. 
52 Ibid at para 118. 
53 Ibid at para 108. 
30 
 
compromised by the sterilisation procedure and that she could not undergo in-vitro 
fertilisation citing religious and financial reasons.54   
In response the Slovak Government stood firm in their stance that the sterilisation was 
undertaken because of medical reasons, the applicant’s consent had been procured and 
that the possibility of in-vitro sterilisation was an option.55  Their response to these 
allegations were similar to the ones put forward in defence of their alleged violation of 
Article 3 save for the submission that they were prepared to cover the costs for an in-vitro 
fertilisation.56 
In assessing the submissions made by the parties the Court began by stating that:-  
 Private life is a broad term, encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an individual’s physical, 
 psychological and social identity such as the right to personal autonomy and personal 
 development, the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and 
 the right to respect for both decisions to have and not to have a child.57 
The Court held that the purpose of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary 
interference by public authorities.58  Since there are two parts to Article 8, any interference 
under the first paragraph of Article 8 must be justified in terms of the second paragraph, 
namely as being ‘’in accordance with the law’’ and ‘’necessary in a democratic society’’ for 
one or more of the legitimate aims listed therein.59  In this instance the Court held that the 
applicant’s rights were infringed as the sterilisation affected her reproductive health status 
and had repercussions for various aspects of her family and private life.60 
The Court also observed that the Slovakian 1972 Sterilisation Regulation and the Health 
Care Act 199461 required patients’ consent prior to a medical intervention.62  However, it is 
evident that these provisions, in view of their interpretation and implementation in the 
applicant’s case did not provide appropriate consent safeguards.63  Conversely, it allowed 
the occurrence of a situation where an intervention of a particularly serious nature was 
performed without the applicant’s informed consent as defined in the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine to which Slovakia was bound at the relevant time.64   
                                                            
54 Ibid at para 134. 
55 Ibid at para 137. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid at para 138. 
58 Ibid at para 139. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid at para 143. 
61 Section 13 (1) made medical treatment subject to the patient’s consent.  A patient’s consent to medical 
procedures of a particularly serious character or which substantially affected a person’s future life had to be 
given in writing or in any other provable manner.  Ibid at para 66. 
62 Ibid at 152. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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With regards to the second issue, namely whether the Slovakian Government acted in a 
discriminatory manner by violating article 1465 (right to equality) and  coercing Roma 
women into being sterilised, the applicant averred that her ethnic origin played a vital role 
in the decision by the health care personnel to sterilise her.66  The applicant submitted that 
this must not be looked at in isolation but rather in the light of the sterilisation policies and 
practices that existed under the communist regime and the widespread intolerance towards 
the Roma in Slovakia.67  With regards to the alleged discrimination based on the grounds of 
sex the applicant averred that the failure by health services to accommodate the 
fundamental biological differences between men and women in reproduction was in breach 
of the prohibition on discrimination on the ground of sex.68  
FIGO also deemed it prudent to make submissions on the issue of discrimination.  FIGO 
found that the practice of physicians performing a sterilisation procedure as an adjunct to a 
caesarean section to be unethical because he / she has deemed it to be in the patient’s best 
interest.69  This could only be appropriate where the physician had fully discussed the 
matter with the patient and received her consent voluntarily.70  FIGO also submitted that 
given the irreversible nature of many sterilisation procedures, physicians should not allow 
any language, cultural or other differences between themselves and their patients to leave 
the latter unaware of the nature of the sterilisation procedures being proposed to them and 
for which they were requested to provide prior consent.71 
The European Court of Human Rights nevertheless held that it would be most feasible to 
examine the allegation of discrimination in conjunction with Article 8.72  The Court’s 
reasoning behind this approach was that the discrimination complained of affected one of 
the applicant’s essential bodily functions and entailed several adverse consequences for 
herself, in particular her private and family life.73  Although the Court accepted that 
information placed before it indicated that there was a practice of sterilising women from 
various ethnic groups without their informed consent, it could not be held conclusively that 
the doctors had acted in bad faith towards the applicant with the intention of ill-treating 
her.74  The majority of the Court was not convinced that there was an organised policy in 
place by the hospital and its staff to target racial minorities.75  The Court however found 
                                                            
65 Makes provision for the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or status.  
66 V. C. v Slovakia Application no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights at para 170.   
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid at para 171. 
69 Ibid at para 175. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid at para 176. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid at para 177.  
75 Ibid. 
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that in light of its findings made in terms of Article 8 it was not necessary to make a separate 
finding with regards to the issue of discrimination.76   
In a minority judgment it was held that the very essence of the case was the discriminatory 
treatment that the applicant was subjected to.77  The learned Judge also expressed her 
dissatisfaction at the scant attention that was paid to the discrimination that the applicant 
was subjected to.78  The Judge made special reference to the words ‘’patient is of Roma 
origin’’ that appeared on the medical file.79  The Judge went on to say that for the Court to 
rule that there were violations in terms of Article 3 and 8 only was tantamount to reducing 
the applicant’s case to a once off occurrence whereas it was obvious that there existed a 
general State policy of sterilisation of Roma women under the communist regime.80  The 
Judge stated that:- 
 The fact that there are other cases of this kind pending before the Court reinforces my 
 personal conviction that the sterilisations performed on Roma women were not of an 
 accidental nature, but relics of a long-standing attitude towards the Roma minority in 
 Slovakia.  To my mind, the applicant was ‘’marked out’’ and observed as a patient who had 
 to be sterilised just because of her origin, since it was obvious that there were no medically 
 relevant reasons for sterilising her.  In my view that represents the strongest form of 
 discrimination and should have led to a finding of a violation of Article 14 in connection with 
 the violations found of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.81  
(v)  Remedy 
In respect of non-pecuniary damage the Court awarded VC 31 000 euros as opposed to the 
50 000 euros claimed and 12 000 euros in respect of legal costs as opposed to the 
38 930.43 euros claimed. 
 
Two further cases similar to that of VC, were heard by the European Court of Human Rights 
dealing with the involuntary sterilisation of Romani women.82  The judgments in these cases 
are substantially similar to the VC case and therefore not dealt with in any detail in this 
dissertation.  
 
 
                                                            
76 Ibid at para 179. 
77 Ibid at page 44.  
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid at pages 44-45. 
82 N.B. vs. Slovakia available at  https://www.poradna-prava.sk/site/assets/files/1151/n-b-v-slovakia.pdf    
and I. G and Others vs. Slovakia available at https://www.poradna-prava.sk/en/documents/decision-of-the-
european-court-of-human-rights-in-the-case-of-i-g-and-others-vs-slovakia/. In both of these cases three of the 
women were minors and the consent of their guardians was not obtained before the sterilisations. 
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2.3  Civil claims in a national court relying on international and national law  
2.3.1  Kenya 
SWK and Others v Médecins Sans Frontières and Others 83  
There has only been one sterilisation case that has relied on both international and national 
law. This matter is currently being heard by the High Court of Kenya regarding the coerced 
sterilisation of four HIV positive women.  This matter has been set down for trial on the 27 
and 30 April 2018.84  The litigation was a by-product of research conducted by an NGO the 
Africa Gender and Media Initiative Trust (GEM).85  The study documented the sterilisation 
experiences of 40 HIV positive women who lived in the Nairobi and Kakamega counties.86 
Following publicity on the outcome of the studies, litigation was initiated by the Kenya Legal 
and Ethical Issues Network on HIV and Aids (KELIN) and GEM.  The affected women were 
SWK, PAK, GWK and AMM.  The Respondents were Médecins Sans Frontières, France (MSF), 
Pumwani Maternity Hospital, Marie Stopes International, County Executive Committee 
Member In Charge of Health Services, Nairobi County and Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of 
Health. 
Kenya has no specific health or sterilisation legislation in place that serves to regulate the 
issue of informed consent before a sterilisation procedure is carried out.  KELIN and GEM 
placed reliance on the National Family Planning Guidelines for Service Providers (2010) 
which emphasises the issue of voluntary and informed consent by a women prior to a 
sterilisation procedure being carried out.87  The Guidelines further note that:- 
 Special care must be taken to ensure that every client who chooses this method does so 
 voluntarily and is fully informed about the permanence of this method and the availability of 
 alternative, long acting, highly effective methods.  Further, the guidelines caution service 
 providers against providing any incentive for one to accept any form of contraception or in 
 recruiting potential clients to perform surgical operations.88 
With very little domestic law to provide guidance within Kenya KELIN and GEM further 
relied on the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) Guidelines on 
female contraceptive sterilisation to plead their case.  The Guidelines are extremely useful 
to medical personnel and are worthy of mention in order to demonstrate what norms and 
                                                            
83 Available at http://www.kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Petition-605-Court-Order-July-22-
2016.pdf.   
84 Personal e-mail communication with Tabitha G Tsaoya, Deputy Executive Director –Kelin, on 21 December 
2017. 
85 SWK and Others v Médecins Sans Frontières and Others Petition No. 605 of 2014, in the High Court of Kenya 
at Nairobi Constitutional and Human Rights Division at para 30. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid para 54. 
88 Ibid.   
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standards should be observed by medical personnel before performing a sterilisation 
procedure.   
In terms of the Guidelines there are a number of minimum standards that must be adhered 
to including:- 
(i) A doctor may not sterilise a woman under the guise of a medical emergency in 
order to prevent future pregnancies and hence dispense with obtaining her full, 
free and informed consent;89 
(ii) The number of children that a woman has must not be used as a deciding factor 
by a doctor when sterilising a woman;90   
(iii) Access to medical care and treatment, for example treatment for HIV must not 
be made dependent on a woman agreeing to be sterilised;91   
(iv) Consent must not be obtained whilst a woman is in labour, or after an 
unpleasant experience of delivering her child; 
(v) A doctor cannot obtain consent for a sterilisation from a woman who is 
requesting a termination of pregnancy;92 and 
(vi) Where a sterilisation is performed as a non-emergency medical procedure in 
addition to the doctor obtaining comprehensive consent the woman must be 
made aware of alternatives to the procedure and the risks or benefits attached 
to it.93 
i)  Facts  
There are four litigants in this matter.  The first is SWK who attended the Blue House 
Mathare Clinic for pre-natal care.94  The Clinic was run by MSF.95  During SWK’s pre-natal 
visits to the Clinic she was advised by a nutritionist  that if she did not agree to be sterilised 
at the time of having her baby ‘’she would not qualify to receive food portions e.g. cooking 
oil, porridge and ugali flour and payment of the maternity bill at Pumwani Maternity 
Hospital.’’96  Shortly before being taken into theatre SWK was given a paper to sign which in 
essence was giving the medical practitioner consent to perform the caesarean section and 
sterilisation procedures respectively.97  She signed the consent form to the sterilisation on 
this basis. 
                                                            
89 Ibid 56. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid at paras 4 and 14. 
95 Ibid at para 4.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid at para 5. 
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A few days after being discharged from hospital she went to the Clinic to collect milk 
formula and was advised by the same nutritionist that she would only be able to access milk 
formula and other food items if she had proof that she had indeed been sterilised.98 
The second applicant, GWK’s case is similar to that of SWK.  GWK sought pre-natal care at 
the Blue House Mathare Clinic.99  GWK was in labour for 48 hours before being taken into 
theater and she was given a form by a nurse to sign to consent to a caesarean section.100 
Shortly before this, the nurse also enquired from GWK as to whether she was using any 
form of contraception.101  Whilst recovering in hospital she was informed by a ward nurse 
that she had been sterilised.102  The hospital fees for GWK were paid for by MSF and she had 
to obtain proof of the sterilisation in order to qualify for food portions and milk formula.103  
The third applicant PAK alleges that during her visit to the Blue House Mathare Clinic to 
collect milk formula and food portions she was told on repeated occasions that she should 
choose sterilisation as a means of family planning.104 She was informed that failure to agree 
to be sterilised would result in her not being eligible for the milk formula and food portions.  
Proof of being sterilised was a requirement.105  On the 8th June 2005 PAK underwent the 
procedure to be sterilised by signing a form.106  Being illiterate, PAK was unaware of the 
contents of the form and neither was the same explained to her.107   
The last applicant, AMM experienced the identical treatment as PAK whilst collecting milk 
formula for her baby from Pumwani Maternity Hospital.108 The nutritionist informed AMM 
that should she continue to give birth in the future this would compromise her immunity 
and she would die.109  AMM provided consent to the sterilisation procedure being 
performed on her on the 4th May 2005.110  Even though she signed the form she was 
unaware of its contents by virtue of the fact that she could not read nor were the contents 
explained to her.111  In addition no other information was offered to her about other family 
planning methods.112 
 
                                                            
98 Ibid at para 6.  
99 Ibid at para 4. 
100 Ibid at para 16. 
101 Ibid at para 15. 
102 Ibid at para 18.  
103 Ibid at paras 16 and 19. 
104 Ibid at para 10. 
105 Ibid at para 10. 
106 Ibid at para 11. 
107 Ibid.  
108 Ibid at para 21. 
109 Ibid at para 22. 
110 Ibid at para 23. 
111 Ibid.  
112 Ibid.  
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ii)  Petitioners’ pleadings 
KELIN and GEM relied on selected provisions of the Kenyan Constitution and International 
and National instruments to form the basis of their litigation against the Respondents.  It 
was alleged on behalf of the four women that their rights as afforded by the above laws and 
covenants had been violated by virtue of the unlawful sterilisation procedures carried out 
on them. 
The ten provisions of the Kenyan Constitution that are being relied upon by the petitioners 
to demonstrate the coercive sterilisations can be divided into personal rights and socio-
economic rights. 
They are basing their claims on seven personal rights.  The first, is a right to autonomy in 
terms of the right to life as enshrined in Article 26 (1); the right to equality and freedom 
from discrimination as under Article 27 (1-8); the right to human dignity and freedom and 
security of the person as contained in Articles 28 and 29 (d & f) respectively; the right to 
privacy encapsulated in Article 31 (a); Article 33 (1) which makes provision for the right to 
freedom of expression and specifically freedom to seek and receive information or ideas; 
the right to access information held by another person and required for the exercise or 
protection of any right or fundamental freedom as under Article 35 (1) (b).113 
The socio-economic rights being relied upon are the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health, which includes the right to health care services including reproductive health care 
as contained in Article 43 (1) (a); the rights of the consumer to be given services of 
reasonable quality, the information necessary for them to gain full benefit of the services, 
and protection of their health as in Article 46 (1) (a-c) of the Constitution; withholding 
medical treatment from the 1st Petitioner violated her right to life under Article 26 (1) and 
(3) , right to equality and non- discrimination under Article 27 (1-8) and the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care services, as 
under Article 43 (1) (a) of the Constitution of Kenya.114   
The petitioners are relying on international and regional human rights norms as Article 2 (5-
6) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010 makes provision for the general rules 
of international law and for provisions contained in any treaty or convention that has been 
ratified by Kenya to form part of the law of Kenya.115  
Arising from this authority, KELIN and GEM are relying on eight international legal 
instruments to demonstrate the core rights that are alleged to have been violated:-  
                                                            
113 Ibid at para 41. 
114 Ibid at para 41. 
115 Ibid at para 44. 
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i)  The right to the highest attainable standard of health which finds protection in the 
UDHR116, the ICESCR117 CEDAW118 ACHPR119 and the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol).120  
 ii)  The right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 
which finds protection in the UDHR121, ICCPR122, CAT123, ACHPR 124 and Maputo Protocol.125 
iii)  The right to dignity of the person which is protected by the UDHR126, the ACHPR127 and 
the Maputo Protocol.128  In addition, the Preamble of the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW and CAT 
recognises the inherent dignity of the human person. 
                                                            
116 Article 25, makes provision for everyone to enjoy the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
wellbeing of himself and of his family. 
117 Article 12 (1) states that the State Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.  Article 12 (2) the steps to be 
taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this right shall include 
those necessary for: (a) the provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child; …. (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness. 
118  Article 12, requires State Parties to ‚take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to 
health care services, including those related to family planning. 
119 Article 16, Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental 
health. 
120 State Parties shall ensure that the right to health of women, including sexual and reproductive health is 
respected and promoted. This includes:- (a) the right to control their fertility; (b) the right to decide whether to 
have children, the number of children and the spacing of children;  (c) the right to choose any method of 
contraception and (f) the right to have family planning education.  
121 Article 5, No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
122 Article 7, No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.  
123 Requires States to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of 
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction‛ and establishes the absolute and unqualified nature of the 
prohibition of torture. 
124 Article 5, All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited. 
125 Article 4(1), Every woman shall be entitled to respect for her life and the integrity and security of her 
person. All forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.  
126 Article 1, All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
127 Article 5, Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to 
the recognition of his legal status. 
128 Article 3, Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition and 
protection of her human and legal rights.  
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iv) The right to privacy or private life is afforded protection in the UDHR129, the ICCPR130 and 
the European Convention on Human Rights.131 
v) The right to informed consent and the right to information is specifically protected in the 
CEDAW132, the UDHR133, the ICCPR134, the ACHPR135 and the Maputo Protocol136. 
vi) The right to determine the number and spacing of one’s children finds specific protection 
in the CEDAW137 and the Maputo Protocol.138 
vii)  The right to be free from discrimination and right to equality which is found in the 
ICCPR139, the CEDAW140, the ACHPR141 and the Maputo Protocol.142 
In addition, the pleadings of the petitioners contained extracts from the reports by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESR) the body responsible for the 
interpretation and monitoring of the provisions of the ICESR and the Special Rapporteur to 
the United Nations.143  
                                                            
129 Article 12, No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence.  
130 Article 17(1), No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence. 
131 Article 8(1), Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence. 
Any interference with this right must be in accordance with the requirements of Article 8(2). 
132 Article 10(h), Requires State Parties to ensure that women have ‚access to specific educational information 
to help to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning.  
133 Article 19, Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers. 
134 Article 19(2), Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to 
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
135 Article 9(1), Every individual shall have the right to receive information.  
136 Article 14, also, States are obligated to ‚provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services, 
including information, education and communication programmes to women especially those in rural areas.  
137 Article 16(1)(e), Requires state parties to ensure that women have ‚the same rights to decide freely and 
responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and 
means to enable them to exercise these rights.  
138 Article 14(1)(b). 
139 Article 26, All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law and the law is to prohibit any discrimination on the above mentioned grounds. 
140 Article 12, Requires State Parties to ‚take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to 
health care services, including those related to family planning.  
141 Article 2, Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.  
Article 18(3), The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women.  
142 Article 2, Mandates the elimination of‚ discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, 
institutional and other measures.  
143 SWK and others v Médecins Sans Frontières and others Petition No. 605 of 2014, in the High Court of Kenya 
at Nairobi Constitutional and Human Rights Division at paras 46 - 48. 
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This matter has not been finalised at Court and further views of the pending case are 
provided in the discussion section of this chapter. 
2.4  Civil claims relying on national law – Namibia and South Africa 
2.4.1  LM and Others v The Government of Namibia144  
In this case it was common cause that all three women were HIV positive at the time that 
they were sterilised on different occasions at two State Hospitals in Namibia.145  
 i)  Facts 
The first plaintiff, LM, was 26 years old at the time of the sterilisation. LM was in hospital to 
deliver her third child (her first child was stillborn).146  On 13 June 2005, LM signed a form 
giving consent to an operation.  This form stated that she was to undergo a caesarean 
section and bilateral tubal ligation.147  The consent document was a single form for both 
procedures.148  She had been in labour for 14 to 15 hours before she was given the consent 
form to sign, 149 and it was signed by her whilst on a stretcher outside the theatre.150  The 
hospital records did not indicate the type of information that was given to LM as part of the 
consent process prior to the bilateral tubal ligation procedure.151  These same records also 
do not reflect whether she was given information on any alternative methods of 
contraception.152  In her testimony, LM indicated that a nurse told her that she was to be 
sterilised since all women who are HIV positive go through that procedure. 
The second plaintiff, MI, had previously given birth to two children.  On the 8 December 
2007 she was handed a standard consent form for an operation to sign. MI signed the form 
at the height of being in labour.  On the form it indicated that she was giving consent for a 
‘caesar +BTL due to previous caesar’.  She also signed a second separate consent form for 
the sterilisation (the BTL).  The form that she signed contained a space for the medical 
practitioner performing the operation to sign a pro forma statement indicating that they 
had explained the procedure and related aspects of sterilisation to the patient.  This section 
                                                            
144 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
In discussing this case I relied largely on the published article by Badul & Strode ‘LM and others v The 
Government of the Republic of Namibia: The first sub-Saharan African case dealing with coerced sterilisation of 
HIV-positive women – Quo vadis’ (2013) 13 African Human Rights Law Journal 223-238. 
145 The Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and others case no 49/2012 para 1, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NASC/2014/19.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
146 Badul & Strode ‘LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia: The first sub-Saharan African 
case dealing with coerced sterilisation of HIV-positive women – Quo vadis’ (2013) 13 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 223-238 at 226. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid.  
149 Ibid.  
150 Ibid.  
151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid.  
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of the form was left unsigned by the surgeon.  There were no hospital records to indicate 
that MI had received counselling on the proposed sterilisation and other alternative 
methods of contraception.  MI was told by the doctor that she was going to be sterilised 
whether she liked it or not.  The hospital staff also informed MI that there was a policy in 
place that all women living with HIV should be sterilised.153   
The third plaintiff NH, was 46 years old and had seven children.  On 13 October 2005, NH 
consented to a caesarean section and a bilateral tubal ligation.  This was done by signing a 
standard consent form to an operation and a second separate consent form giving consent 
to the sterilisation.  NH signed the forms after being in labour for a prolonged period and 
whilst on a stretcher waiting to go into theatre.  The hospital records indicate that NH was 
booked for an elective caesarean due to her advanced age, the number of previous 
deliveries, her HIV status and her prolonged labour.  The consent form included a signed pro 
forma statement from the surgeon confirming that he had explained the procedure and its 
related implications to the patient.154 
(ii)  Issues before the court 
The two core issues that had to be decided by both the High Court and Appeal Court were 
firstly whether the plaintiffs were sterilised without their informed consent and secondly, 
whether in doing so it was part of a wrongful and unlawful practice of discrimination against 
them on account of their HIV positive status.155 
(iii)  Prior proceedings 
The matter was first heard before the Namibian High Court.  In respect of the first issue that 
had to be decided upon, the Court held that in order to assess whether the patient had 
given informed consent to the procedure, it must be established whether they have been 
provided with adequate information to make an informed choice.156  The Court held that 
the Namibian government fell short in proving that they had provided sufficient information 
to the plaintiffs to enable them to make an informed choice on whether to be sterilised or 
not.  There appeared to be three reasons for this.  The first being that the notes made in the 
three hospital files of the affected women did not document the nature of the information 
that had been provided to them;157  there was also an absence of record keeping on 
whether they were informed of the alternatives to sterilisation.158  Secondly, two of the 
consent forms were an adequate reflection of the women’s agreement to the sterilisation, 
                                                            
153 Badul & Strode ‘LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia: The first sub-Saharan African 
case dealing with coerced sterilisation of HIV-positive women – Quo vadis’ (2013) 13 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 223-238 at 227. 
154 Ibid at 227-228. 
155 Ibid at 229. 
156 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia (I 1603/2008, I 3518/2008, I 3007/2008) [2012] 
NAHC 211 (30 July 2012) at para 16.   
157 Ibid at paras 20-23. 
158 Ibid. 
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and that the surgeon did not complete the second plaintiff’s form giving consent to be 
sterilised.  Thirdly, although the second and third plaintiffs’ health passports indicated that 
they wished to have a sterilisation whilst attending antenatal services, the Court held that 
this did not mean that they had consented to the actual procedure on the day of the 
surgery.159 
In relation to the second claim that the plaintiffs had been unfairly discriminated against, 
this was summarily dismissed by the judge on the basis that there was no credible and 
convincing evidence that the sterilisation procedures had been performed on them simply 
because they were HIV positive.160  No further reasons were given for dismissing the claim.  
iii)  Judgment  
Chief Justice Shivute writing the appeal judgment for the Supreme Court of Namibia 
poignantly stated at the outset of the judgment that:- 
 The Namibian Constitution affords every individual in Namibia the right to dignity, to 
 physical integrity, and to found a family. The right to found a family includes the right of 
 women of full age to bear children and of men and women to choose and plan the size of 
 their families. In the case of an unmarried woman, it is primarily her choice in the exercise of 
 her right to self-determination, whether or not to bear children. Against this background, 
 the decision of whether or not to be sterilised is of great personal importance to women. It 
 is a decision that must be made with informed consent, as opposed to merely written 
 consent. Informed consent implies an understanding and appreciation of one’s rights and 
 the risks, consequences and available alternatives to the patient. An individual must also be 
 able to make a decision regarding sterilisation freely and voluntarily.161  
The Appeal Court began by dealing with the findings of the Court a quo which relied on the 
case of Castell v De Greef162 which is considered to be the leading South African decision on 
informed consent.  The court a quo accepted the four requirements that must be met in 
order for consent to operate as a defence as was set out in Castell’s case.163  Before turning 
to the Court’s evaluation of the evidence and application of the law it is important to settle 
the issue regarding on whom the onus of proof rested.  In Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 
the Court held that the onus of establishing the defence of volenti non fit inuria rests on the 
defendant.164 The Supreme Court of Appeal’s discussion of the applicable law began with a 
                                                            
159 Ibid at paras 56 and 65. 
160 Ibid at para 83. 
161 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014) 
at para 3. 
162 Ibid at para 10. 
163 Ibid at para 13. 
164 Ibid at para 27. 
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discussion on informed consent.  The Court began by referring to the Ethical Guidelines for 
Health Professionals which is a product of the Health Professionals Council of Namibia.165 
Of importance is paragraph 2.8 of the Guidelines which deals with informed consent and 
states that ‘’everyone has the right to be given full information about the nature of his or 
her illness, diagnostic procedures, the proposed treatment and the costs involved’’.166  The 
Court in commenting on the Guidelines observed the following:- 
 The publication recognises the importance of the principles of informed consent and self-
 determination, stating a health professional should ‘apply the principle of informed consent 
 as an on-going process’ and that he or she should ‘honour patients’ rights to self-
 determination or to make their own informed choices, living their lives by their own beliefs, 
 values and preferences’.167 
The Appeal Court Judge also cited with endorsement the dictum of Mojapelo J in the 
Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others (Reproductive Health Alliance 
as Amicus Curiae) case.  The learned Judge Mojapelo when considering the issue of 
informed consent stated:- 
 The concept is, however, not alien to our common law. It forms the basis of the doctrine of 
 volenti non fit injuria that justifies conduct that would otherwise have constituted a delict or 
 crime if it took place without the victim’s informed consent. More particularly, day to day 
 invasive medical treatment, which would otherwise have constituted a violation of a 
 patient’s right to privacy and personal integrity, is justified and is lawful only because as a 
 requirement of the law, is performed with the patient’s informed consent.  It has come to be 
 settled in our law that in this context, the informed consent requirement rests on three 
 independent legs of knowledge, appreciation and consent.168 
In reinforcing what the doctrine of informed consent exactly entails the Court found it 
prudent to quote once more from the Christian Lawyers case where it stated that:- 
 In this context, valid consent can only be given by someone with the intellectual and 
 emotional capacity for the required knowledge, appreciation and consent. Because consent 
 is a manifestation of will, capacity to consent depends on the ability to form an intelligent 
 will on the basis of an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the act consented 
 to.169   
In applying the above case authority to the matter at hand Chief Justice Shivute deemed it 
necessary to determine whether the plaintiffs that had been sterilised possessed the 
                                                            
165 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014) 
at para 96. 
166 Ibid.  
167 Ibid at para 97.   
168 Ibid at para 98. 
169 Ibid at para 99. 
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requisite intellectual and emotional capacity whilst providing their informed consent.170 
This, had be considered in light of the peculiar circumstances that the plaintiffs had found 
themselves in when signing the consent forms.171  
In casu the health passports of all three plaintiffs failed to show what information had been 
provided to them by the doctors and nurses that were in attendance when the plaintiffs’ 
written informed consent was obtained.172  Further, despite there being an absence of 
documentation of information on the health passports of the plaintiffs the nurses and 
doctors maintained that there would have been a discussion of the risks inherent in a 
sterilisation procedure.173   
The Court succinctly stated that:- 
 In the absence of any detailed clinical notes regarding what was explained to the 
 respondents about sterilisation, it was unsurprising that the witnesses concerned proceeded 
 from the assumption that they had explained the nature and risks of sterilisation to the 
 respondents just because either their signatures appeared on the consent forms or there 
 were clinical notes bearing their handwriting. Such assumptions, however, are not borne out 
 by the evidence.174 
Of concern to the Supreme Court of Appeal was the opinion that the medical practitioners 
formed of the plaintiffs and in particular the third plaintiff regarding her choice of 
contraception.  One of the medical practitioners put it callously that ‘’BTL would provide a 
final solution to the respondent’s predicament.’’  The Supreme Court of Appeal’s response 
to this was ‘’ with great respect, this attitude smacks of medical paternalism.’’175  The Court 
stated that:- 
 The doctors who testified on behalf of the appellant seemed to agree that the third 
 respondent, especially, should be sterilised. Some of the comments made about her were 
 quite cutting, if not bordering on medical paternalism. She was, for example, described by 
 one of the doctors as being 'unreliable concerning her life care' and that it was felt that she 
 is ‘best helped if she never falls pregnant again'.  As indicated earlier, the third respondent 
 was also asked whether she had thought of 'the final solution' to her pregnancy in light of 
 her age, and was advised to ensure that her pregnancy 'should be the very last in her life'. It 
 may well be that the doctors’ evaluation of the third respondent was medically correct and 
 that the views expressed about her undoubtedly reflected a genuine concern for her well-
 being. However, by virtue of the application of the doctrine of informed consent, our law 
 and the policies applicable to Namibian health professionals recognise that the patient has 
                                                            
170 Ibid at para 100. 
171 Ibid.  
172 Ibid.  
173 Ibid.  
174 Ibid.  
175 Ibid at para 104. 
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 the final say in deciding whether or not she should undergo an elective medical 
 procedure.176  
Commenting on the issue of medical paternalism outweighing the notion of patient 
autonomy, the Supreme Court of Appeal endorsed the often cited quote from the 
unpublished doctoral thesis by Van Oosten which was also cited in the landmark decision of 
Castell v De Greef:- 
 There can be no place in this day and age for medical paternalism when it comes to the 
 important moment of deciding whether or not to undergo a sterilisation procedure. The 
 principles of individual autonomy and self-determination are the overriding principles 
 towards which our jurisprudence should move in this area of the law. These principles 
 require that in deciding whether or not to undergo an elective procedure, the patient must 
 have the final word. Unlike some life-saving procedures that require intervention on a 
 moment’s notice, sterilisation allows time for informed and considered decisions. It is true, 
 as already mentioned, that health professionals are under an obligation to assess the patient 
 and point out the risks involved in particular procedures so as to enable the patient to make 
 an informed decision and give informed consent. They may also make recommendations as 
 to the management and/or treatment of a patient’s condition based on their professional 
 assessment. However, the final decision of whether or not to consent to a particular 
 procedure rests entirely with the patient. I emphasise that the term 'procedure' referred to 
 here must not be understood as including emergency operations or procedures that doctors 
 are obliged to perform on patients even without their consent if legal or medical grounds 
 have been established.177  
In reaching his conclusion, the learned Judge focused on two broad issues firstly, the 
circumstances under which the plaintiff’s consent was obtained and secondly, whether the 
plaintiffs’ had capacity to give informed consent.178   
With regards to the issue of how exactly the informed consent was obtained the Court 
observed that this had been done whilst each of the plaintiffs/respondents were in varying 
degrees of labour and hence in pain.179 The Court was of the opinion that the plaintiffs 
should have been given the option of returning to the hospital at a later stage when they 
would have had the opportunity to make an informed decision without the presence of any 
extraneous factors like labour pains.180  In addition, the Court noted that none of the 
plaintiffs/ respondents indicated their intention to be sterilised by either making an 
appointment or confirming their booking.   
The next issue explored by the Court was whether the plaintiffs/respondents had possessed 
the requisite capacity to give informed capacity especially since such written consent was 
                                                            
176 Ibid at para 104 -105.  
177 Ibid at para 105. 
178 Ibid at paras 107-108. 
179 Ibid at paras 107. 
180 Ibid. 
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procured whilst being under the influence of pain.181  The Court commented as follows on 
this aspect:- 
 
 The consent obtained was invalidated by the respondents’ lack of capacity to give informed 
 consent in light of the history of how the decision to sterilise them was arrived at and the 
 circumstances under which the respondents’ consent was obtained. It was merely written 
 rather than informed consent, which in my opinion is not sufficient for the performance of a 
 procedure as invasive and potentially irreversible as sterilisation. The important factor which 
 must be kept in mind at all times is whether the woman has the capacity to give her consent 
 for sterilisation at the time she is requested to sign consent forms. Therefore, it is not 
 decisive what information was given to her during antenatal care classes or at the moment 
 she signed the consent form if she is not capable of fully comprehending the information or 
 making a decision without any undue influence caused by the pain she is experiencing.182  
In light of the considered reasons afforded above, the Court came to the conclusion that the 
appellants had failed to discharge the onus cast upon them by showing on a balance of 
probabilities that the plaintiffs / respondents had given informed consent.183    
The Supreme of Court Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered that the matter be referred 
back to the trial Court for determination of the amount of damages payable to the 
plaintiffs/ respondents.  The High Court’s ruling with regards to the issue of the alleged 
discrimination remained unchanged on appeal.  Like the High Court, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal found that there was no cogent evidence on the part of the women that they were 
unfairly discriminated against simply because of their HIV status.184  The Appeal Court also 
rejected the submission made by the women that there was an organised policy in place to 
sterilise HIV positive women who were of child-bearing age.185  The amount paid out as 
damages has been kept confidential.  
2.4.2 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case                                                                                                                   
no. 19744/2012 – High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg 
The case of Sithole was the first South African case that dealt with the forced or coerced 
sterilisation of an HIV positive woman.  This matter was settled out of Court.    
 
 
                                                            
181 Ibid at para 108. 
182 Ibid at para 108. 
183 Ibid at para 107. 
184 Ibid at para 2. 
185 Ibid. 
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(i) Facts 
LS was admitted to the maternity unit of the Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital on the 31 
May 2009 for the delivery of her third child by way of a caesarean section.186 On the 4 June 
2009 LS’s baby was delivered by caesarean section and she was sterilised by way of a 
bilateral tubal ligation.187  After LS’s admission to hospital she signed three forms which, 
‘’purported to reflect her written consent to be sterilised by bilateral tubal ligation.’’188  The 
forms signed were a consent to operation form, consent to sterilisation form and a layman’s 
form.189  LS’s signature was procured by the ward nurse who, offered no clear explanation 
or adequate description of the proposed plan of the procedure; had given no clear 
explanation or adequate description of the consequences, risks and reversible or irreversible 
nature of the procedure and had not advised LS that her consent could have been 
withdrawn at any time before the operation.190  
Shortly, before LS’s  consent was obtained  a ward nurse and a cleaner  were making  
degrading remarks about her ‘’perceived sexual proclivity;’’191 she felt humiliated and was 
pressurised into signing the forms by the ward nurse who was aware of her HIV positive 
status;192 and this, was done in the presence of other patients whilst she was waiting to give 
birth. 
(ii)  Issue before the court  
The plaintiff’s cause of action stemmed from the allegation that the sterilisation procedure 
performed on her was done so without her voluntary informed consent.  The essence of the 
plaintiff’s claim is encapsulated as follows:-  
(iii)  Pleadings 
Plaintiff’s particulars of claim 
LS pleaded in her particulars of claim that she relied on the contractual relationship that 
existed between herself as a patient and the hospital as well as between patient and health 
care professionals to found her claim based on a duty of care.193  Arising out of this LS  
averred that the hospital and its employees had owed her a duty of care inter alia to provide 
her with ‘’medical treatment, advice, care and supervision with the professional skill, 
diligence and care that can be reasonably be expected of hospitals, of medical doctors, 
                                                            
186 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no. 19744/2012 – High 
Court of South Africa,  Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg para 10 of Plaintiff’s amended particulars of 
claim. 
187 Ibid at para 11.2. 
188 Ibid at para 15. 
189 Ibid at para 15.1-15.3. 
190 Ibid at para 17.1.-3. 
191 Ibid at para 17.8.2. 
192 Ibid at para 17.8.1. 
193 Ibid at para 14.  
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nurses and of hospital employees.’’194 Further, this duty extended to acting without 
negligence towards LS and only to carry out medical procedures on her that she had fully 
given her informed consent to more specifically, to comply with the provisions of the 
Sterilisation Act.195   
LS further pleaded that she did not have an adequate opportunity to read the form and 
understand the contents of thereof nor, did she request to be sterilised or for that matter 
seek information on different methods of contraception.196 LS pleaded that she was 
genuinely under the impression that an intra-uterine device was to be inserted as this was 
the decision that she had made during her ante-natal clinic visits and that the device would 
be inserted at another time and not when she was undergoing the caesarean section.197   
It was further pleaded on behalf of LS that the consent should have been obtained by a 
health care practitioner.198  Another averment that was made was that the two health care 
practitioners who performed the sterilisation on LS, failed to provide her with any 
information on the planned procedure, the risks attached thereto and the irreversibility or 
reversibility of the procedure.199 LS also pleaded that at no stage during her stay at hospital 
did she request to be sterilised nor did she seek any information about different family 
planning options.200   LS’s pleaded that her purported consent was procured by a ward nurse 
days prior to the sterilisation was performed her.201    
LS averred that as a result of the wrongful and unlawful conduct of the health care 
practitioners and the ward nurse her ‘’rights to privacy, dignity and bodily and psychological 
integrity including the right to make decisions concerning reproduction and the right to 
security in and control over her body were violated; ”202 the health care practitioners and 
the ward nurse were in further violation of section 2(2) of the Sterilisation Act read in 
conjunction with section 4203 and the conduct of the health care practitioners and the ward 
nurse also amounted to an assault on the plaintiff.204  
LS pleaded that as a result of the conduct of the medical professionals and the ward nurse 
she suffered an ‘’invasion of her bodily and psychological integrity, her dignity and her 
                                                            
194 Ibid at para 14.1.  
195 Ibid at para 14.2-4. 
196 Ibid at para 17.4-5. 
197 Ibid at paras 17.5-6 and 19.9.2. 
198 Ibid at para 19.3. 
199 Ibid at para 19.6. 
200 Ibid at para 19.4. 
201 Ibid at para 19.1. 
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privacy.’’205  She also ‘’experienced physical, emotional and psychological pain and suffering 
and ‘’suffered from emotional and psychological shock.’’206;  
In addition, she averred that she ‘’has been temporarily, alternatively permanently, 
deprived of her ability to have children and the ability to make her own decisions regarding 
reproduction.’’207  
Defendant’s plea  
In responding to LS’s case, the defendant relied on the defence that the plaintiff gave her 
full and informed consent to the sterilisation procedure hence there was no wrongfulness 
and unlawfulness on the part of the health care professionals.208   
In taking this defence further the defendant stated that the plaintiff was ‘’fully informed 
about the nature and consequences of the sterilisation’’209 and that the relevant provisions 
of the Sterilisation Act had been complied with i.e. the attending doctors and ward nurse 
explained to the plaintiff the procedure involved, the associated consequences and risks 
attached to such procedure and the permanency thereof.210   
The defendants’ aver that LS was also made aware of the fact that her consent could have 
been withdrawn at any time before the procedure was performed on her.211  The 
defendants further pleaded that LS only appended her signature to the consent forms after 
being made aware of the procedure and the associated risks of the procedure and that she 
had a period of four days within which to change her mind.212 
(iv)  Relief Claimed 
An amount of R 844 304 was claimed on behalf of LS.213  The amount was computed as 
follows:- 
R 500 000 was claimed in respect of general damages; for past and future medical expenses 
a sum of R 100 800 was claimed (to assess the reversibility of the sterilisation)  
                                                            
205 Ibid at para 21.1. 
206 Ibid at paras 21.2-3. 
207 Ibid at para 21.4. 
208 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no. 19744/2012 – High 
Court of South Africa,  Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg para 10 of Defendant’s amended plea. 
209 Ibid at para 14. 
210 Ibid at para 14.1. 
211 Ibid.  
212 Ibid at paras 14.2 & 4. 
213 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no. 19744/2012 – High 
Court of South Africa,  Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg para 22 of Plaintiff’s amended particulars of 
claim. 
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R 150 000 in respect of in vitro fertilisation procedures; R 60 000 in respect of counselling to 
assist the plaintiff with the emotional, psychological and physical pain that she had suffered; 
an amount of R 3 504 for transport costs and an amount of R 30 000 for loss of earnings.214     
The matter was settled by the parties before going to trial.   
(v)  Outcome  
The matter was settled out of Court.  On the 14th March 2014, the first Defendant was 
ordered to pay an amount of R 470 800, within 30 days of the order being granted, to the 
Plaintiff for damages.   
The Plaintiff was also awarded costs on a party and party scale which included the costs of 
two expert witnesses for the plaintiff. 
2.4.3  Pandie v Isaacs 
Pandie v Isaacs 215is the only reported South African judgment dealing with involuntary 
sterilisation. It is included even though it does not deal with discrimination on the basis of 
HIV as it provides insight into the South African judiciary’s views on consent to a 
sterilisation. In this case the Plaintiff instituted action against Dr Pandie, the Defendant (an 
obstetrician) for performing a sterilisation on her without her full informed consent.216   
(i)  Facts 
The Plaintiff, was a 33 year old train driver at the time and had three children.  She alleged 
that during her ante-natal visits to the Defendant she was asked on three different 
occasions whether she considered being sterilised.217  She answered in the negative to this 
question.218  At the last ante-natal consultation on the 3rd November 2004 and on the day 
before the caesarean section and sterilisation she again indicated that she did not want to 
be sterilised.219  The Defendant then gave the Plaintiff a sealed envelope which he 
instructed her to take to the hospital as part of her admission process.220  It later transpired 
that the envelope contained a letter to inform hospital staff that the Plaintiff was to 
undergo a caesarean section and sterilisation.221  Before she signed the consent form for the 
operation the Plaintiff had asked for it to be amended to reflect that she did not want to be 
sterilised.222 She was advised to inform the Defendant of the change on the consent form.223 
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However, this discussion did not take place.224  The Plaintiff became aware that she had 
been sterilised when the theatre nurse held up a jar and shook the contents which were the 
severed portion of the fallopian tubes.225  
(ii)  Issues before the court 
The Court was faced with one key issue, whether the legal obligations regarding the 
obtaining of consent before a sterilisation had been complied with.  
(iii)  Prior proceedings 
The trial Court found that the defendant’s conduct was grossly negligent and unlawful and 
ordered him to pay R 410 172.35 in damages to the Plaintiff.226  The defendant appealed 
this judgment to the full bench of the Cape High Court.   
(iv)  Judgment 
The Court held that consent for a sterilisation must be in writing as per the Sterilisation 
Act.227  Regulations accompanying the Act228 require the completion of two documents.  The 
one being Form 1 of the Regulations and the other being the hospital’s standard consent 
form.229  It held further that performing a medical procedure without a patient’s informed 
consent was actionable.  
If a defendant has acted with dolus (encompassing knowledge of the wrongfulness of his 
conduct) it could amount to a criminal assault but the Act does not make provision for the 
payment of damages for this type of violation.  The court stated that the “interference with 
another person’s body has always been prima facie wrongful at common law”.230 In 
addressing the complex overlap between a common law and statutory duty the Court relied 
on Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA) where the 
SCA held that if the statute does not provide for a damages remedy, and if the Court were to 
infer a common law remedy this would be contrary to the statutory scheme.231 
In applying the law to the facts the Court found that written consent is required by the Act 
but in this case it was absent.232 The Court observed that in the present case only one form 
was used namely the hospital consent form and this only provided consent for the 
caesarean section.233  Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant’s version that he had 
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obtained verbal consent was also improbable.234  Nevertheless, the Judge went onto hold 
that a prima facie wrongful act (failing to obtain written consent in compliance with the Act) 
could be legitimised by verbal consent even if it does not strictly comply with the Act.235  In 
this instance the appellant had performed the sterilisation in the genuine belief that she had 
consented to the procedure verbally at the last consultation therefore, he did not possess 
the requisite intention or dolus.236  The Court accepted that this approach to consent is was 
the prevailing practice in the appellant’s profession and thus the appellant’s conduct was 
not negligent.237  In this instance, liability for the failure to obtain consent should lie at the 
feet of the hospital staff who were negligent in relation to the obtaining of her written 
consent in the manner required by the Act.238  The Court concluded that it is unsatisfactory 
to hold a doctor liable where he has obtained informed oral consent but has failed to 
procure a written consent in accordance with the Act particularly as:239 
i)  The appellant did not stand to benefit financially nor was there any incentive to be gained    
by coercing the respondent into being sterilised;240 
ii)  Taking into account her age, the number of children and socio-economic status it is not 
unlikely that a woman in this position would refuse to be sterilised;241 
iii)  The referral letter written by the appellant requesting the hospital to prepare the 
respondent for a caesarean section and tubal ligation would not have been written contrary 
to her wishes;242 
iv)  The appellant performed the tubal ligation under the genuine belief that her verbal 
consent was in place and 243   
v)   It is highly unlikely that the appellant would have insisted on going ahead with the 
sterilisation despite knowing that he did not have her consent as he would fall foul of the 
law and the Health Professions Council of South Africa.244 
This led the Court to conclude that the respondent had consented to the sterilisation 
verbally and this absolved the appellant from liability in terms of a common law delictual 
claim.245 The appellant could not be liable in terms of the criminal law as the requisite mens 
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rea did not exist.246  Furthermore, given that the hospital staff had failed to inform the 
(gynaecologist) that Mrs Isaacs had refused to be sterilised or alternatively had withdrawn 
her written consent to be sterilised he could not be held liable for the negligence of the 
hospital staff. 247 
2.5  Commissions of Enquiry 
An alternative to litigation is an inquiry into the alleged abuse.  This has been used in 
Slovakia. 
2.5.1  Slovakia  
In Slovakia where the Body and Soul Report revealed systematic sterilisations of Roma 
women the government agreed to set up a commission of enquiry.  In 2001, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe carried out an official fact-finding 
visit to Slovakia with a view to obtaining an in-depth account of the current situation on the 
alleged forced and coerced sterilisations of Romani women.248  Information from various 
stakeholders was collected before a number of recommendations were made.249 
The finding of the Commissioner was that in this instance women from eastern Slovakia 
were exposed to the risk of being sterilised without proper consent.250  Of further concern 
to the Commissioner was that the medical personnel opted to use sterilisation as a method 
to prevent future pregnancies rather than less permanent means of contraception.251 
Some of the recommendations made in light of the Commissioner’s findings to the Slovak 
government was that there should be enactment of new legislation which specifically 
encompasses the issue of free and informed consent;252 policies to be implemented dealing 
with the obtaining of access to medical records of patients253 and the creation of an 
independent commission that deals with redress (in the form of an apology and 
compensation) for the victims.254  
The Commissioner in his 2006 follow-up report made the following observations regarding 
the measures put in place by the Slovak government in response to the grave human rights 
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violations that women suffered as a result of involuntary sterilisations performed on 
them.255 
The Public Health Act which was passed into law on the 1 January 2005 was welcomed.256  It 
addressed the shortcomings raised by the Commissioner by enacting provisions that dealt 
with sterilisations, informed consent and access to medical records.257 As an added safety 
measure, the law now makes provision for a month’s waiting period after informed consent 
is obtained.258  However, the Commissioner noted with concern the failure of the Slovak 
government to establish an independent commission of enquiry to deal specifically with the 
issue of redress for the victims.259  Whilst recognising that redress may be obtained through 
the court system, the Commissioner noted that this does not come without difficulties.260  
Specific mention was made of the cost implications for the victims and the extremely high 
evidential burdens that the victim had the onus of proving.261  In concluding, the 
Commissioner once again stressed the need for a commission of enquiry to investigate and 
verify the violation of the women’s rights and in turn provide ‘’effective and rapid non-
judicial redress.’’262 
2.6  Research 
The litigation on the forced/coerced sterilisation of women in Slovakia, Kenya, Namibia and 
South Africa has all been preceded by research and documentation of individual allegations 
of sterilisation abuse.  It appears that research and documentation have been used to 
expose and obtain publicity around the issue and to identify possible litigants.  
Table 2.1: Table depicting the organisation that conducted the research, date of 
publication and key findings 
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 Slovakia Kenya Namibia South Africa 
Who did 
the report 
The Center for 
Reproductive Rights and 
the Centre for Human 
Rights  
African 
Gender and 
Media 
Initiative 
(GEM) 
International 
Community 
of Women 
Living with 
HIV/AIDS 
(ICW) 
Zaynab Essack 
and Ann 
Strode 
When was 
it published 
2003 2012 2009 2012 
Key 
findings 
1.  Roma women were 
sterilised without their 
consent or by virtue of the 
fact that they received 
incorrect information 
about their medical 
condition. 
2.  Roma women were 
physically and verbally 
abused.   
3.  Roma women were 
denied access to their 
medical records. 
4.  Roma women were 
discriminated against on 
the basis of their ethnicity.  
They were prevented from 
using the same dining and 
ablution facilities as non-
Roma women.  
1.  Women 
did not 
provide their 
full and 
informed 
consent 
before being 
sterilised. 
2.  Women 
had to agree 
to be 
sterilised in 
exchange for 
the payment 
of maternity 
hospital fees; 
obtaining milk 
formula for 
their babies 
and for 
medication. 
3.  Partners 
provided 
consent for 
the 
sterilisation 
unbeknown 
1.  Women 
were 
sterilised 
without 
providing 
their full and 
informed 
consent.   
2.  Women 
were 
discriminated 
against on 
the basis of 
their HIV 
positive 
status by 
health care 
providers. 
   
1.  Women 
were 
sterilised 
without their 
informed 
consent, 
alternatively 
made their 
decisions 
after being 
coerced into 
it. 
2.  Women 
experienced 
physical pain, 
financial 
distress, 
difficulties 
with their 
relationships 
with their 
partners and 
rejection 
from the 
community. 
 3.  Women 
experienced 
discrimination 
as a result of 
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to the 
women. 
4.  Women 
were 
discriminated 
against on the 
basis of their 
HIV positive 
status and 
disability. 
their HIV 
positive 
status by 
health care 
providers. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 1.  There has been a 
blatant violation of Roma 
women’s rights in terms of 
receiving comprehensive 
and accurate information 
about sterilisations thus 
compromising their rights 
to providing full and 
informed consent to being 
sterilised.  
2.  Access to medical 
records have been 
impeded by public health 
officials. 
3.  Roma women were 
subjected to 
discriminatory treatment 
by health care providers. 
4.  There was a violation of 
laws on a national, 
regional and international 
level. 
1.  There has 
been a 
violation of 
the sexual 
reproductive 
health rights 
of women by 
health care 
providers.  
2. Consent 
was sought 
whilst some 
women were 
in active 
labour. 
3.  Incentives 
were offered 
to women to 
influence 
their decision 
to be 
sterilised 
which, 
negated the 
aspect of 
informed 
consent. 
1.  The sexual 
reproductive 
rights 
violations 
had an effect 
on the 
physical, 
personal and 
emotional 
spheres of 
the lives of 
women. 
2.  There is a 
need for the 
Namibian 
government 
to fulfil its 
obligations in 
terms of 
domestic, 
regional and 
international 
human rights 
law.  
1.  Despite 
South Africa’s 
legal 
framework 
that makes 
provision for 
informed 
consent to be 
procured 
before a 
sterilisation is 
performed 
there are 
reports of 
involuntary 
sterilisations. 
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5.  Personal 
circumstances 
of the women 
i.e. poverty 
and their HIV 
status 
affected their 
decision 
making 
process.  
6.  Women 
suffered from 
physical pain, 
psychological 
trauma and 
social 
isolation after 
their non-
consensual 
sterilisation. 
 
2.7  Discussion 
The review of key cases above has shown that civil litigation has been an effective tool in 
that women have received judgments in their favour however, it is doubtful that these may 
be deemed successful as the woman often do not receive compensation that sufficiently 
places them back in the position that they were in before the sterilisation.  Further, there is 
an absence of evidence to show that these judgments have caused hospitals and doctors to 
reconsider the way in which consent has been obtained from patients.  The following key 
themes have emerged from the cases. 
(i)  Most of the litigation has been driven by non-governmental organisations   
NGO’s have litigated successfully, in part, in Slovakia, Namibia and South Africa on behalf of 
sterilised women whose sexual reproductive rights have been violated.263  Furthermore, 
litigation is under way in Kenya.  
(ii)  Litigation based on the norms in national laws, constitutional rights or international                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                            
263 In Slovakia, the litigation was spearheaded by the Centre for Civil and Human Rights, the Legal Assistance 
Centre assisted the women in Namibia and in South Africa, the Women’s Legal Centre litigated on behalf of 
Sithole.   
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       laws have been successful on the issue of informed consent  
 
These cases have been based both on national laws where they exist, on international 
obligations where domestic laws are insufficient and in some instances clinical guidelines.  
Litigating in a country that has national laws in place , such as in South Africa, where there is 
a Sterilisation Act264 obviously has a higher prospect of success as the legal obligations on 
medical practitioners are clearly articulated in the law.  Sithole relied on statutory law to 
plead her claim for the violation of her right to bodily integrity.265  She had the benefit of 
relying on the Sterilisation Act,266 which was designed to set out exactly what qualifies to be 
deemed as free and voluntary consent.  She also relied on her constitutionally protected 
right to dignity, psychological and bodily integrity.  Since the matter was settled out of 
Court, we do not have the advantage of analysing a written judgment setting out whether 
the provisions relied on by Sithole would have been sufficient to make out a case for the 
violation of her bodily integrity.267 
 
However, in the countries reviewed above, South Africa was the only one with dedicated 
legislation on point.  The Slovakian litigation team was able to successfully rely on 
international norms as it took the matter to the European Court of Human Rights.  In 
Namibia, they were able to rely on their rights in the Constitution given the lack of domestic 
law on informed consent and equality.  This shows that the lack of domestic law is not 
necessarily a key barrier to successful litigation.  A key outstanding question is however 
whether the use of clinical guidelines as the basis of a civil claim will be successful.   
(iii)  Litigation based on the norms contained in clinical guidelines has yet to be tested 
The current litigation under way in Kenya places considerable reliance on two sets of clinical 
guidelines to advance their case namely the Kenyan National Family Planning Guidelines for 
Service Providers (2010) and the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics  
Guidelines.  The difficulty that the Kenyan litigation team will face will be its reliance on 
national and international clinical guidelines.  Different jurisdictions place different weight 
on clinical guidelines. 
Many jurisdictions that are based on English common law may likely follow the judgment in 
the case of KR v Lanarkshire.268 Here the Court sets out its view succinctly on the status of 
guidelines in cases of medical negligence.  The pursuer (plaintiff) in casu relied on the 
General Medical Council Guidelines269 when arguing that the obstetrician had failed to fully 
                                                            
264 Act 44 of 1998. 
265 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no. 19744/2012 – High 
Court of South Africa,  Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. 
266 Act 44 of 1998. 
267 Ibid.  
268 KR against Lanarkshire Health Board, available at https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-
judgments/judgment?id=615d1ea7-8980-69d2-b500-ff0000d74aa7 accessed on 25 May 2018. 
269 The General Medical Council is a statutory body in the United Kingdom, which amongst others regulates the 
medical profession.    
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appraise her of the risks that were associated with the delivery of her baby.270  She further 
relied on the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence Guidelines (2007) and the 
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists Guidelines (2001) to show that the 
obstetrician had not met the standards required by a professional working in this field.271  
The Court held that the guidelines came into existence after extensive deliberation by a 
panel of experts who took into account ‘’available scientific information and their own 
collective experience’’ which, are intended to ‘’provide clinical guidance’’ and are not 
binding rules.272  A similar view was held in the South African case of Pandie v Isaacs where 
the Court observed that ‘’guidelines do not have the status of law and are merely part of the 
evidential material to be weighed in determining the standards reasonably to be observed 
by doctors.’’273 
Further, Lord Brailsford in the KR v Lanarkshire case held that a less experienced practitioner 
who does not have the benefit of knowledge that can only be gained from experience, 
should closely follow the guidelines as they are a product of distilled knowledge of 
experts.274  In instances where less experienced practitioners consider the application of a 
particular guideline to be inappropriate, Lord Brailsford was of the view that a more 
experienced practitioner should be consulted for guidance before deviating from them.275  
Based on the dictum in the KR case it is submitted that a departure from clinical guidelines 
seems to be reserved for the more experienced practitioners, however, they would have to 
be mindful of the fact that their conduct in doing so may be reviewed or criticised in certain 
circumstances.276  This approach shows that although guidelines are not directly legally 
enforceable they are used by courts in civil claims when assessing whether a medical 
practitioner is negligent.  
 In the KR277 case the Court found that the obstetrician’s conduct was negligent because she 
failed to comply with the relevant guidelines.  In coming to this conclusion, the Court took 
into account her level of inexperience.  The Court noted that given her inexperience she was 
expected to abide by the advice set out in the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence Guidelines (2007) and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
Guidelines (2001) or alternatively, seek the advice of a more senior obstetrician.278    
                                                            
270 KR against Lanarkshire Health Board, available at https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-
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273 Pandie v Isaacs (A135/2013, 1221/2007) [2013] ZAWCHC 123 (4 September 2013) at para 37. 
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Similar views have been expressed by the authors Dickens and Cook who hold the view that 
guidelines, if followed closely by medical practitioners, can shield them during Court 
proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings and conversely may be used to attack them 
and attract liability if not followed.279  In the Sibisi case, the gynaecologist relied on his close 
observance to the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists Guidelines (2012) to 
assist him favourably when showing the Court that there was no mismanagement on his 
part during the delivery of the plaintiff’s baby.280   
(iv)  Failure to obtain informed consent for a sterilisation has been established in a range     
       of jurisdictions 
 
All the litigation bar Isaacs v Pandie,281 were based on two causes of action namely the 
absence of fully informed consent and discrimination.  Thus far, litigation has only been 
unsuccessful regarding the issue of bodily integrity in the case of Pandie v Isaacs.282  An 
analysis of the litigation strategies used in these jurisdictions will be a useful indicator in 
gauging whether the litigation on the leg of bodily integrity will be successful in Kenya. A key 
factor to bear in mind is that all the litigants had signed consent forms and thus the courts 
had to grapple with the  issue of whether ‘’written consent of a patient amounts to properly 
obtained informed consent.’’ 
In Slovakia, the broad rights relied on were the rights to be free from torture and the right 
to a private life, which are enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights.  The 
Court took into account the circumstances surrounding the manner in which the consent 
was obtained and the state of mind that the patient was in at the time that consent was 
obtained.  The Court did not hesitate in a making a finding that a combination of the manner 
in which the consent was obtained and the state of mind of the patient at the time consent 
was obtained was not ideal for an informed decision to be made.  Furthermore, the 
sterilisation of VC was not done to save her life and therefore her right to make an informed 
choice as a patient cannot be disregarded.   
Some of the key constitutional and common law rights relied on in the Namibian case to 
advance the violation of the plaintiffs rights to bodily integrity, are the rights to found a 
family; not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; the right not to 
suffer infringements of their rights to bodily and psychological integrity; and the right to 
dignity.283  The issue of informed consent was discussed at great length by the Court.  The 
Court relied on the Namibian Health Professions Council’s guidelines and South African case 
                                                            
279 B M Dickens & R J Cook ‘The legal effects of fetal monitoring guidelines’ (2010) 108 International Journal of 
Gynecology and Obstetrics 170-173 at 171. 
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law to emphasise the importance of patient autonomy and the patient’s right to make an 
informed choice after being given full information regarding the proposed medical 
procedure.  The Court focused on the circumstances under which the consent of the 
plaintiffs were obtained.  It was obtained whilst they were in labour and experiencing 
extreme pain. The Court concluded that a patient in that situation would be unable to 
comprehend the information received and make a fully informed decision.  A blind eye 
cannot be turned to the fact that the decision that has to be made by a woman, who is in 
severe pain and protracted labour, is one that has the effect of permanently ending her 
reproductive capacity.  It is submitted that the Courts were correct as this is an extremely 
personal decision that has to be made without the negative influence of external factors 
such as pain and pressure from the hospital staff because of a patient’s HIV positive status.  
The jurisprudence now shows that procuring consent for a life-changing decision like a 
sterilisation under the conditions described amounts to a gross disregard for a woman’s 
autonomy and dignity.  The outcome of the Namibian case has been welcomed however, 
the principle basis of the judgment has been criticised by Pickles for finding that women lack 
capacity during childbirth.284  Pickles submits that this implication has far reaching 
consequences especially where women wish to revoke their consent or refuse consent 
during labour.285  It is submitted that this is a significant issue, which has been raised by 
Pickles as no other South African case has found that consenting under coercive 
circumstances impacts on a person’s legal capacity.     
It is submitted that the Slovakian and Namibian cases can be used as a litmus test to 
indicate whether the litigants in Kenya will be successful with their claim relating to the 
violation of their bodily integrity.  Without any domestic sexual reproductive health rights 
laws to rely on, the petitioners have based their claims on two sets of guidelines.  As noted 
earlier, these guidelines are not binding but will serve an important role in assisting the 
Court to decide whether there was substantial deviation from them, which could together 
with the other evidence presented lead to an adverse finding being made regarding how the 
informed consent of the petitioners was taken.  There was also reliance on the Kenyan 
Constitution, which protects amongst other rights the right to autonomy, human dignity and 
to reproductive health care.  A violation of rights contained in international legal 
instruments was also pleaded.   
Often, the vulnerable position of women in active labour is used as leverage when coercing 
them into being sterilised.  In the LM286 case the women were in active labour for a 
prolonged period of time and were only going to be taken to theatre for a caesarean section 
if they agreed to be sterilised.  In the case of SWK and Others v Médecins Sans Frontières 
                                                            
284 C Pickles ‘Sounding the alarm: Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and women’s rights during 
childbirth in South Africa’ 2018 21 PER/PELJ 1-34. 
285 Ibid 7. 
286 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
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and Others, one of the women reported being in labour for 48 hours before having a 
caesarean section.287  The caesarean section was only done when the woman agreed to be 
sterilised.  The women in VC’s288 case also suffered a similar fate even though they were not 
HIV positive.  It is submitted that once the Court takes into account the circumstances under 
which the petitioners’ consent was obtained it will show that the petitioners were not in a 
frame of mind that was free from negative influence.  Consent was obtained from one 
petitioner after she was told that she would die if she did not stop having babies.  Milk 
formula for their new-born babies, food and payment of hospital fees would be withheld if 
there were no proof of the sterilisation.  By consenting under these circumstances, it is clear 
that their vulnerable socio-economic position was used to influence their decisions.  
Furthermore, there is a clear violation of the guidelines and provisions contained in the 
Kenyan Constitution and international instruments.   
(v)  Courts in some instances remain biased towards medical practitioners who they  
       perceive to be acting in the best interest of patients 
 
Central to the case of Isaacs v Pandie289 was whether oral consent could serve as a 
substitute for written consent as required by the Sterilisation Act290 in instances where the 
same was procured by the medical practitioner.  The Appeal Court was of the view that a 
medical practitioner should not be liable under these circumstances.  It is submitted that the 
Court erred in making such a finding as the Sterilisation Act291 does not allow room for the 
use of one’s discretion to be exercised when deciding how to obtain consent that is, either 
orally or in writing.  Further, the Act292 carries a criminal penalty for non-compliance with 
the provisions of it.  Therefore, there must be a signed form consenting to the sterilisation.  
Given the South African legal framework, it is difficult to understand why the Court 
disregarded these norms in favour of an approach that found the medical practitioner was 
not negligent in relying on a nurse to obtain consent to the procedure.  It is argued that the 
unequal power dynamics between the surgeon and the train driver patient played an 
unarticulated role in the Court’s evaluation of the evidence.  This reflects the difficulties that 
plaintiffs bear in proving that the doctor’s conduct was wrongful.  For example, in Pandie’s 
case the Court appears to have bent over backwards in defending the doctor’s conduct 
because there was no evidence that he had an intention to harm Isaacs and gain financially 
from performing the procedure without her consent.    
                                                            
287 SWK and others v Médecins Sans Frontières and others Petition No. 605 of 2014, In the High Court of Kenya 
at Nairobi Constitutional and Human Rights Division at para 16. 
288 Application no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/orig/11_6/V.C..pdf accessed on 1 July 2015. 
289 Isaacs v Pandie (12217/07) [2012] ZAWCHC 47 (16 May 2012). 
290 Act 44 of 1998. 
291 Ibid.  
292 Ibid.  
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(vi)  Medical practitioners cannot rely solely on the evidence of a signed consent document 
It appears that courts will reject defences based on the mere recording of a person’s 
signature to operate as a form of consent. Instead, it appears that they require medical 
personnel to demonstrate that they obtained the patient’s free and informed consent.293  
(vii)  No court has to date accepted that forced or coerced sterilisations are occurring for a  
         discriminatory reason 
  
With regards to the allegations that the sterilisations were performed for discriminatory 
reasons, none of the litigants succeeded on this leg of their claim.  An assessment of the 
evidence placed before the courts will assist us in understanding this quagmire. 
The following key facts were placed before the court in VC’s294 case in order to assist in 
making a finding that she was sterilised for a discriminatory reason:  it was recorded on her  
hospital file that she was of ‘’Roma origin’’, she did not share the same ward as non-Roma 
women, she had to use dining and ablution facilities that were reserved for Roma women 
only, she received poor treatment from the medical staff, she was only 20 years old at the 
time of the sterilisation and there was no request by her to be sterilised.  The sterilisation 
was not carried out for therapeutic reasons.  This was insufficient evidence presumably for 
the court to make a finding of unfair discrimination based on VC’s ethnic status.  It is 
submitted that a cause for concern is that at the time of VC’s case there was other litigation 
pending on the same cause of action and the fact that the Court accepted that there was 
evidence before it that showing a practice of the involuntary sterilisation of women from 
different ethnic groups.  Therefore, the involuntary sterilisation of VC was not an isolated 
incident.  This is a strong indication that it cannot be co-incidental that VC was singled to be 
sterilised for her ethnicity.  Despite the factual circumstances that the Court accepted, it is 
submitted that it was incorrect in placing emphasis on the behaviour of the doctors by 
finding that they acted without the intention of mistreating VC, which outweighed the 
ultimate harm suffered by her.     
In the LM295 case, the evidence before the Court was that the HIV positive status of all three 
women was a known fact to the nurses and doctors treating them.  Further, two of the 
plaintiffs reported being told by the hospital staff that there was a policy in place to sterilise 
women living with HIV.  None of the women indicated that they wanted to be sterilised by 
making a booking for this procedure. 
Durojaye is of the opinion that the Namibian courts missed an opportunity to make a finding 
regarding the human rights implications of the involuntary sterilisation of women based on 
                                                            
293 This was the approach adopted in the Slovakian and Namibian jurisdictions.   
294 Application no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights available at http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/ 
orig/11_6/V.C..pdf accessed on 1 July 2015. 
295 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
63 
 
a discriminatory reason.296  It is submitted, that the Namibian courts did indeed address the 
issue of discrimination against the women based on their HIV positive status but, found that 
there was no credible evidence by the women to sustain this allegation.  In both 
jurisdictions, the Courts without providing much insight into why the discrimination claims 
were dismissed held that there was no evidence of an organised policy or practice in place 
that orchestrated the involuntary sterilisation of women of child-bearing age based on 
discriminatory reasons.  It is submitted that both of these cases provided an ideal 
opportunity for the Courts to enlighten us on what exactly needed to be proved before it 
could be pronounced that the sterilisations were carried out for discriminatory reasons.  It is 
lamentable that this was not done and that the claims based on discrimination were 
contemptuously dismissed.  Furthermore, it is submitted that both jurisdictions were 
incorrect in requiring the litigants to prove that a discriminatory policy existed as it is a well 
established principle that the violation of the right to equality may occur from an individual 
action or collective practices. 
The NGO297 pursuing the matter in Kenya is optimistic that the judiciary will break the mould 
and make a finding that the sterilisation of the four women before Court was as a result of 
their HIV positive status or alternatively provide the much needed guidance on what 
evidence must be led in order to make a successful finding on discrimination.   
It is the writer’s submission that the very essence of bringing such matters to court is 
defeated if a finding of discrimination cannot be made.  Not only is the discrimination 
against these women based on their ethnicity or HIV status but is accompanied by their 
vulnerable position in society, that is, they are poor; have limited education; compelled to 
use public health care facilities and ultimately have to battle with the power dynamics 
between themselves and health care workers.  It is vitally important for our courts to 
recognise that vulnerable women are subjected to intersectional discrimination to which a 
blind eye cannot be turned.   
A further issue that has not been addressed by the courts particularly in Southern Africa is 
the question of how one pleads a violation of the right to equality in terms of the law of 
delict and more specifically in terms of the Roman law actio iniuarium.  The actio iniuriarum 
allows a plaintiff to claim for general damages for the impairment of dignity, bodily integrity 
(the right to make a choice), reputation, privacy and identity.  It is submitted, that the only 
ground on which a claim for unfair discrimination could be made is if a court accepts that 
being treated in a discriminatory fashion is a violation of a person’s dignitas however, no 
court has expressly pronounced on this issue leaving the way in which equality claims 
should be pleaded unclear.    
                                                            
296 E Durojaye ‘Involuntary sterilisation as a form of violence against women in Africa’ (2017) Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 1-12 at 2. 
297 Kelin available at http://www.kelinkenya.org/ accessed on 5 October 2018.  
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(viii)  The criminal law offers limited assistance to forced or coerced sterilised women 
Criminal remedies appear to have only been used in Slovakia where they were unsuccessful. 
The primary reason behind this may be that establishing dolus is extremely difficult as has 
been demonstrated by the South African case of Pandie.298 This issue is explored further in 
Chapter 5. 
(ix)  Qualitative research plays a significant role in supporting civil claims dealing with  
       forced and coerced sterilisation 
 
Another important feature of the cases discussed was that research preceded all of them  
except for in Isaacs.299  The findings of the research was that women were being sterilised 
for discriminatory reasons.  Apart from the Isaacs300 case, all the sterilisations were carried 
out in State hospitals.   
 
2.8  Conclusion 
The forced or coerced sterilisations of HIV positive women violate their sexual reproductive 
health rights.  The permanency of the sterilisation procedure coupled with the fact that 
sterilisation is a highly personal decision to be made by a woman, and the fact than it can 
never be justified as a medical emergency, makes the forced or coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women not only illegal but offensive and highly objectionable.  The key rights relied 
on by the litigants to prove the lack of fully informed consent on their part were strikingly 
similar in all the cases.  In Slovakia, the rights relied on were the right to be free from 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment301 and the right to family life.302  The litigants in 
Namibia relied on similar rights and in addition, the right not to suffer infringements to 
one’s bodily and psychological integrity was pleaded.303  Although there has been successful 
civil litigation around the failure to obtain informed consent there have been no successful 
cases on the issue of sterilisations being performed for discriminatory reasons.  There are 
disadvantages attached to this legal remedy which cannot be ignored. The first is the long 
and protracted nature of litigation.  The table below depicts the time taken from the 
inception of the litigation to the finalisation of the matters. 
                                                            
298 Isaacs v Pandie (12217/07) [2012] ZAWCHC 47 (16 May 2012). 
299 Ibid. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Application no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights, at para 100, available at 
http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/orig/11_6/V.C..pdf accessed on 1 July 2017. 
302 Ibid 130. 
303 LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia (I 1603/2008, I 3518/2008, I 3007/2008) [2012] 
NAHC 211 (30 July 2012) at para 6.5. 
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Table 2.2: Table depicting the time taken from institution of action to finalisation of 
proceedings 
Case name 
 
Date of 
sterilisation 
Date of 
institution of 
legal 
proceedings 
Date of 
finalisation of 
matter 
Number of 
years for the 
matter to be 
finalised from 
date of 
sterilisation 
V.C v Slovakia  
2000 
 
2004 
 
2011 
 
11 
LM and others v 
Government of 
the Republic of 
Namibia 
 
2005-2007 
 
2010 
 
2014 
 
9 
Sithole v The 
MEC for Health 
and Social 
Development & 
3 Others 
 
2009 
 
2012 
 
2014 
 
5 
Isaacs v Pandie 
 
 
2004 
 
2007 
 
2013 
 
9 
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Chapter 3 
The right to bodily and psychological integrity 
3.1  Introduction 
The right to bodily and psychological integrity has been a well-recognised right which was 
first established within the common law over 90 years ago.  Its significance was emphasised 
in Stoffberg v Elliot where the court found: 
 In the eyes of the law every person has certain absolute rights which the law -protects.  They 
 are not dependant on statute or upon contract, but they are rights to be respected, and one 
 of the rights is absolute security to person . . . . Any bodily interference with or restraint of a 
 man’s person which is not justified in law, or excused in law or consented to, is a wrong and 
 for that wrong the person whose body has been interfered with has a right to claim such 
 damages as he can prove he has suffered owing to the interference.1  
The Court in this matter used the right to security (freedom) of the person to place an 
obligation on medical practitioners to obtain consent from a patient for surgical procedures.  
This was the start of the development of both the right and the defence of informed 
consent in our law.  Many of the core principles established in this case continue to form the 
foundation of our law on informed consent. These principles include firstly, that voluntarily 
going to hospital for a procedure does not equate to informed consent for that procedure. 
Secondly, in hospital patients retain their rights to security and control over their bodies. 
Thirdly, informed consent to the procedure must be provided. Fourthly, failure to obtain 
informed consent means that the procedure will be a wrongful violation of the right to 
bodily integrity.  These principles are also in line with the jurisprudence in many other 
foreign jurisdictions.  For example O’Sullivan quotes from the Canadian case of R v 
Morgenthaler where this right was described as ‘’the notion of liberty in a free and 
democratic society as one which does not require the state to approve the personal 
decisions made by its citizens; it does, however, require the state to respect them.’’2 
In the post 1994 period there has been substantial development of the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity.  It is now a fundamental constitutional right.  Our courts are also 
required to use the norms established in public international law to assist them in 
interpreting these rights, and a range of health laws all addressing when and how consent 
must be obtained from a patient have been introduced.3   
                                                            
1 1923 CPD 148 at 148. 
2 M O’ Sullivan & C Bailey Constitutional Law of South Africa: Reproductive Rights (1998) 16-19 at 19. 
3 These laws include amongst others: National Health Act 61 of 2003; Children’s Act 38 of 2008; Sterilisation 
Act 44 of 1998 and Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
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This chapter describes the right to bodily and psychological integrity in South African law 
and international law.  This chapter includes a discussion on key issues relating to the way in 
which the right of freedom and security has informed the law on informed consent.4   
3.2  The right to bodily and psychological integrity in international law 
There are several international human rights conventions and covenants that afford 
everyone the right to bodily integrity, and women autonomy over their reproductive rights.  
South Africa has adopted and ratified many of these conventions and covenants and our 
courts are therefore, in terms of section 39 (1) (b),5 enjoined to consider the provisions of 
international law when interpreting provisions contained in the Bill of Rights.6  This means 
courts are required to use these provisions to interpret section 12 of our Constitution.7  
Furthermore, given that many of these conventions have been ratified by South Africa, in 
some instances our legislation has been reformed to bring it in line with the principles in 
these conventions.  
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)8 states that everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of person.  Article 59 states further that no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  The 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPRs)10 protects autonomy rights in 
Article 1611 where it states that men and women of full age, without any limitation due to 
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and found a family.  The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)12 recognises the importance of 
and accords protection of the family unit without making any direct reference to the 
reproductive health rights of women.13  However, Article 12(1)14 broadly makes provision 
for States Parties to recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.  
                                                            
4 2006 (3) All SA 565 (C). 
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6 DE v RH (CCT 182/14) [2015] ZACC 18; 2015 (5) SA 83 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1003 (CC) (19 June 2015) as per 
Madlanga J, at p 21 footnote 87.  
7 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
8 Came into effect on the 10 December 1948, as a response to the atrocities committed during World War 2 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml. 
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 and ratified by South Africa on 10 
December 1998. Article 7 and 9.  
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
12 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966 and ratified by South 
Africa on 18 January 2015. 
13 Article 10(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
14 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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Article 16 (1) (e) of CEDAW15 provides that State Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations.  The right is phrased in such a way as to ensure that women have autonomy on 
the basis of equality of men and women; the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on 
the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education 
and means to enable them to exercise these rights.  Specific mention is also made of the 
obligation to ensure that rural women have access to adequate health care facilities, 
including information, counselling and services in family planning.16 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also referred to as the Banjul Charter 
(ACHPRs)17 further entrenches the importance of fundamental human rights and this is 
evident from Article 5 which states that every individual shall have the right to the respect 
of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status.  Article 6 
protects an individual’s right to liberty and security of person.18  The Banjul Charter, like the 
UDHR and ICCPR, also prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. It further 
delineates specific protection of women in Article 18 (3)19 which mandates States to ensure 
the elimination of every form of discrimination against women and also to ensure the 
protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international 
declarations and conventions.  Continuing in a similar vein as CEDAW20 in striving to 
eliminate discriminatory practices against women, the Maputo Protocol has been adopted 
by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.  The protocol deals in more detail 
with the right to security of the person and the right to reproductive health.21   
Further detail on the content of the right to bodily and psychological integrity is described in 
several International Declarations.  The United Nations Fourth World Conference on 
Women held in Beijing known as the Beijing Declaration22 provides in Article 2923 that 
‘’maternity, motherhood, parenting and the role of women in procreation must not be a 
basis for discrimination nor restrict the full participation of women in society.’’24   
                                                            
15 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979 and 
ratified by South Africa on 15 December 1995. 
16 Article 14 (1) (b) of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.  
17African (Banjul) Charter on the Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981 and ratified by South Africa on 9 
July 1996. 
18 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
21 Article 14 extends the integrity of her person by specifically dealing with Health and Reproductive Rights.  
Apart from the right of a woman to control her fertility the rights contained in Articles 1 (b), (c), (g) and 2(a) of 
the Maputo Protocol are protected in CEDAW. 
22 The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, September 1995 ratified by South Africa in 1995.   
23 Beijing Declaration. 
24 Ibid. 
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The Cairo Declaration on Population and Development25 assists in strengthening the call for 
the recognition of women’s reproductive health rights.  This is evident by the fact that 
special recognition has been given to reproductive health and family planning.26   
Parliamentarians from around the globe have committed themselves to ‘’remove all 
remaining barriers in our countries that inhibit access to family planning services, 
information and education, as well as to help support the provision of reproductive health 
and family planning services as widely as possible.’’27   
Table 3.1: Overview of the sexual and reproductive rights protected in international law 
Convention/Covenant  Right of  
security of person 
Right to found a 
family 
Reproductive 
rights & family 
planning rights 
UDHR      
ICCPR      
Banjul Charter     
CEDAW      
Maputo Protocol      
Beijing Declaration      
ICESCR     
Cairo Declaration on 
Population & 
Development 
    
 
It is clear from the covenants and conventions discussed that there is a significant amount of 
protection afforded to the right to one’s bodily and psychological integrity and a recognition 
for the need to respect the reproductive health choices of women, see Table 3 above. 
3.3  Right to bodily and psychological integrity in the South African Constitution 
The protection of an individual’s bodily and psychological integrity is now firmly entrenched 
in our Constitution.28  There are two broad over-arching rights within the Constitution 
                                                            
25 Cairo Declaration on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt 3-4 September 1994. 
26 Ibid at para 5. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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namely the rights to psychological and bodily integrity together with our health–related 
autonomy rights, that is, reproductive health rights and access to reproductive health care.29 
They find protection under the umbrella of the constitutional rights to ‘’freedom and 
security of the person’’ and as well as the right to access ‘’health care, food, water and 
social security.’’30 In essence, these rights provide protection for autonomous choices and 
services in furtherance of such choices.  Interestingly, reproductive health rights and access 
to reproductive health care found no protection under the interim Constitution but in the 
final Constitution, they were expressly mentioned separately in both sections 12 and 27 
making it clear that there is a duty on the State to respect reproductive health choices and 
ensure access to such services.  In fact, the drafters of the final Constitution made general 
provision for everyone to access health care services without defining the minimum core of 
such services.31  However, the right to access reproductive health care has been singled out 
by being mentioned in section 27 (1) (a).32  No other type of health care service is 
mentioned except in section 28 (1) (c) where reference is made to a child’s right to basic 
health care services.33  It has been submitted by Bishop and Woolman that the reason the 
constitutional drafters took this approach is because they recognised that much of the 
oppression and exploitation against women comes from socially entrenched forms of 
physical (and psychological) violence related to their reproduction and sexuality.34  If this 
rationale is correct, it is extremely significant as it recognises how fragile a woman’s 
autonomy and decision making can be within the realm of reproductive health care.    
The shift in focus from the interim to the final Constitution was the result of extensive 
lobbying by gender activists.  According to O’Sullivan, the downplaying of sexual 
reproductive health rights could can be attributed to the history of reproductive rights in 
South Africa, which was characterised by highly invasive regulation.35  For example, black 
women were subjected to the apartheid government’s racist policies on birth control, which 
either took the form of involuntary sterilisations or the use of injectable contraceptives.36  
Further, abortions were illegal in South Africa except for under certain limited 
circumstances.37  In addition, married women were assigned the downgraded status of 
perpetual minors and subjected to the marital power of their husbands which had the effect 
of curtailing their autonomy in various spheres of their lives including in relation to their 
                                                            
29 Sections 12 (2) and 27 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Section 27 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
32 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
33 Ibid.  
34 M Bishop and S Woolman ‘Freedom and security of the person’ in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa(2002-, OS 07-06) 40.9. 
35 M O’ Sullivan ‘Reproductive rights’ in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa(2002-, OS 02-05) 37.5.  
36 Ibid. 
37 See section 3 of Act 2 of 1975. 
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reproductive health care rights.38   Even though women gave birth to their own children 
they were not accorded the status of being the guardians of their children before 1993.39  
Cook and Dickens state that the underlying philosophy on sexual and reproductive rights in 
this era was that married women needed that assistance or in some cases even the 
permission of their husbands when exercising these rights.40  Following extensive advocacy 
from women’s organisations, the relevant sections referred to above were included in the 
final Constitution.41 
An important observation to be made before delving into the meaning of section 12 is that 
‘’the advancement of human rights and freedoms’’ is one of our founding constitutional 
values contained in section 1 of the Constitution.42  These constitutional values are used to 
assist the court in interpreting rights.43  The constitutional value of freedom was 
emphasised by Justice O’Regan in the case of NM where she stated that this value was a 
recognition of every individual being a morally autonomous human to form opinions and act 
on them.44  Section 12 (1) as a right refers to the ‘’right to freedom and security of the 
person’’ which includes a closed list of five rights.45   
According to O’Sullivan, who considered the right in light of its narrow interpretation in the 
case of Ferreira v Levin NO and Others, the right was construed in a narrow, context specific 
manner of only protecting ones physical integrity against unlawful detention and thus 
preventing a person from being subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.46  
O’Sullivan reasons further that even though the learned Judge interpreted freedom to 
include the right of individuals to be free from State restrictions which prevent them from 
exercising their choices or actions, she felt that this was insufficient.47  The difficulty that 
O’Sullivan has with this negative construction of the right is that it does not place a positive 
obligation on the State to ensure that women must have access to safe and inexpensive 
abortion facilities.48  Even though O’Sullivan makes specific mention of termination of 
pregnancy rights when considering this right, Pickles supports and argues that the core of 
                                                            
38 O’ Sullivan ‘Reproductive rights’ in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2002-) 
37.5. 
39 Ibid. 
40 R J Cook and B M Dickens ‘Voluntary and involuntary sterilisation: denials and abuses of rights’ (2000) 68 
International Journal of Gynaecology and Obstetrics 61-67 at 62. 
41 M O’ Sullivan ‘Reproductive rights’ in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa(2002-, OS 02-05) 37.5. 
42 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
43 P De Vos & W Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 458. 
44 (CCT69/05) [2007] ZACC 6; 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC); 2007 (7) BCLR 751 (CC) (4 April 2007) at para 145. 
45 These are ‘’(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; (b) not to be detained without 
trial; (c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; (d) not to be tortured in any 
way; and (e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way’’ of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
46 O’ Sullivan ‘Reproductive rights’ in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2002) 
37.5. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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O’Sullivan’s argument could be applied widely to include other choices relating to pregnancy 
continuation.49  Pickles further suggests that in a reproductive context the ‘’right to freedom 
and security of the person’’ will be meaningless if it is not supported by women having 
access to rights which promote reproductive health care and services.50  Nevertheless, in 
the recent case of AB and Another v Minister of Social Development51 Khampepe J writing 
the minority judgment, held that section 12 is a combination of both freedom and security 
rights whose purpose is to afford protection to individuals to live their lives without having 
constitutionally prohibited obstacles being placed in their way.52  In this regard, it appears 
that Khampepe was favouring the approach taken in the earlier Ferreira v Levin case.  In 
discussing the rights individually she held that section 12 (1) can be classified as a ‘’general 
right to freedom, grounded in bodily security’’ that serves to protect violations against 
specific physical freedoms.53 Although our focus is not on the deprivation of physical 
freedom, the need for protection against such infractions is important.54 
In the context of this dissertation the right to bodily and psychological integrity has also 
been interpreted by the courts as including the right of patients to make autonomous 
choices about medical treatment, in other words to provide their consent as a means of 
justifying a doctor’s physical interference with their body.  
The right to bodily and psychological integrity finds protection under section 12 (2) which 
specifically encompasses the right of a person to make decisions concerning reproduction 
and to have security in and control over their body.55  It is submitted by Pieterse that this 
right ‘’underlies the autonomous pursuit of health through life-style related choices, 
including the freedom to seek and obtain medical care.’’56  It may be submitted that the 
choice of HIV positive women to have more children is a life-style related choice which can 
be managed by them in light of mother-to-child prevention medication.  The ability of a 
woman to make autonomous reproductive decisions goes to the heart of this aspect of the 
freedom right.57   According to Bishop and Woolman, this section at the very least 
recognises that this is a form of a right to dignity as each person’s body is of equal worth 
                                                            
49 C Pickles Pregnancy Law in South Africa (2017) 108. 
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and is entitled to respect.58  From a reading of the three sub-sections of section 12, it is clear 
that they give bodily integrity concrete meaning.  However, the same is not apparent for 
psychological integrity as the Constitution provides no further detail of this right.  
The first case to deal with section 12 (2) (a) concerned the termination of pregnancy.59  In 
the Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others (Reproductive Health 
Alliance as Amicus Curiae) case, Judge Mojapelo held that the heart of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 was the requirement of informed consent of the 
girl or woman concerned.60  Before deconstructing the concept of informed consent in a 
juridical context, the learned Judge made the following observations about the concept.  He 
held that the doctrine of informed consent is based on the defence of volenti non fit 
injuria in that it provides a justification for conduct that would otherwise be unlawful or 
wrongful.61  In particular, medical treatment, which would otherwise have constituted a 
violation of a patient's right to privacy and personal integrity in terms of our common law 
and statute, is justified provided that it is carried out with the patient's informed consent.62 
The requirement of informed consent which the court borrowed from the case of Waring & 
Gillow Ltd v Sherborne, rested on three legs that were independent of each other these are 
knowledge, appreciation, consent - these are the essential elements; but knowledge does 
not invariably imply appreciation, and both together are not necessarily equivalent to 
consent.63  In unpacking these elements, the Court held that knowledge encompasses the 
nature and extent of the harm or risk, and goes a step further and requires that there must 
also be comprehension and understanding of the nature and extent of the harm or risk.64  
Lastly, consent means that there must be a comprehensive understanding of the entire 
procedure whilst bearing in mind all its associated consequences.65  The court held that the 
personal choices of individuals in medical procedures was of significant importance and 
resulted in this right being given a firm place in our Bill of Rights.66  The choice of a woman 
or girl to have an abortion or termination of pregnancy finds protection in these guaranteed 
autonomy rights.  The first would be under section 12 (2) (a) which is the ‘’right to bodily 
and psychological integrity’’ that encompasses a woman’s right to make decisions 
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concerning her reproduction.67  The second section concerns itself with a person having 
‘’security and control’’ over their body.68  The autonomy rights form the foundation for a 
woman or girl to have an abortion or termination of pregnancy but this must be coupled 
with informed consent on the part of the girl or woman.69  In this case the court held that 
any interference on the part of the State regarding the freedom of a woman or girl to make 
choices over their reproductive life would severely infringe their constitutionally guaranteed 
rights of autonomy and self-determination.70   
Nevertheless, an analysis of the sparse body of case law assists in the ascertainment of what 
harm qualifies to be categorised as psychological harm and thus a violation of the right.  In 
the AB case, Khampepe J described section 12 (2) as being a new freestanding freedom right 
whose core focus was on integrity and in particular psychological integrity.71  The reasoning 
behind this approach taken by the learned Judge was that our ‘’Constitution enjoins us to 
actively turn away from indifference and move towards respect, empathy, compassion, and 
attentiveness to the decisions of others.’’72  It is her submission that the protection afforded 
to individuals in section 12 (2) is grounded in these ideals.73  It was also held that the 
provisions of section 12 (2) should be interpreted broadly to cover all instances where a 
person’s psychological or bodily integrity is harmed.74  Accordingly, this requires courts to 
examine whether a law or conduct of another person deprives an individual of freedom or 
security as broadly understood.75  Khampepe’s broad approach to this right is in line with 
the views of authors such as O’Sullivan and Pickles.  Khampepe J also highlighted the fact 
that our law has long since recognised that a person’s psychological integrity, independent 
of their bodily integrity, can be harmed and this violation of their psychological integrity 
finds protection under the actio iniuriarum in our law of delict.76    
Central to this right is the power that a woman has to make decisions regarding 
reproduction.  According to this interpretation of the right, it is therefore the prerogative of 
a woman to (i) decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, (ii) choose the number of 
children should she want to have children (iii) make a choice about the type of 
contraceptives she wishes to use.  Khampepe J made two observations regarding the phrase 
the ‘’right to make a decision.’’  The first being that it is the decision that enjoys protection 
rather than the actual choice made by a woman and second, if a woman does not have the 
ability to exercise this power and make a decision free from coercion and undue influence, 
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this will amount to a violation of her psychological integrity.77  Consequently, a woman 
alleging a violation of this right need only show that her inability to make a decision was as a 
result of some law or conduct that caused her psychological harm.78  The inquiry that the 
learned Judge proposes in these instances is threefold:  
(i)  Does the impugned law or conduct prevent or inhibit a person or group of persons from 
making a decision? 
(ii)  If the answer to (a) is yes, does the decision concern reproduction? 
(iii)  If the answer to (b) is yes, does preventing or inhibiting the decision detrimentally affect 
the psychological integrity of the person or persons concerned?79 
The majority of the court as per Nkabinde J disagreed with the third stage of the inquiry.  It 
held that section 12 (2) (a) affords protection to reproductive decisions that only have a 
physical effect on the person relying on it regardless of the fact that being deprived of 
making a decision can cause psychological harm.80  It is submitted that this view interprets 
section 12 (2) (a) narrowly and does not acknowledge the psychological harm that may be 
experienced by a person who cannot make a decision regarding reproduction or the choice 
has been taken from them.  As stated by Khampepe J: 
 …infertility affects the psychological integrity of a person by placing them in a  socially 
 precarious situation.  Being able to choose to have a child is almost universally accepted  as 
 central to “identity and meaning in life.”  Stripping a person of this choice has far-reaching 
 personal and social ramifications. Infertility is thus harmful partly because it removes the 
 ability to elect to have a child; a decision almost universally considered important.   
The importance of having sub-clause (b) is that it recognises the fact that many South 
African women do not enjoy security in and control over their bodies.81  This is evident from 
the extremely high rates of domestic violence against women, the killing of women by their 
intimate partners, rape, sexual abuse, forced sex and sexual intimidation.82  According to 
Pickles, this is why the right needs to place positive obligations on the State as ‘’freedom 
and security in a reproductive context cannot be effectively developed or sustained where 
women do not have access to reproductive health-care services and other rights which 
support access to reproductive health care.’’83  The minority judgment in the AB case is 
clearly reflective of this view as the court relied not only on the right to freedom and 
security but also the right to equality and dignity.       
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The right to bodily integrity also received attention from the Court in McDonald v Wroe.84  In 
this case, it was alleged that the defendant negligently failed to inform the plaintiff of the 
risk of permanent nerve damage in a planned dental procedure.85  The court stated that ‘’in 
South African law a medical practitioner has a duty to disclose a material risk of a planned 
procedure to the patient.’’86  The learned judge stated further that in obtaining the 
plaintiff’s consent the defendant ought to have ‘’fully informed her of the nature and extent 
of the risk of permanent nerve damage, with the result that the plaintiff consented thereto 
without appreciating the risk of permanent nerve damage.’’87  Even though, counsel for the 
plaintiff did not plead a violation of the plaintiff’s rights in terms of section 12(2) of the 
Constitution88 the Judge found that her right to bodily integrity in terms of the Constitution 
was violated as she underwent surgery without proper informed consent.89  Significantly, 
the court recognised the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity of the 
patient and more specifically the right to obtain the patient’s informed consent.90  
The right to bodily and psychological integrity is provided for in section 12 of the 
Constitution and is formulated in a unique manner as it expressly refers to the right to make 
reproductive health choices and protects against violations of both a person’s physical or 
psychological integrity.  Over time, the courts have broadened the scope of this right 
particularly with regard to psychological integrity.  This has resulted in the most recent case, 
of AB, where the Court found that this right protects a woman’s choice with regard to her 
sexual or reproductive health.  Recognising a woman’s autonomy to choose as being the 
core of this right is very significant in the context of forced or coerced sterilisations.  It is 
argued that this approach means that the focus of the enquiry into whether there was a 
rights violation should shift to how and when the decision was made.  In many of the 
narratives described by Essack and Strode in their study, it was clear that the HIV positive 
women did not make a choice regarding sterilisation, instead they were asked to ratify a 
decision made by health care practitioners.91 Although the way the right is framed in section 
12 of the Constitution is very progressive authors such as Pickles submit that more work is 
required in developing positive obligations on the State to provide services to ensure that 
this right is realised.92 
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3.4  Common law doctrine on informed consent 
Medical practitioners are required by law and medical ethics to obtain the informed consent 
of their patients before initiating treatment.93  The common law position regarding 
informed consent is set out in Castell v De Greef.94 However, Stoffberg v Elliot95 was the first 
South African case to deal with the doctor’s duty to inform the patient of each individual 
procedure. In this matter the plaintiff’s penis was removed without his express consent 
because during surgery the surgeon decided that to avert further growth of the cancer an 
amputation was necessary.96  The plaintiff claimed for damages arising out of an assault in 
that he alleged that his penis was amputated without his consent.  The defendant’s defence 
was that he amputated the plaintiff’s penis as it was the source of the cancer and the 
defendant was of the opinion that it was the most appropriate way to save his life.97  The 
defendant averred further that the plaintiff gave his implied consent by being admitted to 
hospital and by virtue of this he had consented to have any surgical and medical treatment 
that was immediately necessary. Watermeyer J rejected this argument holding that by 
voluntarily going into hospital for a pre-agreed procedure did not amount to implied 
consent to a broader range of procedures that are perceived by the doctors to be 
necessary.98  Further, Watermeyer J held that the failure to obtain express consent for a 
surgical procedure was a civil wrong for which a patient could claim damages.99 
The above dictum is profound and set the landscape for future cases.  In the later case of 
Lymbery v Jefferies100 the court was called upon to adjudicate on the doctor’s failure to 
inform the patient of the consequences of the procedure performed on her.101  The facts 
were that the patient had suffered from fibrosis of the uterus.  Her doctor recommended X-
ray treatment and whilst undergoing such treatment she sustained severe burns and a great 
deal of pain and discomfort.102  In an action for damages, the patient pleaded that the 
doctor had been negligent in the consent process by  failing to warn her that her ovaries 
would be destroyed resulting in infertility  and secondly in failing to warn her that the 
treatment was harmful and might cause pain and suffering.103  In this matter, the court held 
that the doctor had given her sufficient information on the procedure as it was expected 
that she would be able to deduce that she would be infertile because her menstrual cycle 
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would have come to an end.104  Furthermore, the court found that it may well be that it is 
the duty of a surgeon to inform the patient of the risks of the procedure and that it may be 
accompanied by great pain.105  The patient’s consent must be obtained based on this 
information. 106  However, in this instance, the doctor had not failed in his duty of disclosure 
of the potential risks and consequences of the treatment.107 This was the first case to deal 
with the issue of disclosure of risks to patients.  The judgment made it clear that the risks of 
the procedure must be disclosed to the consenter.  This was the start of the evolving 
jurisprudence regarding the nature and extent of information that must be provided before 
a patient gives consent.  
In a similar matter, in Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal108 the plaintiff instituted action 
against the servants of the defendant for wrongfully, unlawfully and intentionally assaulting 
her in that they subjected her to radium treatment which caused her serious injuries.  The 
defendant, like the doctor in the Stoffberg case relied on an ‘‘implied consent’’ to the 
treatments.109  The facts of this matter where that sometime, in 1945 the plaintiff, a 10 year 
old, was treated for a nodule that appeared on her ankle.110  The plaintiff was diagnosed 
with Kaposi’s disease which Dr Gouws described as a ‘’bloedkanker’’.111   The Plaintiff’s 
parents were advised that the she would have to undergo a series of X-rays.  However, the 
plaintiff’s mother was not made aware of any possible dangers associated with the 
treatment.  During 1945 to 1949 she received treatment for the disease and no pain or 
discomfort was reported.   
In October 1949 further nodules appeared on the plaintiff.  The plaintiff’s grandfather took 
her to the Johannesburg General Hospital for further treatment.  The plaintiff’s mother was 
under the impression that her daughter would have received the same treatment and she 
did not anticipate any risk or danger occurring to her daughter.  The plaintiff’s aunt then 
signed a document on the 20th October 1949 which purported to consent to operative 
treatment on the plaintiff.  The plaintiff was then seen by Dr Cohen who, was of the opinion 
that she needed deep therapy treatment.  The evidence led by the defendants indicated 
that Dr Cohen was fully aware that the treatment he proposed for her would cause severe 
irradiation of the tissues in the treated areas which could result in disfigurement or 
deformation and some form of permanent harm would be caused to her growing bone.  This 
is turn, would result in the shortening of the limbs; visible damage to the skin and the 
possibility of amputation.  The dosage administered by Dr Cohen resulted in the subsequent 
amputation of her right leg, left leg and left hand.  
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The issue before the court was whether the treatment took place without lawful consent.112  
Counsel for the defence argued firstly, that the plaintiff was brought to hospital for X-ray 
treatment and this constituted lawful consent to all treatment that she received.113  
Secondly, the position of medical professionals would be intolerable if they were to inform 
patients before any operation or treatment of all the consequences, the dangers and the 
details of the risks accompanying the operation or treatment.114  
Bekker J stated that to establish the defence of volenti non fit injuria the plaintiff must show 
that they perceived the possibility of harm and they appreciated their consent to this 
danger.115  The court quoted with endorsement from the judgment of Rompel v Botha 
where Neser J held that surgeons must obtain consent from the patient and this consent will 
only be valid if they inform them of any serious risks of the procedure.116  
In applying the above dicta the Judge held that merely consenting to X-ray treatment in the 
belief that it is harmless or being unaware of the risks it carries cannot amount to effective 
consent to assume the risk or consequent harm.117  This case was significant as it confirmed 
the approach taken in both Stoffberg and Lymbery where the courts rejected the notion that 
merely presenting oneself for treatment was equal to consent to any process that may need 
to be undertaken in relation thereto.  Secondly, the case dealt with the issue of disclosure of 
risks to patients.  Further, the Court held that even though a doctor may act with integrity in 
attempting to provide the best medical care for the patient this would not absolve him/her 
from liability for failing to obtain proper consent.  The Judge found that if the patient’s 
consent is not obtained it will amount to an assault.118   
In Richter and Another v Estate Hamman119 the court once again had to address the issue of 
disclosure by deciding whether a neuro-surgeon was negligent for failing to warn the 
plaintiff of the dangers inherent in having a phenol block procedure.  The plaintiff’s 
contention was that she would not have agreed to undergo the procedure had she been 
aware of the dangers attached to it.  In this matter the Judge held that the defendant was 
negligent during the informed consent process by failing to warn her of the risks that may 
have been associated with the procedure.  In this regard, the Court held that a surgeon 
needed to provide the patient with a general idea of the possible consequences of the 
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procedure.120  In assessing whether the doctor acted reasonably in describing these risks to 
the patient, the Court used the ‘’reasonable doctor test’’  in other words the Court expected 
the doctor to disclose the risks that any other doctor in the same position as the defendant 
would disclose.121  This requires medical experts to give evidence on what a reasonable 
doctor in the position of the doctor whose conduct is under scrutiny would have done or 
would not have done regarding the obtaining of consent.  This is assessed by taking into 
consideration the prevailing circumstances of the case.122  Nevertheless, in reaching his 
decision Watermeyer J held that the complications that the plaintiff suffered after 
undergoing the phenol block were uncommon and could not have been expected.123  The 
court found that the defendant was not negligent in failing to warn the plaintiff of any 
complications that were associated with the procedure.   
The leading case in South African law regarding informed consent is the case of Castell v De 
Greef.124  In this matter the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant arose from the 
allegation that the defendant had been under a duty to warn her of material risks and 
complications attached to the procedure, and to inform her of any specific alternative 
procedures which might minimise, reduce or exclude such risks or complications.125  The 
defendant’s failure to do this made his conduct negligent, wrongful and unlawful.126  The 
defendant in his plea denied that he had breached his obligations towards the plaintiff and 
averred that the damages suffered by her were an unavoidable, normal and expected 
consequence of the plastic surgery.127   
Judge Ackermann agreed with the lower Court that the key issue was whether a doctor has 
a duty to warn the patient of the risks involved in surgery or medical treatment.128  The 
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complexity is to determine when that duty arises and what the nature and extent of the 
warning must be.129  
The Judge went on to provide a very pertinent illustration of this by way of an example: 
 A woman may be informed by her physician that the only way of avoiding death by cancer is 
 to undergo a radical mastectomy. This advice may reflect universal medical opinion and may 
 be, factually correct.  Yet, to the knowledge of her physician, the patient is, and has 
 consistently been, implacably opposed to the mutilation of her body and would choose 
 death before the mastectomy.  I cannot conceive how the ‘best interest of the patient’ (as 
 seen through the eyes of her physician or the entire medical profession, for that matter) 
 could justify a mastectomy or any other life-saving procedure which entailed a high risk of 
 the patient losing a breast.  Even if the risk of the breast-loss were insignificant, a life-saving 
 operation which entailed such risk would be wrongful if the surgeon refrains from drawing 
 the risk to his patient’s attention, well knowing that she would refuse consent if informed of 
 the risk.  It is, in principle, wholly irrelevant that her attitude is, in the eyes of the entire 
 medical profession, grossly unreasonable, because her rights of bodily integrity and 
 autonomous moral agency entitle her to refuse medical treatment.  It would, in my view, be 
 equally irrelevant that the medical profession was of the unanimous view that, under these 
 circumstances, it was the duty of the surgeon to refrain from bringing the risk to his patient’s 
 attention.130 
In rejecting the reasonable doctor test and endorsing the notion that the patient should be 
ultimately responsible for making his or her own decision, the Judge held that a doctor’s 
duty is to disclose any material risk that may be seen in the contractual setting of an 
unimpeachable consent to the operation and its sequelae.131  Through this judgment, a new 
standard for determining what needs to be disclosed was established.  Justice Ackermann 
used the term material risk to define the boundaries of a doctor’s duty with regard to 
disclosure.  The Judge went on to quote with approval from Van Oosten that volenti non fit 
injuiria, is a ground of justification that excludes the unlawfulness or wrongfulness element 
in delict.132 The court, following on from this premise, stated that for consent to operate as 
a defence in medical matters the following requirements must be satisfied: 
a)  The consenting party must have knowledge and be aware of the nature and extent of the 
harm or risk;133  
b) The consenting party must have appreciated and understood the nature and the extent 
of the harm or risk;134 
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c) The consenting party must have consented to the harm or assumed the risk of the 
procedure;135 and  
d) The consent must be comprehensive that is extended to the entire transaction, inclusive 
of its consequences.136 
It is clear from the above that one of the requirements that must be met is the fact that the 
patient must have understood what particular risk(s) are inherent or attached to a specific 
medical procedure being performed.  By accepting this approach the Court acknowledged 
that it is the doctor’s duty to assess whether a risk was material or not.  Based on the 
Australian case of Rogers v Whitaker137  the court held that a risk is material if:- 
(i) A reasonable person in the patient’s position if warned of the risk, would be likely to 
attach significance to it or;138 
(ii) The medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it139.   
The key question would be how do we determine if the risk is material? The court opined 
that expert medical evidence would be relevant to determine what risks inhere in or are the 
result of particular treatment (surgical or otherwise) and might also have a bearing on their 
materiality.140  It went on to comment that the sole reliance on medical evidence is not 
sufficient. The court quoted with approval a passage from the judgment in Reibl v Hughes 
that ‘’the ultimate question is whether (the defendant’s conduct) conforms to the standard 
of reasonable care demanded by the law.’’141  In casu the court found that the plaintiff had 
been informed of all the material risks.  The Castell case is regarded as a seminal one as it 
shifted the law away from medical paternalism to patient autonomy.  This approach is in 
line with the new constitutional framework regarding bodily and psychological autonomy.  It 
also requires a patient-centred enquiry into what they would consider material. 
Subsequent to Castell142, there have been a number of informed consent cases.  In the 
matter of C v Minister of Correctional Services143 the plaintiff, a prisoner, alleged that he did 
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not provide his ‘’consent to prison authorities when his blood was drawn and tested for 
HIV.’’144  The court held that ‘‘consent is a defence to many acts which would otherwise be a 
delict’’145.  ‘’In regard to surgery, informed consent postulated full knowledge of the risks 
involved and, after being made aware thereof by the surgeon, the patient is then entitled to 
exercise his fundamental right to self-determination.’’146  The Judge acknowledged that the 
ultimate decision of undergoing a surgical procedure lies with the patient.  In casu the 
learned judge stated that this decision can only be made if the person appreciates and 
understands what the object and purpose of the HIV test is and what the consequences of 
an HIV positive result are.147   
The court in this instance did not have much difficulty in reaching its decision as the 
Department of Correctional Services had a policy in place regarding HIV testing.148  The 
policy unequivocally stated that informed consent must be obtained from a prisoner prior to 
an HIV antibody test being administered.149 
More recently, in the Supreme Court of Appeal case of Broude v McIntosh & another150 the 
court avoided endorsing or rejecting the test laid down in Castell.151  The appellant a 
medical practitioner instituted action for damages against the first respondent an ear, nose 
and throat specialist.  The appellant alleged that the first respondent failed to apprise him of 
the risks attached to the operation and the fact that there was an alternative.152  Counsel for 
the appellant argued first, that the first respondent had wrongfully failed to get the 
(appellant’s) real or informed consent to the operation and the first respondent had 
therefore committed an assault on (appellant) in operating on him.’153  Secondly, the 
respondent was negligent and unskilful in failing to inform the appellant of the risks of the 
procedure and of any alternatives available.154   
Whilst recognising that pleading a failure to obtain informed consent amounts to an assault, 
the learned Judge did not agree with the conceptual soundness of this method.  He was of 
the opinion that: 
 To the average person, and I suspect to many a lawyer, it is a strange notion that the surgical 
 intervention of a medical practitioner whose sole object is to alleviate the pain or discomfort 
 of the patient, and who has explained to the patient what is intended to be done and 
 obtained the patient’s consent to it being done, should be pejoratively described and 
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 juristically characterised as an assault simply because the practitioner omitted to mention 
 the existence of a risk considered to be material enough to have warranted disclosure and 
 which, if disclosed, might have resulted in the patient withholding consent.  It seems to me 
 to be inherent in the notion that even if the risk does not eventuate and the surgical 
 intervention is successful, the practitioner’s conduct would nonetheless have constituted an 
 assault.  That strikes me as a bizarre result which suggests that there is something about the 
 approach which is unsound.  There is no principle in law of which I am aware by which the 
 characterisation as lawful or unlawful of an intentional act objectively involving the doing of 
 bodily harm to another can be postponed until its consequences are known.  Either it was an 
 assault at the time of its commission or it was not.155   
The learned Judge did however qualify the above statement by excluding cases in which 
mala fides were alleged.156  In casu the first respondent’s omission to inform the appellant 
of the risk of leakage of cerebrospinal fluid was of no significance.157  No causal connection 
was proved between the leakage of the cerebrospinal fluid and the onset of the facial 
palsy.158  The court also took into consideration the fact that the appellant did not aver that 
had he been made aware of the risk attached to the operation he would have refused to 
consent.159  Therefore, the court found no evidence existed to bear out the appellant’s 
allegation.  
With regards to the appellant’s contention that the first respondent had failed to inform 
him of alternative treatment options, the court held that this could not be upheld as he 
acknowledged in writing that the nature and possible effects of the operation had been 
explained to him.160  It is submitted that the Court conflated two issues is this regard. Firstly 
the patient’s right to choose a course of treatment based on the material risks associated 
with it, and secondly, the doctor’s duty of care to ensure that the best treatment is provided 
to the patient.  By confusing these two concepts the Court ended up adopting an approach 
in favour of medical paternalism.  The mere fact that a procedure did not result in harm 
does not absolve a medical practitioner from their duty to disclose material risks as these 
may have a direct bearing on their right to choose whether or not to have treatment.  In the 
recent AB case the Constitutional Court in a minority judgment made it clear that the right 
to bodily and psychological integrity protected a patient’s decision making powers. 
In a further decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Louwrens v Oldwage161 
the trial court had found against the appellant, a vascular surgeon, in favour of the 
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respondent on the basis that the appellant made an incorrect diagnosis.162  On appeal, the 
issue was whether the appellant gave informed consent to the operation.163 
Mthiyane JA found that the respondent had provided consent by signing a consent form to 
the procedure.164  The next issue that the court had to consider was whether the 
respondent was warned of the risks involved in the surgical intervention.165  Counsel for the 
respondent relied on the enquiry set out in Castell’s166 case.  However, the court did not 
traverse through all of the requirements to ascertain whether the requirements were met.  
The court did however conclude after hearing expert evidence that ‘’the likelihood of steal 
occurring, with resultant claudication, was so negligible that no duty arose on the appellant 
to mention it and his omission to do so did not constitute negligence.’’167  It must also be 
mentioned that the court applied the reasonable doctor test that was postulated in 
Richter’s168 case and which was overturned in Castell.169 
The most recent Supreme Court of Appeal case to deal with the issue of informed consent 
was the decision of Sibisi NO v Maitin.170  The appellant instituted the aquilian action against 
the respondent, an obstetrician and gynaecologist for damages suffered by her daughter as 
a result of his negligent conduct.171  In this instance, the court was asked to determine the 
following issues:-  
(i) Does the doctor have a duty to disclose information about remote risks?172 
(ii) What test should be used to determine whether the duty has been discharged?173 
(iii) And if the doctor is not negligent in failing to disclose the remote risk on what basis 
liability can be founded?174 
(iv) In addition, the appellant asked the court to develop the common law so as to recognise 
that the test to determine whether a doctor has discharged his duty to ensure that the 
consent to the procedure is properly informed is whether the reasonable patient in the 
position of the plaintiff would regard the risk as significant and elect not to undergo the 
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procedure or follow a different mode of treatment.  This test would recognise the patient’s 
right to autonomy and bodily integrity.175 
The findings of the court, are important for the purposes of this discussion as it will direct 
how further cases that involve the lack of informed consent in South Africa will be dealt 
with. 
The appellant pleaded negligence on the part of the respondent.176  It is however not 
necessary for the purposes of this discussion to traverse all the grounds of negligence.  Of 
importance is the allegation that the respondent should have foreseen the risks associated 
with normal childbirth, taking into account the size of the baby, namely that the baby could 
suffer from shoulder dystocia if born through natural childbirth and that the respondent 
was under a duty to warn the appellant of the material risks and complications which might 
arise, and inform the appellant of specific alternative procedures that could have minimised 
the risks.177 
With regards to whether the respondent informed the appellant about the concomitant 
risks associated with natural child-birth, in this instance taking into account the size of the 
baby, the court accepted that the respondent at no time warned the appellant that there 
was a possibility of shoulder dystocia occurring and of a resultant brachial plexus injury, 
leading to Erb’s palsy.178  The court when assessing whether a doctor is under a duty to 
disclose the risks of a procedure to a patient referred to the reasonable doctor test set out 
in Richter’s case.179   
Counsel for the appellant argued that the approach in Richter’s180 case should not be 
adopted for two reasons.  The first is that it leaves the determination of a legal duty to the 
judgment of the doctor which is analogous to them being players and referees in their own 
cause.181  The second, is that in keeping with the rights to autonomy and bodily protection, 
now entrenched in the Constitution, the test should rather be whether the reasonable 
patient, in her position, if warned of the risk, would attach significance to it, as per the 
Castell case.182    
The court stated that the full court in Castell’s183 case accepted the approach relied on by 
the appellant.184  Further, the court agreed with the view postulated by Ackermann J in 
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Castell’s185 case where he said that our courts ought to adopt the approach in the Rogers’s 
case.186  The Court held that patients have a right to autonomy and that doctors could not 
rely on medical paternalism to justify their failure to disclose information to patients.187  
Furthermore, this focus on autonomy meant that our approach would be consistent with 
that adopted in Canada, the United States of America and Australia, as well as judicial views 
on the continent of Europe.188  
From analysing the aforesaid, the court in Sibisi’s case stated that ‘the question of informed 
consent goes to the wrongfulness element of the Aquilian action.’189  A logical follow 
through of this would mean that ‘’negligent conduct on the part of the doctor will be 
wrongful if the patient has not given informed consent.’’190  As was established in 
Castell’s191 case negligence is still a requirement.  However, where no negligence is proved, 
the test for wrongfulness does not come into play.192  The court found that in this matter 
the appellant did not prove that the respondent was negligent in not advising her to have a 
caesarean section and hence there was no need for a determination on whether the doctor 
acted wrongfully as it had already been established that he acted in accordance as a 
reasonable doctor in his position would have done.193   
The court in employing the test to assess the materiality of the risk as formulated in the 
Rogers’s case, held that in this instance the risk of injury to the child through natural child-
birth was very remote and therefore did not need to be disclosed.194   
3.5  The statutory framework dealing with informed consent 
There are two pieces of health legislation dealing with consent that warrant being 
discussed.  These are the Sterilisation Act 44 of 1998 and National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
The Sterilisation Act deals expressly with when and how a person must provide their 
consent to a sterilisation. On the other hand, the National Health Act provides a number of 
general norms governing consent to medical treatment and operations. The two pieces of 
legislation need to be read together in order to understand the comprehensive statutory 
framework governing consent to a sterilisation. 
 
 
                                                            
185 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
186 2014 (6) SA 533 (SCA) 543. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid.  
190 Ibid. 
191 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
192 2014 (6) SA 533 (SCA) 543. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid 544. 
88 
 
3.5.1 Sterilisation Act 44 of 1998 
The Sterilisation Act gives statutory protection to one’s right to bodily integrity and the right 
to have autonomy over their reproductive life.195  In addition, it has safeguards in place to 
monitor instances where patients who are not able to consent are sterilised.196  The key 
features of the Act relating to consent are: 
(i) It should be a patient initiated procedure and the patient requesting the 
sterilisation must be older than 18 years;197 
(ii) The patient must be capable of consenting in writing to the procedure;198 
(iii) If they are incapable of consenting; 
(iv) The written consent must obtained in a manner that is be free from coercion199 
(v) The person obtaining the consent must give an unambiguous explanation about 
the proposed procedure200 including information about the permanency or 
reversibility of it;201 and 
(vi) The patient must be made aware that the written consent202 that has been given 
for the sterilisation can be withdrawn at any time before it is performed.203 
Despite the detail in the Act with regard to consent it is silent on who is responsible for 
obtaining consent. This is problematic as the courts have also been unclear on this point as 
was evident in the Pandie matter.204 In a recent article, Badul, Strode and Singh submitted 
that given that the Health Profession Council’s guidelines require surgeons to ensure that 
consent has been obtained, the courts ought to regard a medical practitioner’s failure to 
obtain consent as negligent as it is a failure to act in accordance with a statutory duty.205  
In instances where there is non-compliance with the Act on the part of the medical 
practitioner, he or she may be found to be guilty of a criminal offence.206 The sanctions that 
may be imposed by the Court could be either a fine or a period of imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 years.207  
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3.5.2  National Health Act 61 of 2003 
In terms of the definitions provided in the National Health Act,208 a health care provider 
encompasses medical practitioners and nurses.209  Thus all the obligations referred to below 
apply to both categories of health care workers.210  Patients must be told of the risks, 
benefits and consequences that are attached to the proposed treatment sought or 
procedure to be performed.211  The Act212 makes further provision for health care providers 
to advise patients of this information in a language of their choice.213 They must also be told 
of alternatives available to the treatment that they seek or a procedure to be performed 
and their right to refuse treatment.214Although the National Health Act does deal with some 
exceptions to informed consent, these all relate to situations where the patient lacks 
capacity amongst other reasons.215 
3.6  Discussion  
The Castell216 case has been credited for formally adopting the doctrine of informed consent 
into South African law, however, it is submitted that the doctrine existed prior to this case.  
This doctrine according to Flanigan, protects patient’s medical autonomy which means that 
patients are entitled to make treatment decisions against medical advice.217  It has however 
shown significant evolution from the Stoffberg case.  The Stoffberg case was the first to set 
the benchmark with regards to what the notion of consent in a medical setting equated to 
and set the platform for patient autonomy and the right to bodily integrity.  It is evident 
from this case that when a patient is admitted to hospital this does not give doctors wide 
ranging operative powers over them even though it may have been in the patient’s best 
interest or alternatively considered to be life-saving treatment.  Subsequent cases218 have 
held similar views therefore it was not open for a doctor to argue that by the patient being 
admitted to hospital he had given his implied consent for surgical procedures to be 
performed on him.  Therefore, the foundation was set in this case to affirm that the 
interference with one’s body without his consent is wrongful and would amount to a civil 
assault.   
One of the main issues that the progression of cases thereafter paid attention to was what 
information actually needed to be disclosed to the patient.  The Lymbery219 case held that 
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the risks of the procedure must be disclosed to a patient before they provide consent for 
surgical intervention.  This was extended in the Esterhuizen220 case to cover serious risks and 
dangers that are concomitant with the medical procedure to be performed on the patient.  
In Richter and Another221 this approach was endorsed and in addition the ‘’reasonable 
doctor’’ test was introduced.  This test postulated that the attendant doctor must disclose 
risks to the patient that a ‘’reasonable doctor’’ in his position would see fit to disclose.  The 
introduction of this test signalled a move towards a paternalistic approach when dealing 
with the issue of disclosure of information to a patient.  The life span of this test was short 
lived as Castell’s case rejected this test and moved towards a patient-oriented test.  It is 
submitted, that taking into account the time at which Castell was decided, this coincided 
with the dawning of our new constitutional era and therefore a move in this direction was 
inevitable.  The test introduced in Castell’s case regarding disclosure of information is still in 
place and has been accepted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Sibisi’s case.  The enquiry is 
now centred around whether a reasonable person in the position of the patient if aware of 
the risk would attach significance to it or whether the patient who is undergoing surgery if 
warned of the risk would attach significance to it.  The three key principles that have 
emerged are that (i) only material risks need to be disclosed; (ii) remote risks did not need 
to be disclosed and (iii) the test is assessing this is a patient centred one.  The ‘’reasonable 
patient test’’ is only used when determining the issue of disclosure of information.   
Further, Castell’s case set out four elements that must be satisfied before the consent of a 
patient can be used as a defence to the wrongfulness element in a delictual claim against a 
doctor.  A patient consenting to the risk or harm  must first be provided with the necessary 
knowledge and understanding of the risk or harm.  The envisaged consent given by the 
patient must be comprehensive so that it has the effect of consenting to possible adverse 
consequences that may arise from the procedure.  Consent has thus developed into a 
defence through the maxim volenti non fit iniuria rather than a positive right in terms of our 
law.  The defence has influenced the nature of the doctrine in that the courts have thus far 
focused on the minimum standards that must be met particularly regarding the information 
that must be provided for there to be agreement. 
Many of the principles of the doctrine are now enshrined in our statutory framework with 
some statutes taking the issue of consent further.  The Sterilisation Act222 for example 
requires the consent to be free from coercion, in writing and a full understanding by the 
patient of the permanency of the procedure.  The National Health Act,223 which covers all 
other medical procedures, apart from the termination of a pregnancy, a sterilisation and 
where treatment is administered to a mental health care user, directs that patients must be 
given information about the treatment in a language of their choice.  The National Health 
                                                            
220 1957 (3) SA 710 (T). 
221 1976 (3) SA 226 (C). 
222 44 of 1998. 
223 61 of 2003. 
91 
 
Act224 also introduces the requirement that patients must be given possible alternatives to 
the treatment they seek.  It is submitted that these pieces of health specific legislation add 
to the common law doctrine of informed consent by introducing the aspects of alternatives 
to the choices made by patients and the option for patients to withdraw their consent or 
decline treatment.        
Our Constitution also bolsters these rights by giving a strong voice to patient autonomy by 
protecting a person’s bodily and psychological integrity and more especially their decisions 
relating to reproduction.  The AB225 case delved into the nature and scope of the right and 
defined it as an autonomy right that has the effect of protecting ‘’choice’’ for example a 
woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy or to use a non-permanent form of 
contraception must be respected.  A similar view was expressed by the Scottish court in the 
KR case which stated that had the patient been given sufficient information she would have 
been in a better position to make an informed choice on the course she opted to take.226    
The common law, constitutional principles dealing with bodily and psychological integrity 
and the body of legislation governing informed consent provide multi-level protection to a 
patient’s autonomy.  Therefore, a failure to obtain informed consent from a patient is 
actionable either in delict or in the criminal law.  The long-standing debate that ensued 
about whether a failure to obtain informed consent amounted to negligence or assault has 
been put to rest in the case of Sibisi.227  The judiciary has held differing views on this issue 
without concretely stating why one form of fault is to be preferred over the other.228  It is 
submitted that this could be a contributing factor as to why actions based on the lack of 
informed consent are difficult to succeed on.  The writer favours the approach taken in 
Sibisi’s case, that is, an action based on the absence of informed consent must be grounded 
in negligence.  Van Loggerenberg is of the view that this is a sound approach and there is no 
need for an ‘’artificial delict’’ in the form of a civil assault to be pleaded when establishing 
liability for the lack of informed consent.229  It is submitted that following on from the Sibisi 
case the courts should in future adopt a multi-layered approach when assessing whether 
the absence of informed consent amounts to negligence on the part of the medical doctor.  
It is submitted that the first enquiry will be whether the patient was provided with 
information regarding the procedure.  The patient will rely on the common law, the 
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Constitution and dedicated legislation that deals with informed consent when alleging that 
there was an absence of full and proper informed consent.  In the event that the medical 
doctor fails to appraise the patient in accordance with the statutory requirements as a 
reasonable doctor in his position would have done, the next stage of the enquiry will assess 
whether the doctor’s conduct was wrongful as informed consent goes to this delictual 
element. 
The evolution of patient autonomy in our law cannot escape criticism. Courts and in 
particular the Supreme Court of Appeal have been inconsistent in the way in which they 
have approached the absence of informed consent.  Cases which have come before the 
courts post 1996 have paid scant attention to the right to bodily and psychological integrity 
and the consent provisions in the National Health Act leaving the door open for strong 
elements of medical paternalism to pervade the air of informed consent.  The Sibisi case is 
however credited for bringing certainty into this arena by endorsing the patient centred test 
for disclosure of information thus removing a potential element of paternalism by a doctor 
and confirming that negligence must be pleaded as opposed to an assault.   
According to Carstens and Pearmain, medical professionals have complaints against 
informed consent citing the following: (i) it wastes valuable time which could be better 
spent on treatment as patients do not understand what they are told and that they do not 
want to be informed; (ii) it has the effect of undermining the trust that a patient should 
have in their doctor if they are to be treated successfully; (iii) the doctor will disclose only 
specific information to the patient that will ensure that the patient consents to the 
treatment; (iv) in some instances disclosure may have the effect of frightening a patient and 
thereby refusing treatment and (v) some patients will have a fixed mind-set about the 
treatment to be received and therefore disclosure of information will not have an effect on 
their decision.230  Giesen holds a similar view where he opines that a patient may also make 
an unbalanced judgment if he is provided with too much information and is made aware of 
possibilities which he is not capable of assessing because of his lack of medical training, his 
prejudices or personality.231  Paternalism is therefore more focused on the patient’s care 
rather than the needs and rights of the patient.232 
Unfortunately, it seems that from the narratives of the HIV positive women who have been 
sterilised without their full and proper consent that this attitude towards informed consent 
was present when dealing with them.  It is respectfully submitted that these complaints are 
weak and do not have a basis to survive in our current legal landscape which has made a 
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committed and concerted effort to move away from medical paternalism towards patient 
autonomy.   
The Sterilisation Act requires all persons to consent in writing to a sterilisation.233 In the 
literature, it is argued that prior to women exercising their right to make a choice they must 
be provided with sufficient information to do so which results in them making an informed 
decision.  The Sterilisation Act234 deals with matters connected to sterilisations and more 
especially the issue of consent.  Likewise, the issue of consent is also covered in the National 
Health Act.235  Dhai argues that the ethical and legal elements of a valid consent process are 
disclosure, understanding, capacity and voluntariness.236  It is vitally important to establish 
whether these elements are contained in the legislation dealing with the aspect of consent.  
Each of these elements will now be discussed in turn. 
In order for the first element of disclosure to be satisfied, the HIV positive woman should be 
given information on the risks and complications associated with a sterilisation.237  She 
should also be supplied with information regarding possible alternatives to a sterilisation.238  
The Sterilisation Act comprehensively sets out what information must be imparted to a 
woman who chooses to be sterilised.239  This legislation, being specific to sterilisations, 
requires the woman to be informed of the reversibility or permanency of the procedure.240  
Part of what must be disclosed to the woman is that she may retract her consent to the 
procedure at any time prior to it being carried out.241  The National Health Act also sets out 
explicitly what information must be relayed to a patient prior to a medical treatment being 
administered.242   
The second element of a sound consent is ensuring that the patient understands the 
proposed treatment or procedure.243  The intrinsic requirement of this, is the ability of the 
patient to grasp the information given by the medical practitioner about the planned 
procedure.244  According to Dhai, a key challenge to the process of obtaining informed 
consent is the difficulty in establishing whether or not the patient truly understands and 
grasps the nature of their illness and is able to consent to or refuse treatment. 245  In order 
to assess the level of the patient’s understanding, the learned authors McQuoid- Mason and 
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Dhai246 submit that the four levels of optimal competence proposed by Appelbaum and 
Grisso ought to be followed. The first level would entail the patient communicating the 
choices that have been given to them back to the doctor.247  The patient’s ability to 
understand the relevant information which forms the basis on which the choice is made is 
the second level.248  Our common law doctrine of informed consent also cites understanding 
as one of the key pillars of the volenti non fit inuria defence.249  The third level is the 
patient’s ability to appreciate the situation according to their own values.250  The final level 
of competence is the ability of the patient to weigh various values to arrive at a decision.251   
A positive feature of the National Health Act252 regarding understanding is that all 
information conveyed to an HIV positive woman regarding the sterilisation must be in a 
language that she understands.  This feature of the Act253 coupled with the fact that her 
literacy level must be taken into account during the information sharing exercise is 
deserving of praise.   
Adequate safeguards are contained both in the National Health Act and Sterilisation Act 
relating to legal capacity and mental capacity.254  The Sterilisation Act is prescriptive 
regarding the age that a woman needs to be before consenting to a sterilisation.255  
It is crucial that a decision made by an HIV positive woman to be sterilised must be made 
voluntarily.  This goes to the very heart of patient autonomy and self-determination.256  
Therefore, for informed consent to be genuinely valid, there should be an absence of 
coercion or manipulation of the HIV positive woman to consent to be sterilised against her 
own best interests and wishes.257  There are two built in safety mechanisms ensuring 
voluntariness in the Sterilisation Act.258  It is important to note at this juncture that there are 
only three instances in which the written consent of a patient is required by statute before a 
medical procedure is performed.259  Sterilisation has been identified as one of them. The 
Sterilisation Act requires the consent of a woman to be sterilised to be in writing and that it 
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258 Act 44 of 1998. 
259 Apart from a sterilisation, written consent is required in terms of sections 55 and 71 of the National Health 
Act 61 of 2003.  The former section deals with the removal of tissue, blood, blood products and gametes from 
a living person.  The latter concerns itself with research and experimentation with living persons.  
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must be freely and voluntarily obtained.260  It was held in the LM case that even though 
written consent to the sterilisation had been obtained this did not equate to voluntary 
consent because other factors such as prolonged labour or fear of treatment being withheld 
clearly played a role in their agreement to be sterilised.261  
Neither the Sterilisation nor the National Health Acts provide expressly that a patient must 
understand the information they have been provided with.262  It is submitted that this can 
only be achieved if a mechanism exists to ensure understanding by the women in the 
context that they find themselves in.  The National Health Act does state that where it is 
possible, the patient must be given the information in a language that he/she understands 
and that cognisance must be taken of the literacy level of the patient.263  This provision 
clearly places a duty on health professionals to promote understanding.  However, it is 
submitted that a blind eye cannot be turned to the fact that our country has eleven official 
languages and in many instances an interpreter may be required and in practice a nurse 
fulfils this function.  It is submitted that women may feel intimidated when being spoken to 
in a language that they do not understand and therefore will not participate in the decision 
making process and will provide their consent out of fear.264  
The Sterilisation and National Health Acts265 do not have provisions relating to value 
systems and cultural norms to be considered whilst dealing with the issue of consent.  The 
learned author Dhai states that ‘’differences of language and culture are two major 
obstacles to good practitioner-patient communication, with differences in cultural 
understanding of the nature and cause of illness impeding the understanding of the 
diagnosis and treatment options provided by the practitioner.’’266  It may be argued that in 
the South African context this would be placing an unfair and onerous responsibility on the 
medical practitioner because of the diverse cultures that the women come from.  However, 
the importance of this cannot be trivialised as an understanding of the value systems and 
cultural norms of African women cannot be overlooked.  The studies conducted in our 
country and in Africa reveal the coerced or forced sterilisation of African HIV positive 
women only.  In the African culture, high value is placed on a woman’s fertility.267   
3.7 Conclusion  
The progression of the law on informed consent has seen immense benefits for patients in 
the form of a solid legal framework.  Constitutional protection to the right to bodily and 
                                                            
260 Section 4 and 4 (c) of Act 44 of 1998 
261 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014) 
at para 107. 
262 Act 44 of 1998 and Act 61 of 2003. 
263 Section 6 (2) of Act 61 of 2003. 
264 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014.  
265 Act 44 of 1998 and Act 61 of 2003. 
266 Dhai ‘Informed consent – 2008’ (2008) 1 (1) South African Journal of Bio-ethics and the Law 27-30 at 28. 
267 Essack & Strode ‘I feel like half a women all the time: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34 at 31. 
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psychological integrity has influenced the changes in legislation dealing with the issue of 
consent to medical procedures.  A strong focus on patient autonomy is the underlying 
thread in all of South Africa’s health related legislation.  Despite the comprehensive legal 
framework it is submitted that challenges lie at the level of implementation.  Women who 
are poor, illiterate, marginalised and HIV positive may not enjoy the benefits of making 
autonomous informed decisions about their sexual reproductive health for an array of 
reasons that have been canvassed in Chapters 2 and 4.  Both the civil and criminal law can 
assist in vindicating these violated rights.                       
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Chapter 4 
The rights to equality and dignity 
4.1  Introduction 
The violation of the rights  to equality and dignity are key issues in the involuntary 
sterilisations being studied in this dissertation.  Many of the women interviewed in the 
Strode, Mthembu and Essack study reported that they were targeted for sterilisations 
because they were known to be HIV positive.  The constitutionally guaranteed rights to 
equality and dignity can only be understood if they are interpreted contextually.1  Currie and 
De Waal submit that the contextual analysis should include a reflection on our colonial and 
apartheid past. They state that ‘’this requires a historical understanding of the type of 
society that South Africa once was and against which the new Constitution has set itself.’’2  
Former Chief Justice of South Africa Judge Arthur Chaskalson used emotive language when 
describing apartheid as a ‘’wicked system of law’’ that privileged whites and shamefully 
marginalised black people in all aspects of life.3 South Africa’s apartheid dispensation was 
infamously known for its unequal and discriminatory political and legal order.4  The 
discriminatory treatment of black people was captured by Justice O’ Regan in the first case 
dealing with equality in the Constitutional Court.  She stated in Brink v Kitshoff: 
 Black people were prevented from becoming owners of property or even residing in 
 areas classified as 'white', which constituted nearly 90% of the landmass of South 
 Africa; senior jobs and access to established schools and universities were denied to 
 them; civic amenities, including transport systems, public parks, libraries and many 
 shops were also closed to black people.  Instead, separate and inferior facilities were 
 provided.  The deep scars of this appalling programme are still visible in our society.5 
Whilst there has been an extensive focus on race discrimination, African women faced 
barriers beyond just their race.  They also faced other layers of discrimination which related 
to their gender, sex, class and socio-economic status.  In more recent decades, many African 
women have had to endure the additional burden of being HIV positive and all of the stigma 
and discrimination that has accompanied this label.6   This chapter discusses the rights to 
equality and dignity.  This includes how these rights are described in terms of international, 
national and regional law.  It sets out in detail the relevant constitutional provisions and 
cases as well as describing the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
                                                            
1 I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 211. 
2 Ibid. 
3 A Chaskalson ‘From wickedness to equality: The moral transformation of South African law’ (2003) 1 (4) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 590 -609 at 590. 
4 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 211.  
5 (CCT15/95) [1996] ZACC 9; 1996 (4) SA 197; 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (15 May 1996), 40. 
6 A Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9. 
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Discrimination Act.7  It concludes with comments on the extent to which current South 
African law protects persons living with HIV and in particular HIV positive women. 
4.2 The right to equality 
4.2.1 Understanding the right to equality in its historical context 
Racial and gender discrimination in apartheid South Africa was institutionalised by a myriad 
of laws which were binding on all of its people and very difficult to challenge in the Courts 
because of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.8  The irony of this lay in the fact that 
although black people accounted for 80% of the population they had no say in the law 
making process of the country.9  
‘’Parliament has the power to pass the statutes it likes, and there is nothing the Courts can 
do about that.  The result is law.  But that is not always the same as justice.  The only way 
that Parliament can ever make legislation just is by making just legislation.’’10  This profound 
statement was made by Judge Didcott in In re Dube11 which bore testament to the impact of 
apartheid legislation that black South Africans were subjected to.  In that case Dube was 
considered to be an ‘’idle person’’ according to the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 
25 of 1945 by virtue of being unemployed for a period of 122 days.12  The Judge was called 
upon to endorse the declaration made by the Commissioner deeming Dube an ‘’idle 
person’’ and confining him to a farm colony for a period of two years unless he obtained 
employment within thirty days.13  This decision was made without taking into account that 
Dube was an epileptic who suffered from frequent fits, required constant medication and 
could only perform light tasks.14  The Dube case reflects the arbitrary nature of apartheid 
legislation that expressly aimed at excluding blacks from so called white areas.  It also shows 
how cruel it would have been if Judge Didcott confirmed the order as Dube would be 
punished for being disabled.  Even though, this case is more than thirty years old it still 
reflects how arbitrary policies or laws can have a profound personal impact on individuals.  
In Dube’s case he would have to spend two years in a farm colony simply because he was 
disabled.   
An example of a piece of legislation that depicted the unequal and discriminatory treatment 
that black people were subjected to is set out below. 
                                                            
7 Act 4 of 2000. 
8 Chaskalson ‘From wickedness to equality: The moral transformation of South African law’ (2003) 1 (4) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 590 -609 at 590.  
9 Ibid 592. 
10 In re Dube 1979 (3) 820 (N) 821 F.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 820 - G. 
13 Ibid 821 - F. 
14 Ibid 821 G. 
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The Railways and Harbours Regulation, Control and Management Act 22 of 1916 was an 
example of legislation that was unequal and partial in nature. This legislation was actively 
enforced by the apartheid Government.  Persons who attempted to wilfully disobey the law 
were punished.  In Rex v Abdurahman15  the appellant was convicted for violating section 36 
(b) of the Act by inciting non-white persons to sit in first class compartments of a train that 
was reserved for Europeans only.16   
The implementation of unjust and partial legislation also led to the loss of lives in South 
Africa.  On the 21 March 1960 in the township of Sharpeville, Africans marched in protest 
against the provisions of the Native Urban Areas Act of 1954 which was more commonly 
known as the pass laws.  This law required Africans to carry their pass books with them 
which had to bear official stamps serving as proof that that person was allowed to enter an 
urban area or a specified town at that time.17   Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act18 set out 
the instances in which Africans were permitted to stay in an urban area for more than 72 
hours.  These instances included: 
(i)  The person must have been born and lived in that area since birth; 
(ii)  The person had been employed for ten years under one employer, or had lived there for                                                                                                                                                                                
15 years without contravening any law;  
(iii)  The child or wife of a man as who fulfilled the conditions contemplated in sections 10 
(a) and (b) and 
(iv)  The person was authorised to be in an urban area by virtue of a signed contract of 
employment for a limited period of time.19 
An opportunity arose in Rikhoto v East Rand Administration Board and Another20 to 
challenge the unjust consequences the Act had for many people who lived in urban areas 
for long periods of time but never gained any security of tenure.21  This was done through 
arguing that the purpose of the provisions of section 10 of the Act22 should be interpreted 
broadly.  The court held that its purpose was to provide an exemption to a small category of 
black persons who could show that they were employed by one employer for a period of ten 
years and hence they could ‘’usefully or satisfactorily be absorbed in the economic life of 
the urban community in question.’’23  In addition, an African who did not contravene the 
                                                            
15 1950 (3) SA 136 (A). 
16 1950 (3) SA 136 (A) 141. 
17 P De Vos & W Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 17. 
18 Native Urban Areas Act of 1954. 
19 1983 (4) SA 278 (W) at 281. 
20 1983 (4) SA 278 (W). 
21 Urban Areas Act of 1954. 
22 Ibid. 
23 1983 (4) SA 278 (W) at 285 E. 
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law for 15 years was regarded as being desirable therefore could be exempt from the 
seventy two hour ban.24  
Another example of legislation that had the aim of racial segregation was the Bantu 
Education Act of 1953.  The architect of this repressive piece of legislation, H F Verwoerd, 
stated that "there is no place for [the Bantu] in the European community above the level of 
certain forms of labour ... What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it 
cannot use it in practice?"25  This white supremacist philosophy endorsed by Verwoerd was 
adopted as the national approach to education for Africans and it resulted in them being 
taught from an early age that equality was not for them.26  In fact, this was borne out by the 
spending patterns of the South African government on its scholars.  Approximately six and a 
half times more was spent on a white school-going child as opposed to a black school-going 
child.  Table 4 below depicts the different amounts spent on scholars of different race 
groups.27   
Table 4.1:  Inequality in education spending under apartheid 
Different race groups Black Coloured Indian White 
Amount spent for 1985/1986 per 
scholar 
R 293.86 R 708.32 R1 182.00 R1 926.00 
Source: Rycroft, 1987.  
To further entrench the divide in education the apartheid government also promulgated for 
Afrikaans, commonly referred to as the language of the oppressor, to be taught alongside 
English as the only mediums of instruction to African children.28 On the 16 June 1976 
students marched in protest against this oppressive directive which resulted in the loss of 
many young lives.29  With the passing of time resistance grew stronger towards the unequal 
treatment that black people were receiving in South Africa.  Activism gained momentum 
and the call for a non-racial South Africa where all people are equal before the law became 
commonplace.  In response to the activism from non-white people and intense international 
pressure, the apartheid government unbanned the African National Congress and other 
political parties on the 2 February 1990.30  The 11th of February 1990 saw the historic 
release of former president Nelson Mandela from prison.31  As a result of extensive 
                                                            
24 Ibid. 
25 ‘Bantu Education Act, 1953’ (2018), available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bantu_Education_Act,_1953.  
Accessed on 7 April 2017. 
26 ‘The June 16 Soweto Youth uprising’ (2013), available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/june-16-soweto-
youth-uprising.  Accessed on 7 April 2017 
27 A Rycroft Race and the Law in South Africa (1987) 237. 
28 ‘The June 16 Soweto Youth uprising’ (2013), available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/june-16-soweto-
youth-uprising.  Accessed on 7 April 2017. 
29  Ibid. 
30 De Vos & Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014).  
31 Ibid. 
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negotiations a ‘’moral document’’32 the interim Constitution was born which signalled the 
end of the apartheid era and more especially unequal treatment for all who lived in South 
Africa.33   
The most significant purpose of the interim Constitution was to administer South Africa’s 
first democratic elections where all adult South Africans could vote in the same election for 
the first time.34  Unjust legislation that existed in the apartheid era could not be erased from 
the statute books without its provisions being repealed by the new democratic Parliament 
or declared invalid by the Constitutional Court.35  One such challenge that was made was in 
the case of Moseneke and Others v The Master of the High Court.36  This case challenged a 
manifestly discriminatory piece of legislation in light of the provisions of the Constitution.37  
The Court held that the Black Administration Act and the attached Regulations imposed 
differentiation on listed grounds contained in section 9 (3) of the Constitution that is, on the 
grounds of colour, race and ethnic origin and as such constituted discrimination which was 
unfair.38  This case like many others that have come before the Constitutional Court has 
shown firstly, that the Court recognises intersectional discrimination as a key factor in such 
cases.  Secondly, even 24 years into our democracy the court continues to adjudicate 
equality disputes within the historical context of South Africa’s unjust past.39    
4.2.2 The right to equality in international and regional law  
The concept of being treated equally and being equal before the law is entrenched in 
international, regional and national law.  Article 1 of the UDHR proclaims that ‘’all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’’.40  Article 2 extends this concept of 
equality and dignity by stating that ‘’everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status’’.41  
Similarly, the ICCPR echoes the sentiment that with equality there shall be no discrimination 
by stating that ‘’all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law.  In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
                                                            
32 Aptly described by former Chief Justice and the first President of the Constitutional Court, Judge Arthur 
Chaskalson. 
33 De Vos & Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 19. 
34 Section 6 of the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993.   
35  See section 98 (2) (c) of the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993 and section 172(1) (a) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
36 Moseneke and Others v Master of the High Court (CCT51/00) [2000] ZACC 27; 2001 (2) BCLR 103 (CC); 2001 
(2) SA 18 (CC) (6 December 2000). 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid para 22. 
39 Duncanmec (Pty) Limited v Gaylard NO and Others (CCT284/17) [2018] ZACC 29 (13 September 2018). 
40 Came into effect on the 10 December 1948, as a response to the atrocities committed during World War 2, 
available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml. 
41 Ibid. 
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discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’’.42     
CEDAW deals specifically with the prohibition of discriminatory treatment of women in all 
spheres of life including civil, social, cultural, economic and political.43  According to the 
Convention discrimination means ‘’distinction, exclusion or restriction’’ made on the basis of 
sex.44  
The right to be equal before the law and have equal protection before the law is also 
protected at a regional level.45  The ACHPR provides that ‘’every individual shall be entitled 
to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present 
Charter without distinction of any kind…’’.46  The grounds listed are identical to the grounds 
contained in the UDHR and ICCPR save for the addition of ethnic group.47  It is clear from a 
cursory glance at the international and regional law that there is a clear right to equality 
based on the listed ground of sex however, HIV is not a listed ground. 
Based on our international law obligations, the Cairo Declaration mandates our government 
to have in place mechanisms that deal with population and development in a manner that 
aligns itself with human rights and takes into account the values and traditions of its 
citizens.48 Although the obligations in the Cairo Declaration are not legally binding, 
nevertheless they are important as the Constitutional Court has made it clear that both 
binding and non-binding public international law can be used to assist in the interpretation 
of constitutional rights.49   This means that any interpretation of constitutional rights 
relating to women’s reproductive health care must be interpreted in line with these 
international norms which focus on amongst others the right to autonomy. 
 
 
 
                                                            
42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 and ratified by South Africa on 10 
December 1998, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.pdf.  Article 26.  
43 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979 and 
ratified by South Africa on 15 December 1995, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ 
daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm.  Article 1. 
44 Ibid. 
45 African (Banjul) Charter on the Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981 and ratified by South Africa on 9 
July 1996. Available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/.  Article 3. 
46 Ibid Article 2. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
49 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 
164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (6 June 1995). 
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4.2.3  National Law 
4.2.3.1  Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
According to Jugwanth equality has a central place in the South African legal framework.50  
This was echoed in the case of Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North Mohamed J stated 
that: 
 There can be no doubt that the guarantee of equality lies at the very heart of the 
 Constitution.  It permeates and defines the very ethos upon which the Constitution is 
 premised.  In the very first paragraph of the preamble it is declared that there is a ‘’…need to 
 create a new order…in which there is equality between men and women and people of all 
 races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and 
 freedoms.51 
This rings true as equality is not only a right but also a foundational value in our 
Constitution, as stated in sections 1 (a) and 7 (1).52  Constitutional values can best be 
described as the ‘’ideals or characteristics’’ to which a society deems deserving to aspire 
to.53  In the South African context, these values reflect a move away from our past and serve 
to cement the foundation of a new society.54  The importance of the constitutional values as 
set out in section 1 of the Constitution is highlighted by the fact that a 75% majority vote is 
required before the values of the Constitution can be changed by Parliament.55 
The first substantive right in our Bill of Rights is the right to equality.56  There are five 
subsections to the right.  The first is section 9 (1) of the equality clause makes provision for 
everyone to be equal before the law and to have the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law.57  This is the premise from which liberal states that strive for an egalitarian society 
begin.58  This is an important starting point for our law on equality as it moves us away from 
our discriminatory past in which there was no equal treatment.  However, is it not without 
difficulties as Sachs J has pointed out that treating people alike does not necessarily have to 
                                                            
50 S Jagwanth ‘Expanding equality’ (2005) Acta Juridica 131-148. 
51 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North and Others (CCT31/96) [1997] ZACC 1; 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC); 1997 (2) 
BCLR 153 (CC) (5 February 1997), para 20. 
52 Section 1(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that the Republic of South Africa 
is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.  Section 7 (1) proclaims that the Bill of Rights is 
a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.  It enshrines the right of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.   
53 De Vos & Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 59. 
54 Ibid 58. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
57 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
58 T Loenen ‘The Equality Clause in the South African Constitution: Some remarks from a comparative 
perspective’ (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 401-429 at 416. 
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result in uniformity, instead it is an recognition of difference.59  This approach of identifying 
difference is critical in the South African context in which the jurisprudence has focused on 
substantive rather than formal equality.   
Formal equality, according to Currie and De Waal, means the sameness of treatment, that is, 
individuals in like circumstances must be treated alike by the law.60 De Vos and Freedman 
define formal equality as treating all people in the same manner regardless of their social 
and economic status; personal circumstances; their history; whether they have faced 
discrimination in the past and continue to face discrimination.61 Goldstone J in President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo observed that treating people identically 
can sometimes result in inequality: 
 We need, therefore, to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that 
 although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal 
 worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical 
 treatment in all circumstances before that goal is achieved.  Each case, therefore, will 
 require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action 
 upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which 
 furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not.  A classification which is unfair in one 
 context may not necessarily be unfair in a different context.62 
It can be said that Hugo’s case signalled the end of the notion of formal equality being 
applied exclusively when dealing with issues of equality.  Substantive equality by contrast 
reinforces the idea that people who are not alike should not be treated the same and that 
the circumstances of people must be taken into account to ensure an equal outcome.63  This 
is particularly important in the context of this thesis that addresses unfair discrimination 
against women who are HIV positive, poor and often African. The court in Minister of 
Finance v Van Heerden embraced the concept of substantive equality by noting that there 
are many levels and forms of differentiation which subtly impact on the way people are 
                                                            
59 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (CCT10/99) 
[1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) (2 December 1999), at para 132. 
60 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 213. 
61 De Vos & Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 421. 
62 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo (CCT11/96) [1997] ZACC 4; 1997 (6) BCLR 708 
(CC); 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (18 April 1997), para 41.  The facts of this case are that on 27 June 1994 the President 
of the Republic of South Africa granted special remission of sentences to certain categories of prisoners.  The 
category of prisoners that this was directed to was all mothers in prison on 10 May 1994, with minor children 
under the age of twelve (12) years.  Hugo alleged that the Presidential Act was in violation of the provisions of 
section 8 (1) and (2) of the interim Constitution in as much as it unfairly discriminated against him on the 
ground of sex or gender and indirectly against his son in terms of section 8 (2) because his incarcerated parent 
was not a female.  It is common cause that Hugo would have qualified for remission, but for the fact that he 
was the father (and not the mother) of his son who was under the age of twelve years at the relevant date.  
The court held that the discrimination against men was fair and was motivated by a genuine desire to assist 
the children of these women.   
63 J De Waal ‘Equality and the Constitutional Court’ (2002) 14 SA Mercantile Law Journal 141-156 at 141-142.  
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treated.64  The Court stated that these forms of differentiation were scrutinised as part of 
the fairness enquiry and to ensure that equality as a constitutional value was promoted.65  
From these early cases our jurisprudence has developed in a fashion that affirms the notion 
that substantive equality must prevail when interpreting issues of equality as the 
uniqueness of South Africa’s history must be taken into account.  A host of learned authors 
have concurred with the views favouring the notion of substantive equality.66  Ngcobo J in 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd sums up the concept of equality by stating that: 
 The achievement of equality is one of the fundamental goals that we have fashioned for 
 ourselves in the Constitution.  Our constitutional order is committed to the transformation 
 of our society from a grossly unequal society to one in which there is equality between men 
 and women and people of all races.  In this fundamental way, our Constitution differs from 
 other constitutions which assume that all are equal and in so doing simply entrench existing 
 inequalities.  Our Constitution recognises that decades of systematic racial discrimination 
 entrenched by the apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive action being 
 taken to achieve that result.  We are required to do more than that.67  
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court’s focus on substantive equality is important in 
relation to addressing the unfair discrimination and sterilisation abuse suffered by HIV 
positive women. A substantial equality approach requires an examination of the social 
context within which the discrimination occurred.  As quoted above from the Minister of 
Finance v Van Heerden case, in some instances these may be small and subtle factors but 
nevertheless they lead to value judgments and differential treatment.  In this specific 
instance it is clear from the Strode study that poor African women using public health 
facilities whose medical records showed they were HIV positive and in some cases had other 
children, were treated in a discriminatory and demeaning way because they were perceived 
to be irresponsible in  bringing potentially HIV positive children into the world.68  This 
behaviour was seen as so inappropriate that they were singled out for sterilisations as part 
of what appears to be an unarticulated policy that HIV positive women should be sterilised 
for their own benefit.  
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The remedial and restitutionary component of the equality clause is found in section 9 (2) of 
the Bill of Rights which makes provision for the achievement of equality of persons who 
have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination through legislation.69  This sub-section is a 
constitutional acceptance of the importance of substantive equality.  The two pieces of 
legislation that are by-products of section 9 (2) are the Employment Equity Act70 and 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (hereinafter referred to 
as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act  or the Equality 
Act).71    
The third and fourth sub-sections of section 9 prohibit unfair discrimination by the state or 
natural persons on one or more of the listed grounds and that legislation must be enacted 
to prohibit such discrimination.72 The discrimination need not be overt and can be either 
direct or indirect.73  It is significant that these subsections ensure that the clause applies 
both vertically and horizontally.  The seventeen listed grounds are race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.74  In commenting on the rationale 
behind the listed grounds O’Regan stated: 
 Although our history is one in which the most visible and most vicious pattern of 
 discrimination has been racial, other systematic motifs of discrimination were and are 
 inscribed on our social fabric.  In drafting section 8, the drafters recognised that systematic 
 patterns of discrimination on grounds other than race have caused, and may continue to 
 cause, considerable harm.  For this reason, section 8(2) lists a wide, and not exhaustive, list 
 of prohibited grounds of discrimination.75  
The learned author De Waal refers to these listed grounds as illegitimate grounds.76  In 
Harksen v Lane NO the Court stated that listed grounds are those grounds of discrimination 
are those grounds that have been identified in the past.77  Some of these relate to biological 
characteristics such as sex and others deal with the associational life of humans such as 
conscience.78 
                                                            
69 Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.   
70 55 of 1998. 
71 4 of 2000.  This Act will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
72 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
73 Section 9 (3) and (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
74 Section 9 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
75 Brink v Kitshoff NO (CCT15/95) [1996] ZACC 9; 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC); 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC) (15 May 1996).  
Section 8 of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 was the equality clause.   
76 De Waal ‘Equality and the Constitutional Court’ (2002) 14 SA Mercantile Law Journal 141-156 at 150.  
77 Harksen v Lane NO and Others (CCT9/97) [1997] ZACC 12; 1997 (11) BCLR 1489; 1998 (1) SA 300 (7 October 
1997) at para 49. 
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Discrimination can also take place on other grounds that are not listed in section 9(3) and 
these have become known as analogous grounds.79  The Constitutional Court has on two 
occasions in the past used analogous grounds to decide whether the discrimination 
complained of was unfair.  The first instance was in Larbi-Odam and Others v Member of the 
Executive Council for Education and Another where it was held that a regulation issued by 
the Minister of Education which had the effect of preventing non-citizens from being 
appointed as permanent educators amounted to unfair discrimination.80  The educators 
who were foreign nationals and some of whom were permanent residents of South Africa, 
were employed as temporary teachers.  The analogous ground of discrimination on which 
they relied was citizenship.  The court held that in this case the disadvantaged group was 
foreign nationals.81  Citizenship, being an unlisted ground was ‘’based on attributes and 
characteristics which have had the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of 
persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.’’82  In 
addition, Judge Mokgoro went on to state that ‘’foreign citizens are a minority in all 
countries, and have little political muscle and that citizenship is a personal attribute which is 
difficult to change.’’83   
An important question then arises as to how exactly is unfair discriminatory conduct 
established by our courts.  According to Freedman, the Constitutional Court’s analysis of the 
equality clause in Harksen’s case provides for two separate inquiries which embrace three 
separate tests.84  The aim of the first stage of the inquiry is: 
To determine whether the law or conduct in question differentiates between individuals 
and groups of people.  If it does so differentiate, then in order not to fall foul of section 8(1) 
of the interim Constitution there must be a rational connection between the differentiation 
in question and the legitimate governmental purpose it is designed to further or achieve.85   
According to the majority judgment in the case of Prinsloo, ‘’the idea of differentiation lies 
at the heart of the right to equality.’’86  The court held that ‘’in order to govern a modern 
country efficiently and to harmonise the interests of all its people for the common good, it is 
necessary to classify people in countless different ways and to treat the members of each 
group so classified differently from members of other groups.’’87  The court concluded that 
                                                            
79 According to Loenen the grounds mentioned in section 9(3) are extensive but not exhaustive due to the 
addition of the word ‘including’:  ‘’The Equality Clause in the South African Constitution: Some remarks from a 
comparative perspective’ (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 401-429 at 403.  
80 Larbi-Odam and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) and Another 
(CCT2/97) [1997] ZACC 16; 1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC); 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) (26 November 1997).  
81 Ibid at para 3. 
82 Ibid 20. 
83 Ibid 19. 
84 W Freedman ‘Understanding the right to equality’ (1998) 115 (2) South African Law Journal 243-251 at 248. 
85 Harksen v Lane NO and Others (CCT9/97) [1997] ZACC 12; 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (7 
October 1997) para 42. 
86 Freedman ‘Understanding the right to equality’ (1998) 115 (2) South African Law Journal 243-251 at 245.   
87 Ibid 245. 
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such differentiation will seldom amount to unfair discrimination.  In other words the Court 
accepted that differences based on a listed ground of discrimination on its own will not 
always per se be unfair.88  
The second stage of the inquiry is ‘’to ascertain whether the law or conduct in question 
unfairly discriminates on a ground or two or more grounds. There are two parts to this 
inquiry that is, (i) a test for discrimination; and (ii) a test for unfairness.’’89  
With regards to the test for discrimination the key question is whether the differentiation 
amounts to discrimination.90  In casu the court held that if the discrimination is based on 
one of the illegitimate specified grounds contained in section 8 (2) this would amount to 
discrimination.91  The court had to then grapple with instances where the differentiation 
was not based on a specified ground.  Judge Goldstone stated that in these instances: 
 If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is discrimination will depend 
 upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have 
 the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to 
 affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.92 
At this point in the inquiry if it is concluded that the differentiation does amount to 
discrimination, the next test that has to be administered is whether the discrimination is 
unfair.93  A presumption of unfairness exits if the discrimination is on a specified ground.94  If 
however, the discrimination is on an unspecified ground the onus will rest on the 
complainant to show unfairness.95  To assist a Court in coming to its decision where a 
complainant has to show unfairness, Judge Goldstone enumerated factors that the Courts 
must take cognisance of when embarking on this leg of the test: 
(i) The position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the 
 past from patterns of disadvantage.  If the complainants are part of a group which 
 has suffered discrimination in the past, then it is more likely that the discrimination 
 will be unfair.96 
(ii)  The nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it.  If 
 its purpose is manifestly not directed at impairing the complainant’s dignity but is 
                                                            
88 Ibid 245. 
89 Ibid 248. 
90 Harksen v Lane NO and Others (CCT9/97) [1997] ZACC 12; 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (7 
October 1997) para 45. 
91 Ibid para 46. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid para 47. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Freedman ‘Understanding the right to equality’ (1998) 115 (2) South African Law Journal 243-251 at 246. 
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 aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal, such as furthering the fact 
 suffered the impairment in question.97 
(iii) The extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of 
 complainants and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental human 
 dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious nature.98 
If the inquiry renders a result of unfair discrimination then a determination will have to be 
made as to whether the law or governmental conduct in question is a violation of s 8 (2).  In 
other words it will be then necessary to assess whether the unfair discrimination can be 
justified in terms of s 33.99   
It is trite that discrimination on one of the seventeen listed grounds will be presumed 
unfair.100  With regards to unfair discrimination based on a similar ground the onus now 
shifts to the applicant to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.  This would 
immediately seem a more onerous burden that rests on the applicant, however, according 
to Freedman the reasons set out by Judge Goldstone in Harksen’s case make the onus 
relatively easy to satisfy.101  The learned Judge in this case stated that a wide interpretation 
must be given to the terms ‘’characteristics and attributes’’; the differentiation in question 
must have the ‘’potential’’ to impair the applicant’s dignity and the notion of dignity is 
broad and vague.102  Apart from the guidance provided by the learned Judge in assessing 
when a ground can be considered to be analogous to a listed ground, other behaviour that 
leads to patterns of disadvantageous treatment may come to be considered as ‘’suspect’’.103  
According to Kruger, stigmatisation that arises from prejudice and stereotyping is not 
unique to South Africa’s past.104  ‘’New patterns of marginalisation and exclusion hinging 
upon attributes like HIV-status are as constitutionally reprehensible as the old ones based 
on race.’’105  It has also been argued that disadvantaged groups should not only be afforded 
protection against unfair discrimination but such protection must extend to all persons who 
belong to a vulnerable group.106 
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The other case that dealt with unfair discrimination on a non-enumerated ground was 
Hoffmann v South African Airways.107  Hoffmann applied successfully to South African 
Airways (SAA) to be a cabin attendant.  This was subject to him passing a pre-employment 
medical screening test.  Part of the process entailed being tested for HIV.  Hoffmann was 
found to be clinically fit and suitable for employment, however, the blood test revealed that 
he was HIV positive.  On the basis of his HIV-positive status he was rendered unfit for 
employment.   It was contended on behalf of Hoffmann that he was unfairly discriminated 
against on the listed ground of disability.  The Court refused to classify HIV positive persons 
as being disabled but rather held that South African Airway’s policy of not employing 
Hoffmann because he was living with HIV impaired his dignity and resulted in him being 
unfairly discriminated.108  The Court applied the test used in Harksen’s109 case to come to 
this decision.  The relevant sub-sections relied on by the Court were 9 (1), (3) and (5).  
Although the Court did not specify that it was relying on an analogous ground, it can be 
implied that it recognised a person’s HIV status was an illegitimate reason for failing to 
employ them.  
South African Airways is an organ of state by virtue of it being a business unit of Transnet 
which has public powers and performs public functions in the public interest.110  Therefore, 
in terms of section 9 (3) it is expressly prohibited from discriminating against anyone.  In 
order to determine whether there has been a violation of section 9(1) the following 
enquiries have to be undertaken.  The first is to assess whether the challenged provision 
makes a ‘’differentiation that bears a rational connection to a legitimate government 
purpose.’’111  If, the differentiation bears no rational connection, there is a violation of 
section 9 (1) which would then warrant the second enquiry, that is, whether the 
differentiation amounts to unfair discrimination.112  If the differentiation is fair, there is no 
violation of section 9 (3) and the enquiry will end at this point.  Where there is unfair 
discrimination, this would necessitate an enquiry into whether the unfair discrimination can 
find protection under the limitations clause.113  Judge Ngcobo did not consider it necessary 
to embark on the rationality enquiry in light of the views that he held regarding the unfair 
discrimination in this case.  Judge Ngcobo stated that: 
 At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination is the recognition that under our 
 Constitution all human beings, regardless of their position in society, must be accorded 
 equal dignity.  That dignity is impaired when a person is unfairly discriminated against. The 
 determining factor regarding the unfairness of the discrimination is its impact on the person 
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 discriminated against.  Relevant considerations in this regard include the position of the 
 victim of the discrimination in society, the purpose sought to be achieved by the 
 discrimination, the extent to which the rights or interests of the victim of the discrimination 
 have been affected, and whether the discrimination has impaired the human dignity of the 
 victim.114 
The Court found that the present case is a good example of how people living with HIV are 
marginalised and stigmatised as a result of their positive status when it comes to 
employment rather, than being assessed on their ability to perform their duties.115  Further, 
the learned Judge stated that HIV positive people constituted a minority and belonged to a 
vulnerable group in our society.116  In turn, society’s response to HIV positive people is 
fuelled with intense prejudice and discrimination.117    
The employer in this case justified their unfair and discriminatory policy on three broad 
grounds.  The first was for medical reasons, the second for operational requirements and 
the third being for the safety of its passengers and staff.118  It was submitted that an 
employee had to be fit in order to travel world-wide.119  World-wide duty entailed travelling 
to yellow fever endemic countries which meant that a cabin attendant had to be vaccinated 
against contracting yellow fever.120  The difficulty in this regard was that HIV positive 
persons could have an adverse reaction to this vaccine as it is a live-attenuated vaccine 
which could be dangerous to persons with compromised immune systems.121 The employer 
could not run the risk of HIV-positive cabin attendants not taking the vaccine as they could 
contract yellow fever and transmit it to staff and passengers.122 A further submission made 
by the employer was that people living with HIV were more likely to contract opportunistic 
diseases ultimately leading to illness- which would render the employee unfit for duty.123  
The life span of people living with HIV was too short to justify the expenditure on training 
them.124  
The medical evidence presented to the Court was contrary to the submissions made by the 
employer.  The evidence indicated that an HIV-positive person who is not displaying the 
symptoms of the illness can perform the functions of a cabin attendant competently.125  
Medication, counselling and monitoring would assist in ensuring that a cabin attendant who 
is HIV-positive carries out his job requirements efficiently and well established 
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precautionary measures can be taken to ensure that no harm is caused to staff and 
passengers.126  It was also submitted on behalf of Hoffmann that the employer’s policy did 
not take into account cabin attendants who have contracted HIV subsequent to being 
employed as they would pose the same risks as listed by the employer.127  In other words 
SAA’s pre-employment HIV employment testing policy was irrational as it did not factor in 
the possibility that employees could become HIV positive after being employed.   
The court held that discriminating against persons living with HIV is in itself devastating and 
to do so in the work place intensifies its impact as it robs them of the right to make a 
living.128  The Court held that the reason for the discriminatory conduct on the part of South 
African Airways could not support its continued policy of discrimination.129  The Court 
acknowledged that whilst ‘’legitimate commercial requirements’’ play a pivotal role in 
dictating whether an individual should be employed this should not be a licence to allow 
stereotypes and prejudice to prevail.130  The learned judge stated that: 
 The greater interests of society require the recognition of the inherent dignity of every 
 human being, and the elimination of all forms of discrimination. Our Constitution protects 
 the weak, the marginalised, the socially outcast, and the victims of prejudice and 
 stereotyping.131 
The court cited with approval the dictum from the case of MX of Bombay Indian Inhabitant v 
M/S ZY which eloquently encapsulated the plight of people living with HIV and the 
challenges they face in the employment sphere: 
 In our opinion, the State and public Corporations like respondent No. 1 cannot take a 
 ruthless and inhuman stand that they will not employ a person unless they are satisfied that 
 the person will serve during the entire span of service from the employment till 
 superannuation. As is evident from the material to which we have made a detailed reference 
 in the earlier part of this judgment, the most important thing in respect of persons infected 
 with HIV is the requirement of community support, economic support and non-
 discrimination of such person. This is also necessary for prevention and control of this 
 terrible disease. Taking into consideration the widespread and present threat of this disease 
 in the world in general and this country in particular, the State cannot be permitted to 
 condemn the victims of HIV infection, many of whom may be truly unfortunate, to certain 
 economic death. It is not in the general public interest and is impermissible under the 
 Constitution. The interests of the HIV positive persons, the interests of the employer and the 
 interests of the society will have to be balanced in such a case.132     
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With regards to enquiring whether the violation of Hoffmann’s right to equality was 
justified, the Court held that such an enquiry was not necessary as it was not dealing with a 
law of general application.133  The learned Judge also stressed that our commitment to 
eradicating discrimination does not only stem from our Constitution but also international 
instruments which are committed to eliminating discrimination.134   In this matter, the Court 
remedied the violation by ordering SAA to instate Hoffmann to the position of cabin 
attendant that he would have qualified for had it not been for their discriminatory HIV 
policy.135   
Following on from the Hoffman decision, if a HIV positive woman was sterilised because of 
her status she would be able to challenge the actions of the medical practitioner and 
hospital on the basis of an unlisted ground.  It is clear from Hoffman and the subsequent 
recognition of HIV status as being a ground for unfair discrimination in both the 
Employment Equity Act and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act that discrimination on this basis violates a person’s dignity and is 
unacceptable within our constitutional framework.    
4.2.3.2  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000  
The drafters of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act were 
alive to the unequal and discriminatory treatment that affected the majority of South 
Africans in the social and economic spheres of life and it was recognised that significant 
inroads were made with regards to transformation and restructuring.  However, the 
difficulty lies with the deep rooted prejudices, practices and stereotypes that serve to 
perpetuate unequal and discriminatory treatment that the majority of the people are still 
subjected to.  Given this objective, the drafters of the Act included a number of innovative 
remedies which could be used to address the underlying prejudice.136  The purpose of the 
Act is therefore to promote equality and prevent unfair discrimination by being guided by 
the principles of equality, human dignity, fairness and justice.137 
The history of this Act has been captured admirably by Barney Pityana who was one of the 
key role-players in the drafting of the Equality Act.138  According to him, there were four key 
objectives of the Act which deserve mention.  In the first instance the Act seeks to fulfil its 
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constitutional mandate in terms of section 9 (4) of the Constitution.139  Secondly, the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act  is aimed at giving effect 
to South Africa’s international obligations in respect of The International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter referred to as CERD) and 
CEDAW.140  Both of these conventions have been ratified and adopted by South Africa.141  
Thirdly, the Act is aimed at being accessible to ordinary people by providing specific 
remedies and redress to litigants.142  Prior to the enactment of the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act the Constitutional Court pronounced on 
equality cases whose decisions, served to develop our equality jurisprudence.143  The 
learned author argues that ‘’privileged classes’’ of persons had the means to approach the 
Constitutional Court whilst for the vast majority of poor South Africans discrimination 
remained a ‘’daily fact of life.’’144  At this point it is appropriate to mention that the principle 
of subsidiarity requires that ‘’where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, 
without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.’’145  
This in effect means that cases that seek to challenge issues of unfair discrimination and the 
right to equality must invoke the provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act  rather than relying on the equality clause in terms of the 
Constitution.  Lastly, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
 seeks to reinforce the primacy of equality being a foundational value of the South African 
Constitutional system. 146   
According to the learned authors Pityana and Bohler-Muller, the central feature of the 
Equality Act is the establishment of the Equality Courts.147  The sections of the Act 148 that 
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will assist in advancing the claims of HIV positive women who have been sterilised without 
their informed consent or coercively will be examined.   
Before proceeding with the examination of the relevant sections it is imperative to ascertain 
what the Act prohibits and its scope. Section 6 of the Act149 provides a very broad 
prohibition of unfair discrimination by stating that that no person may unfairly discriminate 
against any person on the ground of sex.  No person encompasses the State as well.150  
According to section 1 of the Act discrimination means ‘’any act or omission, including a 
policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which directly or indirectly; imposes 
burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages 
from any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds.’’151 For McGregor and 
Germishuys a violation of a person’s dignity is the most significant factor in determining the 
grounds for making differentiation illegitimate and, consequently, discriminatory.152   
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act  lists a number of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination which are identical to the grounds listed in terms of 
section 9 (3) of our Constitution.153  As of the 2 August 2017, HIV/AIDS has now been added 
to the prohibited grounds of discrimination.154  In addition, the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act goes further and states that a prohibited ground can 
also include any other ground.  Discrimination based on that other ground is such when it: 
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
(ii) undermines human dignity; or 
(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious 
manner that is comparable to discrimination on a listed ground.155  
It must be borne in mind that this is not a closed list as the Act makes provision for further 
grounds to be added to the list.156 These grounds have been referred to as analogous 
grounds by certain authors157 who state that differentiation on analogous grounds may also 
be constitutionally illegitimate as is now clearly stated by The Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act .  The Constitutional Court has held that grounds 
                                                            
149 Act 4 of 2000. 
150 Section 5 (1) of Act 4 of 2000. 
151 Act 4 of 2000. 
152 M McGregor & W Germishuys ‘The taxonomy of an ‘’unspecified’’ ground in discrimination law’ (2014) 35 
(1) Obiter 94-107 at 95. 
153 1996 Constitution. 
154 Judicial Matters Amendment Act 8 of 2017, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2017-
008.pdf accessed on 18 December 2017 at p 24. 
155 Section 1 (1) (xxii) (b) (i)-(iii). 
156 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (2001) 53. 
157 K Govender ‘Equality, sexuality and taking rights seriously’ (2008) 29 (1) Obiter 1-18 at 7. 
116 
 
such as citizenship158 and HIV-status159 are analogous grounds which are afforded 
protection by section 9 of the Constitution.160 
The onus of proving that there has been discrimination rests with the complainant.161  In 
other words, the complainant has to show that prima facie the discrimination as stipulated 
in section 1 was based on a ground listed in terms of the Act162 or on an analogous ground.  
Discrimination based on a listed ground or analogous ground provided, that it qualifies as an 
analogous ground as required by the Act, is deemed to be discrimination. 
4.3  The right to dignity 
4.3.1 Understanding the right to dignity in a South African context 
The concept of dignity is a difficult one to define.  Some authors such as Wood state that 
dignity means ‘’worthiness’’ or ‘’excellence.’’163  This seems to imply that dignity is only 
accorded to persons who meet a certain standard.  In terms of Kantian ethics, individuals 
must not be treated or perceived to be mere objects or instruments subject to the will of 
others.164  All individuals, regardless of their position in society have intrinsic worth and 
every person must be respected.165  Our Constitutional Court has followed the Kantian 
approach with Ackermann J stating in Dodo v The State,166 that ‘’human beings are not 
commodities to which a price can be attached; they are creatures with inherent and infinite 
worth; they ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to an 
end.’’167  Respect for the worth of every person, requires a recognition that a person is 
allowed to have their own feelings, beliefs, attitudes and ideals which, if changed by either 
physical or psychological coercion amounts to an affront on the dignity of that person.168  
Following on from this, a person’s autonomy to make their own choices and be responsible 
for their own conduct irrespective of their position in society goes to the core of the right to 
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dignity and respecting individuals.169  This will also ring true even if the decision made by an 
individual is not objectively in their best interests.  In Barkhuizen v Naiper170 Ngcobo J held 
that ‘’self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own 
detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity.’’171   
In MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay, our Chief Justice at the time, 
Justice Langa, held that a necessary element of dignity is the right to be respected for the 
unique set of ends that he or she pursues.172  A number of other key elements of the right to 
dignity were enumerated in the Canadian Supreme Court case of Law v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration).173  This list of elements are useful as it provides us with an 
idea of the broad scope of the right to human dignity.  Broadly, the Court stated that dignity 
includes a person’s feeling of self-worth and right to autonomy with regard to a person’s 
physical and psychological integrity and empowerment.174  The court also linked the rights 
to equality and dignity.175  In other words, unfair treatment which is based upon the 
personal traits or circumstances of a person has both the potential to infringe the right to 
equality and harm one’s dignity.176  Linking equality and dignity means that there is an 
acknowledgement of the contextual differences that exist between human beings and that a 
recognition of these differences will serve to enhance one’s human dignity.177  An example 
of how the Constitutional Court used this approach can be found in the case of MEC for 
Education: KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay where O’ Regan J stated that a learner who is 
seeking an exemption from a school rule should give reasons stating why this rule if applied 
uniformly would undermine their right to follow certain cultural practises.178  It was 
submitted by the learned Judge that such a process (where other pupils and teachers would 
understand the significance of wearing a nose ring in terms of her culture) would have the 
effect of contributing towards the enhancement of human dignity and autonomy.179  In this 
regard, the Court held that not allowing the learner to wear a nose ring in accordance with 
the South Indian culture resulted in a devaluation or a marginalisation of this sector of 
society and had the effect of harming their human dignity.180 
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In Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others181 the Court adopted a similar approach by capturing the different ways that dignity 
operates in our legal system: 
 Human dignity therefore informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a 
 range of levels.  It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, 
 other rights.  This Court has already acknowledged the importance of the 
 constitutional value of dignity in interpreting rights such as the right to equality, the 
 right not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, and the right to life.  
 Human dignity is also a constitutional value that is of central significance in the limitations 
 analysis.  Section 10, however, makes it plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental 
 to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and 
 protected. In many cases, however, where the value of human dignity is offended, the 
 primary constitutional breach occasioned may be of a more specific right such as the right 
 to bodily integrity, the right to equality or the right not to be subjected to slavery, 
 servitude or forced labour.182 
4.3.2  The right to dignity in international and regional law 
A number of international human rights instruments acknowledge the concept of dignity 
and provide that it is a fundamental human right.  Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights recognises that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights.183  This implies that individuals possess both the ability to reason and act on their 
conscience.184  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights185 and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights186 describe dignity as a right accorded to every 
person.   
4.3.3 National law  
4.3.3.1  Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Woolman submits that in the South African constitutional context dignity operates in four 
varied ways: (i) dignity as a right; (ii) dignity that informs the right to equality; (iii) dignity as 
a correlative right and (iv) dignity as a foundational value.187  The section below uses 
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Woolman’s formulation to critically discuss the right to dignity as established in the 
constitutional era. 
Section 10 of our Constitution creates the right to dignity.  This right is given prominence by 
being placed as the second human right in the Bill of Rights directly after equality.  This 
placement was recognised by Justice Langa when he stated that our Constitution places a 
very high premium on human dignity.188   This section not only recognises that all persons 
have inherent dignity but also makes provision for one’s dignity to be respected and 
protected through this independent, self-standing and enforceable right.189  The mere fact 
that dignity occupies such a central role in our Constitution signifies the constitutional 
commitment to asserting dignity and to preventing us from returning to a system where the 
respect for black South Africans was cruelly denied.190   In our post-apartheid era dignity will 
now be used to ensure that the intrinsic worth of all human beings is respected.191  The 
Constitutional Court has interpreted the right to dignity very broadly so that it includes for 
example degrading, abusive, humiliating and demeaning treatment of another person as a 
non-human being which will qualify as a violation of the right to dignity.192 
It is not surprising, that the early cases that have relied on dignity as a free-standing right, 
were challenges to unjust, oppressive and inhumane laws that were synonymous of the 
then political order of South Africa.  The Williams193 case is a good example of this approach.  
The issue before the Constitutional Court was whether the sentence of juvenile whipping 
which was permitted by section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act was consistent with the 
constitutional provisions of equality, dignity, not to be subject to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment and the rights of the child.194  Langa J held that the act 
of whipping a sentenced juvenile violated their right to dignity and the right not to be 
subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.195  The Court described 
this form of punishment as being "punishment of a particularly severe kind ... brutal in its 
nature ... a severe assault upon not only the person of the recipient but upon his dignity as a 
human being."196  The component parts of this type of punishment were uncivil and 
objectionable in a society in which the right to dignity is enshrined in the Constitution.  In 
this case, Langa J highlighted that the State appoints a stranger to intentionally inflict 
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physical pain on the juvenile.197  This act was held not only to be incompatible with respect 
for the dignity of the juvenile but also the stranger administering the whipping.198  
The Court in expressing its disquiet about this type of punishment endorsed the dictum 
from the American case of Furman v Georgia which dealt with capital punishment, where 
Brennan J held that: 
 members of the human race are treated as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and 
 discarded ...[and that this is] ... thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the 
 Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human 
 dignity.199   
It was further submitted by the Court that an enlightened society will meter out punishment 
to transgressors of the law without sacrificing decency and human dignity.200   
The Constitutional Court has also interpreted the right to dignity broadly so that it protects 
an individual’s family relationships.  In Dawood’s case201 it was argued that section 25 (9) (b) 
of the Aliens Control Act had the effect of denying spouses the right to live together which 
in turn affected their ability to sustain and have permanent intimate family relationships.202  
The affected spouses submitted that this contravened their rights to freedom of movement 
and that of citizens to reside in South Africa.203  Inasmuch as O’Regan J noted that the 
impugned section of the Aliens Control Act may well have had the effect of limiting the 
rights relied on, she was of the view that the primary right offended in this instance was the 
right to dignity.204  The Judge further held that legislation that had the effect of denying 
spouses the ability to enter into marriage relationships and honour their obligations to each 
other constituted an infringement of their dignity.205   
The Petersen v Maintenance Officer and Others206 case is another instance of where the 
right to dignity was relied on.  The applicant, the mother of a child born out of marriage, 
submitted that her child’s right to dignity was violated by the common law rule that 
prohibited maintenance from being claimed from the paternal grandparents of a child.207  
The court held that the common law rule that differentiated between children born out of 
marriage and those born out of an extra-marital relationship affected them in two ways.208  
The first being that they were denied the right to be supported by their paternal 
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grandparents and the second being that this differentiation meant that they do not possess 
the same inherent worth and dignity that children born out of marriage do.209  
In Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another,210 the first wife (the applicant) in a customary 
marriage challenged her late husband’s customary marriage to his second wife (the 
respondent) on the basis that her consent for him to enter into a further marriage was not 
obtained.211  The applicant alleged that the act of dispensing with her consent amounted to 
a violation of her right to dignity.  In the main judgment of the Court, it was held that given 
the sacredness of the institution of a marriage coupled with the fact that it is highly personal 
in nature, the first wife’s dignity will be violated by the bringing in of a new partner into the 
relationship without her consent.212  It was further held by the Court that the ramifications 
for the first wife in instances where a subsequent customary marriage is entered into 
without her consent are manifold.213  The repercussions for the first wife are that she 
cannot make informed decisions about the proprietary consequences of the new customary 
union, her personal life and her sexual or reproductive health.214 The court held that the 
right to dignity encompasses the ability of the holder of the right to make key decisions 
about his or her life.215  In instances where the decision to be taken is of great significance to 
the person, the entitlement to this justiciable right is greater.216  Self-determination and 
having control over one’s personal circumstances is a key aspect of human dignity.217  The 
Court concluded that a first wife cannot have effective control over her family life when her 
husband dispenses with her consent to take a second wife, this amounts to a lack of respect 
for her human dignity.218    
The Dawood, Petersen and Mayelane cases are examples that show the broad way that 
dignity as a right is used to promote the inherent respect of every individual.  It is clear from 
these cases that dignity as a right is used broadly to encompass instances where family 
relationships and violations of duties emanating from them have occurred.   
Our Constitution views dignity as a right and value.  It explicitly sets out a quartet of 
founding values within which we as a society must operate.219  For the purposes of this 
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dissertation the first set of values enshrined in section 1 (a)220 are of importance to us 
namely; ‘’human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms.’’  The recognition of dignity as one of the founding values of our Constitution 
is significant.221  Dignity was not recognised as a founding value in the interim Constitution 
whilst the values of democracy, freedom and equality occupied centre stage.222  In an 
academic article, Chaskalson highlighted that even though dignity was ingrained in these 
values, the role of dignity was not acknowledged until the adoption of the final 
Constitution.223  This significant shift, that is, the affirmation of inherent human dignity as a 
foundational value, aligned the South African legal order firmly with the development of a 
culture of constitutionalism.224  Accordingly, the language and focus of our Constitution now 
measures up to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, which are key 
international and regional human rights instruments.225  These instruments all place 
considerable weight on the inherent worth and dignity of human persons.226 
South Africa’s post-constitutional jurisprudence has relied extensively on dignity being a 
foundational value when called upon to adjudicate on an array of issues.  In the landmark 
decision of S v Makwanyane227 not only did the right to life which is firmly intertwined with 
the right to dignity receive well-deserved attention but dignity as a founding value was 
recognised.228  This acknowledgement, according to Judge O’Regan was symbolic as it 
appreciated the fact that as a starting point, ‘’human beings are entitled to be treated as 
worthy of respect and concern.’’229  This is so especially taking into account that apartheid 
denied black people respect, dignity and common humanity.230  Further, the Judge opined 
that the ‘’recognition and protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the new political 
order and is fundamental to the new constitution.’’231  Similar sentiments regarding dignity 
being recognised as a foundational value in our Constitution, were expressed by the same 
Judge in Dawood’s232 case.  In Barkhuizen’s case Ngcobo J held that the Bill of Rights 
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‘’enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic founding 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”233    
Dignity as a value has also been invoked in matters where socio-economic rights were being 
accessed.  In the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others234 the right to housing was invoked in terms of section 26 of the Constitution.235   
Yacoob J stated that there can be no human dignity in instances where people are denied 
basic necessities like shelter, food and clothing.236  In terms of the constitutional provision 
regarding housing, the State is required to take reasonable action to see this materialise and 
in doing so must have in particular, regard for human dignity.237  In Minister of Health and 
Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2)238 the respondents sought an order 
compelling the appellants to make nevirapine (an antiretroviral drug that has the effect of 
significantly reducing mother-to-child transmission of HIV) available in public health 
facilities. 239  In refusing to do so the appellants were effectively denying poor women and 
their new born babies access to ‘’simple, cheap and potentially life-saving intervention.’’240  
Liebenberg argues that this would clearly show a lack of respect for their dignity and self-
worth.241  In doing so, the Court held that ‘’no one should be condemned to a life below the 
basic level of dignified human existence.’’242  What is evident is that these rights can only be 
realised within the available financial constraints of the State, however, at a minimum, 
human dignity must be taken into account at the very least when setting minimum 
standards.243  Liebenberg submits that the Grootboom case invoked dignity as the central 
value when interpreting the reasonableness requirement attached to the fulfilment of 
socio-economic rights.244  She further argues that if we are to pride ourselves as a society 
that respects human dignity there must be a commitment to redressing the social and 
economic conditions of those who are stricken by poverty.245   
The Constitutional Court has adopted the approach that the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights are ‘’mutually interrelated and interdependent and form a single constitutional value 
system.’’246  It is submitted that this is evident as in very few instances do litigants rely solely 
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on the self-standing right to dignity, instead, its value and use as a correlative right 
particularly in relation to equality and freedom is common.  The symbiotic and 
interdependent nature of the right to dignity is captured by a vast body of case law which 
shows the interplay between the right to dignity and the rights to freedom, life and 
equality.247 Key principles will be extracted from selected cases to depict how dignity 
interrelates with other listed rights.  
In Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others,248 the 
court had to make a finding on whether section 417 (2) (b) of the Companies Act which had 
the potential to infringe the rule against self-incrimination was inconsistent with the right to 
freedom as protected by section 11 (1) of the interim Constitution.249  Writing for the 
majority judgment of the Court, Ackermann J held that ‘’freedom and dignity are 
inseparably linked.’’250  The Judge continued by stating that in instances where an 
individual’s personal development and fulfilment was stymied there can be no freedom; 
conversely, human dignity will have no worth and amount to nothing more than an idea 
without freedom.251   
In the recent AB252 case the primary right relied on was the right to freedom and security of 
the person.  Coupled with that, reliance was placed on the right to dignity as a correlative 
right.253  In this context, it was alleged that placing limitations on AB’s reproductive 
autonomy was tantamount to a violation of her inherent dignity as it effectively prevented 
her from making her own reproductive choices.254  Similarly, in cases of involuntary 
sterilisations of HIV positive women where, their right to bodily and psychological integrity 
were violated, this invasion would go to the core of their dignity as it takes away their ability 
to make choices freely about their reproductive health.  
One of the key reasons behind the decision in Makwanyane’s255 case, which marked the end 
of capital punishment in South Africa, was the close-knit relationship between the rights to 
life and dignity.  The first President of our Constitutional Court, Judge Chaskalson in his 
judgment, set out the purpose of South Africa moving into an era of constitutional 
democracy, which also served to facilitate the process of judicial review of legislation.256 The 
primary purpose was to protect the rights of minorities, marginalised groups and social 
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outcasts in our society.257 It is only through safeguarding the rights of the weakest in society 
that we can be assured of the protection of our own rights.258  Judge Langa concurring with 
Judge Chaskalson placed a greater emphasis on the right to life.259 The elevation of the right 
to life over dignity was motivated by the past patterns of mistreatment of the majority of 
South Africa’s people.260 The political and social order resulted in unrest at the time in which 
the culture of violence and retaliation thrived.261  The respect for human life and human 
dignity were sacrificed by the State in two respects.262 The first being by virtue of their 
involvement in the conflicts of the past and the second having in place punishments that did 
not accord with the respect for human life and dignity.263  This served to diminish the value 
of human life and one’s dignity.264  At the epicentre of this case were the rights to life and 
dignity of the criminal.265  The court described this twin set of rights as taking precedence 
over all other human rights and being the source of all other personal rights in the Bill of 
Rights.266  The judgment by the Court showed the way in which the rights to life and dignity 
mutually re-inforce each other. As held by Justice O’Regan the right to life cannot be 
reduced to mere existence of a human being but ‘’it is a right to be treated as a human 
being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially diminished. Without life, 
there cannot be dignity.’’267 
Malherbe holds the view that ‘’equality cannot be pursued in isolation from human dignity 
and freedom.’’268  Dignity as a guiding principle is the vehicle that drives all equality 
litigation.269  This operates in three specific instances: (i) when discrimination on an unlisted 
ground is alleged.270  In these instances, the test in Harksen’s case will be used and an 
enquiry into whether the ‘differentiation in question has the effect of impairing one’s 
dignity’;271 (ii) dignity will be used as a lodestar when determining whether the 
discrimination is fair in instances where the differentiation is based on one of specified or 
unspecified grounds272 and (iii) where the discrimination has been deemed unfair it will 
have to pass through the limitations clause which enquires into whether the unfairness is 
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justifiable based on the founding values of the Constitution where human dignity occupies a 
central space.273  According to Cowen, this in essence means that ‘’it is primarily a violation 
of dignity that offends the equality clause.  Put differently, protecting dignity is viewed as 
the desired outcome, or objective, of placing a value on equality.’’274   
It is submitted by the learned authors that the ills of stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and 
humiliation are capable of being addressed by the core notion of dignity but this is not as 
straightforward in instances where substantive equality is concerned.275  It is further 
submitted that the reliance of dignity on its own is not ideal and in order to mitigate this 
shortcoming, cognisance must be given to other values like redressing social and economic 
disadvantage, promoting participation and by bringing about structural change by 
accommodating differences.276 
The close relationship between dignity and equality was illustrated in the cases of National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others277 and 
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another.278  The Court as per Ackermann 
J held in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality case that the criminalisation of 
consensual sodomy in private between consenting men could not pass constitutional 
muster as it violated their right not only to equality but also of dignity.279  This type of 
discrimination against gay men had severe and grave impacts on them as the conduct 
complained of would not be a crime if committed between a woman and another woman or 
between a man and woman.280  Ackermann J held that even though the central argument of 
the case was based on the right to equality and more especially the discriminatory 
treatment of gay men by targeting them as criminals, this also infringed on their right to 
dignity.281  The protection of dignity forces us to acknowledge the self-worth of all 
individuals regardless of their sexual orientation and differences.282  Therefore, legislation 
which devalues the conduct of a vulnerable group in our society for being who they are, 
strikes at the heart of infringing on one’s dignity.283   
Sachs J concurring with Judge Ackermann’s judgment, took the baton further and re-visited 
the judiciary’s approach to our equality jurisprudence after hearing argument from an amici 
regarding the role of dignity in matters where equality was challenged.284  The basis of the 
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attack was two pronged: (i) it was contended that the purpose of the equality clause is to 
advance equality and not dignity and (ii) the job of section 9 (1) being the grantor of 
substantive equality, is diminished to that of a gatekeeper for claims where a violation of 
dignity is alleged.285  Sachs J, in addressing the argument, held that Ackermann J promoted 
substantive equality by addressing the disadvantage and prejudice that members of the gay 
community faced and how this impinged on their dignity and sense of self-worth.286  
Further, Sachs J held that by keeping human dignity at the core of equality jurisprudence it 
acknowledges our country’s unique history and places us firmly in the context of evolving 
human rights concepts worldwide.287 
The learned Judge held that there is a distinction between the violation of dignity under the 
equality provisions and the self-standing dignity right.288  The violation of dignity as an 
independent right extends to a much broader range of situations.289  It offers protection to 
individuals in their different ‘’multiple identities and capacities.’’ This could range from 
being disrespected or to being treated differently because of the situation that they find 
themselves in.290  This indignity of treatment will have the effect of leading to inequality as 
opposed to inequality producing indignity.291   
Accordingly, Sachs J held that dignity and equality should not be viewed as competing values 
but rather as complementary values.292  Further, it was held that an infringement of one’s 
dignity is more easily ascertained when there exits an inequality of power and status 
between the violator and the victim.293 This rings true especially in the case of vulnerable 
HIV positive women who are pitted against well-educated health care professionals.  This 
elevated status and unequal power dynamic between health care practitioners and HIV 
positive women may impact on their ability to make highly personal decisions about their 
reproductive health. 
The manner in which the unequal treatment of individuals on the enumerated grounds 
listed in section 9 (3) is experienced varies markedly, however the central unifying feature is 
injury to their dignity because of their differences.294  It is submitted that this is how dignity 
in the context of equality has to be understood.295 
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In Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another296 the Constitutional Court 
endorsed Judge Cameron’s Supreme Court of Appeal majority judgment.  Judge Cameron 
held that the capacity of gay and lesbian couples to marry enhances their autonomy, liberty 
and dignity, which the common law definition of marriage violates.297  The conclusion to be 
drawn from this instance is that the inherent dignity, self-worth and self-respect of 
heterosexual couples differs from that of individuals who are in same-sex relationships.298 
Judge Sachs held that in dealing with cases where the rights of same-sex couples were 
violated and the equality clause was invoked, the values and concepts of human dignity, 
equality and freedom play an extremely pivotal role.299  The impact on the self-worth and 
dignity of same-sex couples who were denied the opportunity of entering into a legal union 
could only be assessed through our equality jurisprudence.300   
The elevated position that dignity occupies in the equality analysis is not without criticism.  
Albertyn and Fredman raise several concerns around the right to equality being reduced to 
the single value of dignity.301  The challenges aired by Albertyn and Fredman are (i) ‘’can 
dignity act as a placeholder for all the inequalities and harms that the idea of substantive 
equality seeks to address?’’302 (ii) is there no room for other principles and values in 
assessing whether the equality right has been violated?303 and (iii) whether dignity on its 
own is not too individualistic with its focus being on stigma harms instead of broader socio-
economic disadvantage?’’304  It is submitted, that given South Africa’s history it is not 
possible to fully articulate the right to equality without the link to dignity.  Discrimination in 
our past aimed not only at unequal treatment but also at devaluing the inherent human 
dignity of all persons who were not white.     
4.4  Discussion 
Even though, the global response to HIV is based on human rights principles including non-
discrimination, it should then by logical extension, include the protection of the sexual and 
reproductive health rights of HIV positive women.  It is clear that stigma and discrimination 
continue to fuel the way in which health care workers treat women living with HIV who seek 
sexual and reproductive health services.305  The long standing practice of sterilising women 
globally for an assortment of reasons is widespread.  These reasons have ranged from 
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physical and mental disability;306 race and ethnicity;307 poverty and illiteracy;308 population 
control;309 and as a pre-requisite for employment.310  The HIV positive status of women has 
now become the new focus for those wanting to practise eugenics.311  The modus operandi 
used by many medical practitioners and nurses in coercing or forcing HIV positive pregnant 
women to be sterilised is varied and reflects the multiple levels of intersectional 
discrimination.  It appears that in many cases, given that there is no policy requiring HIV 
positive women to be sterilised, the actions of health care workers reflect those of the 
community they come from and the high level of blame that is levelled at women who 
become HIV positive.  For example, a sterilisation is offered to HIV positive women as a 
trade-off for something that may be more desirable to her at that time.312  The incentives 
offered to these women range from accessing medical treatment, to obtaining milk formula 
for their new born babies and to receiving payment of their hospital bills.313 Health care 
workers have also been accused of exaggerating the medical condition of HIV in order to use 
fear as a means to obtain their consent.314  In other cases women are provided with 
inaccurate information regarding the permanency of the procedure when obtaining an HIV 
positive pregnant woman’s consent to be sterilised.315  In some cases women were 
informed that they would not get medical attention unless they agreed to the sterilisation.  
An account given by one Kenyan woman of being coercively sterilised lends support to the 
prevalence of this practice.  She said that ‘’when they insisted on tubal ligation, I signed the 
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documents so that they could attend to me and relieve me of the pain I was going 
through.’’316   
The category of women targeted for forced or coerced sterilisations forms part of the poor, 
vulnerable, illiterate and marginalised women in our community.  Their poverty is used as a 
bargaining tool in exchange for consent.  This is evidenced by the narrative of Aida a Kenyan 
women who stated that: 
 ‘’I visited Blue House and was told that I had to think about tubal ligation because I 
 was a  mother who was HIV positive and had many children.  I said I did not want to 
 because there were many methods of family planning but I was told if I did not 
 undergo tubal  ligation I would not receive the drugs again and should think of what 
 to do after that as I would not be given the milk again.’’317    
Similarly, another Kenyan woman Emma related her experience of being coerced into being 
sterilised in lieu of payment for her maternity bill: 
 ‘’the nurse told me if I did not agree to tubal ligation then Blue House will not take 
 care of my maternity expenses.  I got to Pumwani and I was given a form, the nurses 
 insisted I had to sign.  They called me a useless woman with HIV.  I took the form and  
 signed it because I was kept waiting in the labour ward until I signed.’’318  
Illiteracy and fear are also used as tools to coerce HIV positive mothers into being sterilised.  
One women stated that, in response to her question as to why she was being discriminated 
against because of her positive status, a nurse replied that ‘’it is illegal for HIV positive 
women to have children.’’319  A doctor who was discussing sterilisation as the only option for 
a contraceptive with an HIV pregnant mother, told her that ‘’since I am about to die, I 
cannot give birth to a healthy child and took me to a ward that had children with extreme 
Aids-related infections so that I could decide if I still had the desire to have a child.’’320   
Women have also reported being told by medical practitioners and nurses that their HIV 
positive status prevented them from becoming mothers and if they continued to have 
children they would die.321   
Research conducted in South Africa, Kenya and Namibia has shown that women are being 
sterilised forcibly or coercively on the basis of their HIV positive status.  This is described in 
detail in Chapter 2.  This form of discriminatory treatment which undermines human dignity 
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is strongly condemned in our legal framework. In this regard, South Africa is unique as it has 
specialist equality legislation which could be used by women living with HIV who wish to 
vindicate their rights.   
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act aims at addressing 
unfair discrimination.  HIV positive women wishing to challenge their forced or coerced 
sterilisation on the basis of discrimination have the option of seeking redress through an 
Equality Court and relying on the provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act to advance their claims.  There are a number of advantages in 
pursuing legal relief through this avenue.  It is submitted that the most significant advantage 
would be that HIV/AIDS is now included as one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination 
in terms of the Act.322  This inclusion has the effect of shifting the evidentiary burden to the 
party that is alleged to be responsible for the discriminatory conduct, as discrimination on a 
listed ground is unfair.323  In our situation, the Minister of Health would have to show on a 
balance of probabilities that the discrimination was fair.  It may be argued that this would be 
a difficult onus to discharge as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act is prescriptive on what factors need to be taken into account by the 
Equality Court before making a determination of fair discrimination.324   For our purposes, 
an enquiry must be set into motion assessing whether sterilising women on the basis of 
their HIV positive status, reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons;325 
whether discrimination against HIV positive women has a legitimate purpose326 and 
whether there are other methods of family planning that could be suggested to HIV positive 
women rather than ending their ability to have more children.327  It is submitted that the 
Minister of Health may have difficulty in convincing the Equality Court that sterilising HIV 
positive women serves a legitimate purpose as it is contrary to the principles in the National 
Contraceptive Guidelines.  In addition, the Minister of Health would have to justify why 
these women were singled out to be sterilised under very coercive circumstances such as 
during advanced labour.  
A further benefit of using the Equality Act is that it does not specifically require 
discrimination to be systemic in nature or for there to be a policy or practice in place before 
deeming the conduct to be discriminatory.  The Act regards discrimination as being ‘’any act 
or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which has the effect 
of imposing burdens or withholding benefits on one or more of the prohibited grounds.’’328  
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Thus, although the Slovakian cases329 seemed to require evidence of a particular policy 
which targeted particular women, this ought not to be a requirement in our context.  This 
dissertation has shown that there is no policy of targeting HIV positive women for 
sterilisation in South Africa, however it has been a practice in certain circumstances.330  
Approaching the Equality Court is affordable and expeditious.  HIV positive women who 
wish to litigate in this forum do not require the services of a legal representative.  They will 
be assisted by trained court officials in completing the complaint forms should they 
experience difficulty in doing so.331  The diagram below outlines the process that must be 
followed when bringing a claim to the Equality Court332: 
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A period of 37 days lapses from the date of lodging the complaint to obtaining a court date.  
This is an extremely short period of time compared to litigating in the High Court where it 
can take between six months to two years to obtain a trial date.333  A further key feature of 
the Act334 is the broad range of relief that can be ordered.  It is submitted that the most 
appropriate form of relief that the Court should order where women have been sterilised 
for being HIV positive is (i) an award of damages.335  This will enable women to use the 
amount awarded for damages to obtain reversals or assisted reproduction. It is submitted 
that the presiding officer ought to be guided by the amount of damages being awarded in 
cases such as Sparrow336 and the only South African specific HIV coercive sterilisation out of 
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court settlement.337 (ii) An unconditional apology from the medical practitioners concerned 
for their actions.338 An apology is an important restorative step as it recognises that HIV 
positive women’s dignity was undermined by taking away their ability to choose whether or 
not to have children simply because they are HIV positive.  (iii) An order that the policies and 
practices of the Department of Health be audited.339  This could for example require all 
hospitals to provide information on when and where consent for sterilisations were 
obtained and whether it was coupled with a caesarean section.  This would provide data on 
the number of times consent is obtained during labour which is one of the indicators of 
consent being obtained coercively.  (iv) A recommendation to the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa to suspend or revoke the licence of the health care practitioner who 
is found to be responsible for the forced or coerced sterilisation.340   
It is argued that this combination of four different remedies addresses the need for 
individual relief as expressed by the women in the narratives above as well as attempting to 
ensure that the Department of Health takes structural steps to ensure that this practice is 
stopped.   
The Act also makes provision for the Commission on Gender Equality and the South African 
Human Rights Commission to institute proceedings on behalf of a complainant.341  The 
flexibility of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act in this 
regard, helps to ensure that litigants who are especially illiterate and have been at the 
receiving end of discriminatory treatment, are afforded the opportunity to access the Courts 
in a supportive manner.   
It is submitted, that there may be a few issues that pose a challenge in using the Equality 
Courts to deal with the forced or coerced sterilisation of women because of their HIV 
positive status, successfully.  Presently, the two pieces of health legislation342 that may be 
relied on to advance the claims of this group of women are silent on the issue of 
discrimination.  It is suggested that the Sterilisation Act and Health Professions Council’s 
Guidelines on Reproductive Health343 must contain provisions which bar sterilisations based 
on discriminatory reasons.  It also remains unclear what evidence will be required of the 
complainant in order to make out a case for discrimination as there is no precedent 
available nationally and internationally for guidance. Proceedings in the Equality Courts are 
open to the public and this may deter HIV positive women from seeking redress for the 
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reasons mentioned above.  It is submitted that if compelling reasons are placed before the 
Presiding Officer of the Court, it may be directed that the proceedings be conducted in 
camera.  Prescription of the claim may be an impediment to accessing the Equality Court.  
This is discussed in Chapter 6.  In the study by Strode et al it was shown that most of the 
sterilisations appeared to have taken place prior to the widespread roll out of antiretroviral 
treatment.344  Accordingly many of the sterilisations took place more than three years ago 
and it is unclear whether these affected women could approach the Equality court.   
Violations of the right to dignity were a clear theme that ran through the narratives in the 
various studies that have been undertaken.  These show that being sterilised undermines 
the sense of self-worth of these women.  There is often pressure on HIV positive women to 
have children which comes from husbands, partners, extended family and society.  
Motherhood is viewed as a norm for women in most societies.345  This is particularly true for 
women in Africa, where culture places a high value on women’s fertility.346  A woman’s 
sterility often carries undesirable social consequences for her as she is seen as ‘’half a 
women’’.347  Often HIV positive women do not disclose their status to their partners, 
husbands, family or the community for fears of being ostracised and being viewed as 
worthless.348  South African women have reported, in the study by Essack and Strode, that 
they were unwilling to reveal their positive HIV status to their partners or husbands for fear 
of being abandoned and rejected because of being barren.349  The sterility of a HIV positive 
woman impacts negatively on the bride price that will be paid for her or alternatively lead to 
the reclaiming of the bride price that was paid for her.350 Therefore, the act of sterilising HIV 
positive women without their consent has a multitude of undesirable effects for them.    
HIV positive women who have been sterilised without their informed consent can invoke 
dignity as a foundational value, as a free standing right, a right that informs equality and as a 
correlative right when accessing justice.  In this regard they could institute a civil claim 
under the action iniuriarum, see Chapter 5.  Relying on dignity as a value will be extremely 
useful when highlighting the fact that it is poor, vulnerable, black women who have limited 
education that are being targeted for having an illness that has a high level of stigma and 
prejudice attached to it.  This goes against the ethos of what our Constitution represents 
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and it serves to further entrench division instead of healing divisions on the basis of race 
and sex as was characteristic of apartheid South Africa. 
It is submitted that pleading a violation of the right to dignity of HIV positive women who 
have been coercively sterilised will involve showing that their self-worth and self-respect 
have been eroded by the conduct of the nurses and doctors.  This offensive conduct will be 
the act of denying the women the right to make an autonomous decision without elements 
of fear being added to the decision making process.  It has been submitted by Schachter 
that conduct that would be incompatible with respect for inherent dignity is in instances 
where medical treatment or hospital care disregards and is insensitive to personal choice.351 
Pleading the violation of dignity in isolation will not have the same impact as pleading it with 
an infringement of the women’s right to bodily and psychological integrity which 
encompasses reproductive autonomy and equality.  We must view this in a context-specific 
manner as we are emerging from a country that has a deeply divided past where not all 
individuals were accorded the same self-worth and self-respect.  As a result of this, we have 
a society that is laced with prejudice and stereotypes.  Without recognising the impact that 
differential treatment, prejudices and stereotypes have on individuals we will not be able to 
achieve a society that is ‘’based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
rights.’’352  An enquiry into the impact that this has on one’s dignity is a tried and tested way 
of assessing this.    
5.  Conclusion 
There is a well-developed legal framework on equality.  The legal principles flow from 
section 9 of the Constitution and are interpreted through a historical lens. The case of 
Harksen v Lane 353 will go down in the annals of history for being the first case to deal with 
the issue of the right to equality in terms of our interim Constitution.354  Even more 
memorable, will be the ‘’equality test’’ that emanated from the judgment.  The test has 
become a firm foundation for our equality jurisprudence.  In addition, other cases that came 
before the Constitutional Court in quick succession contributed to there being a solid 
framework for equality in the Constitution and the Equality Act.  With the notion of equality 
being firmly entrenched in our Bill of Rights, discrimination on the seventeen listed grounds 
are presumed to be unfair.  The recent inclusion of HIV/AIDS status in the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act is indicative of the serious stance taken 
against discrimination based on this ground.  Sex and pregnancy also fall into this category 
i.e. discrimination on these grounds are presumed to be unfair unless shown to be fair by 
the party responsible for the differentiation. 
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Equally the right to dignity is entrenched in South African law.  In our context equality and 
dignity are seen as intertwined rights and values.  An equality analysis requires amongst 
others an investigation into the impact the alleged discriminatory conduct had on the 
plaintiffs.  This unique right to equality is important as it underscores how multiple layers of 
discrimination serve to devalue and dehumanise certain sectors of society.  In the context of 
such marginalised groups seeking health care it can result in health care providers treating 
them as objects rather than autonomous individuals.  We cannot address the inequalities 
that poor, illiterate, non-English speaking HIV positive women face without a process that 
focuses on requiring health care workers to respect their intrinsic worth despite their 
position in society.   
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Chapter 5 
Legal and administrative remedies 
5.1  Introduction 
In a study conducted by Strode, Mthembu and Essack in 2011, the experiences of HIV 
positive women who were sterilised without their informed consent were documented.1  
The study also explored the impact that these rights violations had on HIV positive women 
and their views on possible remedies.2  Findings included devastating psycho-social impacts 
that were felt by these women.  They also reported on the physical pain experienced and 
the adverse financial consequences that flowed from their sterilisations.3   
Extracts from the narratives of these women bear testimony to this suffering.  Most 
participants reported ongoing and significant emotional and psychological distress because 
they could no longer bear children.4  A few women even reported that they were clinically 
depressed and used anti-depressants to help them cope with the consequences of being 
infertile.5  Participants described feelings of trauma, isolation, helplessness, stress and long-
term humiliation that extended far beyond their time in hospital.6  One woman commented 
that ‘’I feel like half a woman all the time.  I can identify with other women but I know that 
I’m different in a very sort of unusual way.’’7  The intersectional discrimination that women 
felt from being both infertile and HIV positive increased the feeling of hopelessness that 
some women experienced.  Another woman was recorded as saying: 
‘’It makes me feel incomplete that I am not a proper woman, first that I’m HIV positive and 
secondly I cannot bear children. Men don’t want HIV positive women but the inability to have 
a child is an added problem.’’8   
Apart from experiencing psychological distress some women in the study narrated feeling 
physical pain.  The physical effects were perceived to be as a result of wounds taking a long 
                                                            
1 A Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9 and  
Z Essack & A Strode ‘I feel like half a women all the time: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid 28-29.   
4 Ibid 28. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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time to heal,9  complications with their menstrual cycles,10  backache11 and other post-
sterilisation ailments.12 
The study also recorded the negative financial implications experienced by some of the 
women as a consequence of being sterilised.13  Many women tried to redress their lack of 
fertility after the sterilisation.  Women reported spending money consulting doctors on 
reversals or alternative methods of conception.14  In some cases women appeared to have 
been misled because of their desperation to conceive for example one women relayed that 
‘’I went to another doctor who said I could get a child.  I kept paying and I thought I would 
eventually conceive.  At 8 months I went to the clinic and they said the pills I had been taking 
were poisonous.’’15  A further illustration of wasteful spending arising out of being sterilised 
without informed consent being obtained was evident from the narrative of one woman 
where she stated that: 
‘’I had to pay the doctor R 7 000 for the reversal procedure.  I also had to pay R 15 000 for the 
hospital.  These were all paid in cash; I do not owe anything.   No.  Physically, I have no 
problems.  My problem is financial.  Since the reversal, I have paid a lot of money, it’s not 
only R 22 000 I have paid but it goes on since I have not conceived to this day.’’16    
The social discrimination experienced by these women as a result of not being able to bear 
children was captured in their interviews.  These narratives reflect the way in which their 
dignity was impaired by their new status of being infertile, for example it was stated by one 
woman that: 
 ‘’when you consider the lobola that people pay – I mean it’s like buying a woman and the 
 chances are that if you can’t bear children they wouldn’t pay lobola for you.  So I  mean 
 within my networks there are young women, and one of them is actually married and she 
 wouldn’t dare tell her husband that she is sterilised because her  husband will go 
 back to the family to claim the money back.’’17   
Essack and Strode found that the social impact of sterilisations was particularly felt by 
African women.  They highlighted a quote in which it was stated that being infertile was a 
larger burden than being HIV positive.  This woman stated ‘’in African culture, if you are not 
able to have children, you are ostracised.  It’s worse than having HIV.’’18   
                                                            
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid 29. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 31. 
18 Ibid. 
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Given the wide-ranging harms suffered by HIV positive women who have been coerced or 
forced into being sterilised, this chapter focuses on the different civil, criminal law and other 
administrative remedies that exist in the South African legal system.  Section 34 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa expressly makes provision for everyone to have 
‘’any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing 
before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
forum.’’19  Van der Westhuizen J in the case of Mdeyide reinforced this notion by stating 
that: 
The fundamental right of access to courts is essential for constitutional democracy under the 
rule of law.  In order to enforce one’s rights under the Constitution, legislation and the 
common law everyone must be able to have a dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law, decided by a court.  The right of access to courts is thus protected in the 
Constitution.20 
In this regard South Africa can pride itself on having a conceptually sound legal framework 
that protects sexual reproductive health rights.  However, this thesis interrogates the extent 
to which this framework provides access to justice for HIV positive women who allege that 
they were subjected to sterilisation abuse.  This chapter examines the range of legal and 
administrative remedies available.  In the discussion section the appropriateness of each of 
these within the specific context of coerced or forced sterilisations is critically evaluated.   
5.2  Civil law remedies 
Civil litigation has often been described as a channel through which disputes could be 
peacefully settled without resorting to physical violence thus averting the innate quality of 
vengeance possessed by humans.21  Even though various reasons may exist for civil litigation 
its primary purpose still remains to have civil disputes resolved without the involvement of 
the State.22  A person who has been wronged by another should be able to claim relief in 
the civil courts if it could be shown that that person committed a delict.  As succinctly stated 
by Neethling and Potgieter ‘’a delict is the act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable 
way causes harm to another.’’23   It is clear from a detailed reading of the study by Strode, 
Mthembu and Essack that the affected women could potentially use three distinct actions in 
delict.  These are: 
(i)  Damages claims under the action iniuriarum for violations of their bodily and                                        
psychological integrity and their right to dignity; 
                                                            
19 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
20 Road Accident Fund and Another v Mdeyide (CCT 10/10) [2010] ZACC 18; 2011 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2011 (2) SA 
26 (CC) (30 September 2010) at para 1. 
21 E Hurter ‘Seeking truth or seeking justice: Reflections on the changing face of the adversarial process in civil 
litigation’ (2007) 2 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 240-241. 
22 Ibid. 
23 J Neethling & JM Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 4. 
141 
 
(ii)  Claims for pain and suffering arising from the procedure itself and any long-term 
implications; and 
(ii)  A claim for any financial loss suffered such as loss of earnings and future medical costs 
under the Aquilian action.24   
5.2.1  Elements of a delict    
The elements of a delict are that there must be an act or omission (conduct) which, is 
wrongful; in addition there must be a causal connection between the conduct of the 
defendant and the consequent harm (damages) suffered by the plaintiff; and lastly, there 
must be the element of fault or blameworthiness that can be attributed to the defendant.25  
(i)  Harm 
Plaintiffs who institute a civil claim would have to do so as a result of some harm that they 
have suffered to their patrimony or non-patrimonial / personality interest.26  The harm 
suffered must result from a violation of the plaintiff’s interest or a protected right.27  It is 
therefore imperative to firstly establish whether the plaintiff has a legal interest that the law 
of delict protects.28  In other words it is not sufficient to simply demonstrate that harm has 
been suffered even though, the plaintiff’s rights may have been violated in a wrongful 
manner, it must be sufficient to constitute actionable harm.29   
Harm falls into two categories, patrimonial harm30 and non-patrimonial harm.31  Non-
patrimonial harm is further divided into two categories: pain and suffering32 and 
infringement of personality interests.33   
                                                            
24 The Aquilian action is used to claim compensation for patrimonial loss.  The actio iniuriarum is used to claim 
compensation for a violation of a personality interest and the elements of the Germanic remedy must be 
satisfied before pain and suffering is claimed.  R Midgley & M Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed 
(2012) at 46. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Midgley & Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 45. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.   
29 Ibid 47. 
30 Patrimonial loss is defined as the reduction in the value of an element of patrimony according to JA Joubert  
Law of South Africa  3 ed (2013) 3 at 45. 
31 Non-patrimonial damage has been defined as the diminution, as a result of a damage-causing event, in the 
quality of highly personal (personality) interests of an individual in satisfying his or her legally recognised 
needs, but which does not affect the individual’s patrimony.  Non-patrimonial loss is defined with reference to 
the deterioration of highly personal or personality interests. The law recognises personality rights (and 
interests) in regard to physical and mental integrity, bodily freedom, reputation, dignity, privacy, feelings and 
identity. A deterioration of the quality of any of these interests constitutes non-patrimonial damage.  Ibid. 
32 Compensation can be claimed for pain and suffering where there is a wrongful and negligent (or intentional) 
impairment of bodily or physical-mental integrity.  Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 5.  
33 Midgley & Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 47. 
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Bodily integrity, dignity and reputation have been recognised by our common law as being 
the three classic personality interests.34  According to the learned authors Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser, bodily and psychological integrity is protected against “every factual 
infringement of a person’s physique or psyche.  Physical infringements may occur with or 
without violence and with or without pain.”35 
In the context of forced or coerced sterilisation the protected interests are the right to 
bodily and psychological integrity and dignity.36  It is argued firstly, that the right to bodily 
integrity means that medical procedures will be unlawful unless consent is obtained.37  
Secondly, that the rights of all HIV positive women to be free from being sterilised on a 
discriminatory basis is an inherent element of their dignitas.  Treating HIV positive women 
differently to HIV negative women in relation to reproductive choices implies that they are 
less worthy of being mothers which violates their inherent dignity.  The documented cases 
referred to above in chapter 2, indicate that many of the women suffered patrimonial harm, 
for example they incurred hospital expenses for trying to reverse the procedure.38  They also 
suffered non-patrimonial harm such as the loss of a partner due to an inability to conceive 
as well as psychological distress caused by the coerced sterilisations.39 
(ii)  Conduct 
The harm suffered by the plaintiff must be caused by the wrongful conduct of the 
defendant40. The conduct complained of must be a voluntary act or omission41 committed 
by a human being.42  In this instance, it is submitted that the conduct would be both the 
performing of the sterilisation without full informed consent and the undignified and 
differential treatment of HIV positive women. 
(iii)   Causation  
Delictual liability will not arise if it is not proved that the conduct of the wrongdoer or 
defendant caused the damage to the person suffering the harm.43 It then logically follows 
that a person cannot be liable if he has not caused any damage.44   
                                                            
34 Ibid 54. 
35 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015)345-346. 
36 Sections 12 and 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
37 Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148. 
38 Essack & Strode ‘I feel like half a women all the time: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24-34 at 29.  
39 Ibid 30. 
40 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 25. 
41 An omission can be described as indications of legally deficient conduct.  Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 
7 ed (2015) 30. 
42 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 25.  This, is in contrast to the conduct of an animal. 
43 Ibid 184. 
44 Ibid 183. 
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In ascertaining whether a causal link exists between the conduct of the wrongdoer and 
harm suffered by the plaintiff, a two stage enquiry is employed: 
(i)  Whether there is factual causation, that is, whether the wrongdoer’s conduct caused the 
damage to the person suffering the harm; and45    
(ii)  Whether there is legal causation.46  
This approach was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in the case of Lee v Minister of 
Correctional Services.47   The Court held that this element of liability gives rise to two distinct 
enquiries.48  The first is a factual enquiry into ‘’whether the negligent act or omission by a 
wrongdoer caused the harm giving rise to the claim.’’49  If it is established that the 
wrongdoer’s conduct did not cause the harm, this will have the effect of extinguishing the 
plaintiff’s delictual claim.50  Progression to the next level of the enquiry which, is referred to 
legal causation, will only take place if it has been established that the negligent act or 
omission ‘’is linked to the harm sufficiently closely or directly for legal liability to ensue or 
whether the harm is too remote.’’51   
In the Lee,52 case Judge Nkabinde stressed that our law does not require an inflexible 
application of the substitution exercise when employing the but-for test.53  The dual set of 
reasons offered by the Judge for the rejection of the inflexible approach is that (i) our law 
makes provision for a more flexible approach to be adopted when determining factual 
causation and that it is not necessary to have the ‘’substitution of reasonable alternative 
measures’’ and (ii)  even in the event the ‘’substitution of reasonable alternative measures’’ 
being used, there is no requirement in our law for evidentiary proof to be presented by the 
plaintiff of alternatives.54  What is required according to the Judge is a ‘’notional and 
hypothetical lawful, non-negligent alternative.’’55 
The learned Judge quoted with approval the approach adopted in the Gore and the Van 
Duivenboden cases in relation to discharging the onus required to prove factual causation.56  
In Gore’s case, the Court stated that ‘’application of the ‘but for’ test is not based on 
mathematics, pure science or philosophy.  It is a matter of common sense, based on the 
                                                            
45 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 184. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Lee v Minister of Correctional Services (CCT 20/12) [2012] ZACC 30; 2013 (2) BCLR 129 (CC); 2013 (2) SA 144 
(CC); 2013 (1) SACR 213 (CC) (11 December 2012). 
48 Ibid at para 38. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid at para 45. 
54 Ibid at para 43. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid at para 47. 
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practical way in which the ordinary person’s mind works against the background of 
everyday-life experiences.57   
Van Duivenboden’s case echoed similar sentiments:- 
 A plaintiff is not required to establish the causal link with certainty, but only to establish  that 
 the wrongful conduct was probably a cause of the loss, which calls for a sensible 
 retrospective analysis of what would probably have occurred, based upon the evidence and 
 what can be expected to occur in the ordinary course of human  affairs  rather than 
 metaphysics.58 
It must be noted that the flexible approach adopted in Lee’s59 case did not replace the 
traditional but-for-test used when determining factual causation.  The test in Lee’s case is 
relevant in instances where the harm caused is closely connected to an omission by a 
person who has a duty to prevent the harm and the enquiry is whether the harm would 
have occurred even if the omission had not taken place.60 
Before setting out the enquiry into the second leg which is legal causation, it is important to 
note that on the grounds of policy and fairness, no legal system can hold a wrongdoer liable 
for an endless chain of harmful consequences which their act may have caused.61  There is 
general agreement that some means must be found of limiting the wrongdoer’s liability.62   
It is sometimes stated in general terms that the wrongdoer is not liable for harm which is 
‘’too remote’’ from the conduct.63  There are many complexities with legal causation and 
ensuring that the net of liability is not cast too widely.  Courts use policy principles to ensure 
fairness. 
This is basically a juridical problem in the solution of which considerations of policy may play 
a part. This inquiry, unlike the first, presents a much larger area of choice in which legal 
policy and accepted value judgments must be the final arbiter of what balance to strike 
between the claim to full reparation for the loss suffered by an innocent victim of another’s 
culpable conduct and the excessive burden that would be imposed on human activity if a 
wrongdoer were held to answer for all the consequences of his default.64 
In this case, it is submitted that the conduct complained of would be the failure of the 
health care professional to obtain full informed consent and the violation of the women’s 
dignity through treating her differently to HIV negative women.  In the study conducted by 
Strode and others it is submitted that there would be factual causation as but for the 
                                                            
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Mashongwa v PRASA (CCT03/15) [2015] ZACC 36; 2016 (2) BCLR 204 (CC); 2016 (3) SA 528 (CC) (26 
November 2015) at para 65. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 183. 
62 Ibid 197. 
63 Ibid 198. 
64 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) 702. 
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sterilisations, the women would be fertile and would not have incurred the pain and 
suffering, additional medical costs or emotional distress associated with involuntary 
sterilisations.  However, establishing whether legal causation exists involves a broad analysis 
of whether doctors and nurses should be held accountable in light of prevailing legal policy.  
Factors to consider would be the motivations of the health care professionals or whether 
the conduct was sanctioned by their professional bodies or the Department of Health.  In 
casu it is submitted that neither the Department of Health nor the professional medical 
bodies sanctioned the sterilisation of HIV positive women.  There is no national policy 
suggesting that HIV positive women should not fall pregnant or have children.  Instead, the 
National Contraceptive Clinical Guidelines of 201265 specifically state that sterilisations may 
not be undertaken for a discriminatory purpose.  Furthermore, patronising attitudes about 
the choices that HIV positive women should make regarding reproduction are unlikely to be 
accepted by a court as justification for coercing or forcing a woman to be sterilised.  It is 
thus submitted that legal causation will also be present.  
   (iv)  Fault  
It is insufficient to show that harm to the plaintiff was caused wrongfully in order to 
establish delictual liability.66  The defendant must be at fault in some way in order to be held 
accountable67 and culpable68 for their wrongful conduct.69  There are two forms of fault 
namely intention and negligence.70   
(aa)  Intention 
A person is considered to be at fault when that person intends to cause another person 
harm, knowing that it is wrong to do so.71 It is clear from this definition that there are two 
components to intention; namely direction of the defendant’s will and consciousness 
(knowledge) of its wrongfulness.72    
(bb)  Negligence 
                                                            
65 National Contraceptive Clinical Guidelines of 2012, available at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/ 
Contraception_Clinical_Guidelines_28jan2013-2.pdf accessed on 25 May 2018. 
66 Midgley &Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 99. 
67 According to Midgley & Loubser, accountability is a prerequisite for finding a person blameworthy.  It refers 
to a person’s capacity to distinguish between right and wrong and then to act in accordance with that 
distinction.  If a person is not legally accountable, we cannot impute blame, and the element of fault is not 
satisfied.  Anger due to provocation, youth, mental illness and intoxication have been recognised as categories 
that affect a person’s capacity.  Midgley & Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 100. 
68 Culpability refers to the law’s judgment of an accountable person’s state of mind (intention) or of the 
inadequate quality of a person’s conduct (negligence).  Midgley & Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 
ed (2012) 100. 
69 Ibid 99. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Midgley & Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 105. 
72 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 133. 
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With negligence, liability is based on the law’s disapproval of a defendant’s conduct73 
where, the defendant fails to adhere to the standard of care legally required of him.74  The 
criterion adopted by our law to establish whether a person has acted carelessly and thus 
negligently is the objective standard of the reasonable person, the bonus paterfamilias.75  In 
the case of Kruger v Coetzee76 the test for negligence was set out succinctly and 
authoritatively by Holmes JA: 
For the purposes of liability culpa arises if : 
(a) a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the defendant – 
(i) would foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his person or                         
property and causing him patrimonial loss; and 
(ii) would take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; and  
(b) the defendant failed to take such steps.77 
 
The two pillars that form the basis of the test for negligence is the foreseeability of harm 
and the second being the preventability of harm.78 In terms of the first leg, negligence 
cannot be imputed to a defendant unless it can be established that the harm arising from 
the defendant’s conduct was reasonably foreseeable.79  This is assessed by objectively 
taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances and the qualities that the law 
attributes to a reasonable person.80   
With regard to the second part of the test, the enquiry will then progress to whether the 
harm was reasonably preventable.81  The pertinent question to be asked is what steps a 
reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have taken to prevent the harm.82  
In addition, the plaintiff must put forward what reasonable measures the defendant should 
have taken in the circumstances to prevent the harm from occurring.83 
 
Applying both the foreseeability test and the preventability test is the foundation for 
practically evaluating the defendant’s conduct.84  In terms of the Aquilian action negligence 
or intention is required.  However, it is easier to prove negligence.  With regards to 
negligence, it is submitted that the health care professional would have been able to 
foresee that the failure to obtain informed consent specifically for a sterilisation would 
                                                            
73 Ibid 113. 
74 Ibid 137. 
75 Ibid. 
76 1966 (2) SA 428 (A).  
77 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) at 430. 
78 Ibid 120. 
79 Ibid 116. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid 120. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
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result in harm being caused to the patient because her right to choose whether or not to 
undergo the procedure has been violated.  Furthermore, this harm could have been 
prevented by the health care professional by properly obtaining consent before proceeding 
with the operation.85  Even in instances where the surgeon or a nurse obtained written 
consent to the sterilisation, the Aquilian action could be used if the Plaintiff could show that 
they should have foreseen their failure to fully explain the implications of signing the 
document would result in the consent being a coerced consent and not an informed 
consent.  In the case of the Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM & Others86 it was 
held that although all of the respondents had signed consent forms this did not equate to 
having received adequate and sufficient information about the nature and risks of 
sterilisation.87    
(v)  Wrongfulness 
For liability to follow, the act or omission must be wrongful in other words it must infringe a 
legally protected interest such as a person’s right to dignity or bodily and psychological 
integrity.88  
The determination of wrongfulness involves a two pronged enquiry.  The first would be to 
determine whether a legally recognised interest has been infringed which resulted in a 
harm.89  Should this be answered in the affirmative then the second enquiry would ensue.  
The second enquiry is whether the harm occurred in a legally reprehensible way.90  This is 
established by measuring it against legal norms.91  This is an objective enquiry which 
includes taking cognisance of all the pertinent facts and surrounding circumstances that 
existed at that time together with the resultant consequences that ensued.92 
(aa)  Defences directed at the wrongfulness element 
A violation of a right or breach of duty that would otherwise be wrongful could be lawful if a 
ground of justification exists.93  Grounds of justification are special circumstances that make 
the factual violation of a right or breach of duty reasonable and therefore lawful.94  The 
                                                            
85 As decided in Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19 (3 
November 2014). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid at para 100. 
88 For the purposes of our discussion the legally protected interest that will be relevant is the right to bodily 
integrity. 
89 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 33. 
90 Ibid. 
91 The legal norms refer to the legal convictions or boni mores of the community which, should be aligned to 
the norms and values enshrined in our Constitution and Bill of Rights. The boni mores test is an objective test 
based on the criterion of reasonableness.  Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 36-37.   
Midgley & Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 140.  
92 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 33. 
93 Midgley & Loubser The Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 157. 
94 Ibid 156. 
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violation of a right is therefore not always unreasonable or contra bonos mores.95  For 
example, where a person legally capable of expressing his will gives consent to an injury or 
harm, the causing of such harm will be lawful.96  Consent97 is a ground of justification where 
the person suffering harm has waived their right to bodily integrity thus the defendant 
cannot be held liable for the damage caused.98  This is the well-known maxim volenti non fit 
iniuria.99  
In this context of sterilisation abuse, wrongfulness can be established if there is a legally 
protected interest that has been infringed, a statutory duty that has not been complied with 
or the conduct is considered wrongful in terms of the legal convictions of the community.  It 
is argued that this would be the medical professional’s failure to obtain informed consent as 
required by the Sterilisation Act100 and the violation of a patient’s constitutional right to 
bodily integrity.  Secondly, it would have to be shown that the harm is inconsistent with the 
legal convictions of the community.  In situ it is submitted that it could be argued that 
consent would not be a successful defence in this instance, see the arguments made in 
chapter 3.     
5.2.2 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) 
An additional civil law remedy that can be invoked by HIV positive women who have been 
sterilised without their informed consent is the use of the provisions of the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.101  This piece of legislation confines 
itself to the unequal and unfair treatment of persons; hate speech and harassment of 
persons.  As a result of its specific nature specialised Courts were created to adjudicate on 
these delineated types of matters. 
The onus of proving that there has been discrimination rests with the complainant.102  In 
other words, the complainant has to show on a prima facie basis that the alleged 
discrimination was based on a ground listed in terms of the Act103 or on an analogous 
ground.  Discrimination based on a listed ground or analogous ground, provided that it 
qualifies as an analogous ground as required by the Act, is deemed to be discrimination. 
                                                            
95 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 87. 
96 Ibid 108. 
97 Consent has been described ‘’freely and lawfully given by a person who has the legal capacity to give it 
justifies the conduct consented to, making lawful the infliction of the ensuing harm.  It is therefore a defence 
that operates by negativing wrongfulness.’’ Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 108. 
Van der Walt and Midgley comment further by stating that ‘’by consent … the plaintiff unilaterally restricts his 
or her rights to such an extent that the defendant’s conduct is not wrongful.’’  Ibid. 
98 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 108. 
99 The literal translation of the maxim is that a willing person is not harmed.  He who consents cannot be 
injured.  Neethling & Potgieter ibid 108.  This is discussed further in Chapter 3.  
100 Act 44 of 1998. 
101 Act 4 of 2000. 
102 Section 13 of Act 4 of 2000. 
103 4 of 2002. 
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The onus then shifts to the respondent to prove that the discrimination did not take place as 
alleged by the complainant and that the respondent’s conduct is not based on one or more 
of the prohibited grounds.104  Should the respondent concede that the discrimination did 
indeed occur the respondent would then have to prove that the discrimination was fair.105  
Govender argues that it is apparent from the above that no material difference exists in the 
way unfair discrimination has to be proved for a listed or analogous ground.106 
The Act107 provides adequate guidance on the factors that ought to be taken into account 
when arriving at a decision. In essence, there are three categories of factors to be 
considered. Firstly, section 14 (2) states that in determining whether the respondent has 
proved that the discrimination is fair, the context, must be considered. Secondly, the factors 
referred to in s 14(3) must be taken into account.  These factors require the court to look at 
the impact of discrimination on the complainant and any justifications advanced for the 
conduct.  Thirdly, it must be asked whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably 
differentiates between persons according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to 
the activity concerned must be taken into account.108 
According to Albertyn an understanding of the context in which laws operate has become 
an integral part of legal interpretation because of the diverse nature of people’s life 
experience.109  Therefore, a presiding officer in the Equality Court would be required to 
listen closely to the experience of the complainant alleging discrimination, particularly when 
they are narrating their version. Context helps the presiding officer to understand how such 
an experience has impacted on the life of the complainant.110   
The factors which must be taken into account in terms of subsection 3111 can be divided into 
a three part assessment.  Firstly, the effect of the discrimination on the complainant is 
assessed.  This is done by taking into account whether the discriminatory practice impairs 
the dignity of the complainant;112 whether it impacts on the complainant113 and whether 
the complainant is part of a group in society that is subjected to patterns of disadvantage.114 
The second stage of the enquiry focuses particularly on whether the discriminatory act was 
directed at a worthy and legitimate goal, such as remedying past disadvantage or furthering 
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equality.115  The last stage of the enquiry revolves around the steps taken by the respondent 
to address the specified disadvantage.116  
It is clear from the reading of section 14 (3) (a) – (e) that it involves an assessment of how 
the discriminatory conduct impacted on the complainant or a group that the complainant 
belongs to.  The latter part of section 14 (3) (f) to (i) focuses on the possible justifications 
that the respondent may  raise and whether the discriminatory conduct served a legitimate 
purpose and therefore will be deemed fair.   
Unsurprisingly, the enquiry that has to be undertaken in determining the fairness or 
unfairness of the discrimination in terms of PEPUDA, is striking similar to the three tier 
enquiry coined by Judge Goldstone in the case of Harksen v Lane.117  An example of a case 
where the provisions of PEPUDA were invoked was the case of Du Preez v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development and Others.118  Briefly, the facts of the case were that Du 
Preez, a white male, who was a magistrate for 19 years, applied for a regional court 
magistrate’s position in Port Elizabeth.  Despite holding a BJuris, LLB and Master of Public 
Administration degree and fulfilling the minimum requirements he was not short-listed for 
the position.  This case is significant as it was the first matter to be heard before a High 
Court sitting as an Equality Court.119  
Two black females were shortlisted instead.  It must be mentioned at the outset that the 
provisions of the Employment Equity Act120 were not applicable to the complainant, as 
magistrates are not regarded as employees in terms of the Act.121  According to Van der 
Walt and Kituri122 the primary issue for determination in the Du Preez case was whether the 
criteria123 used in shortlisting applicants for the post were fair.  In arriving at his decision 
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Judge Erasmus began by referring to the relevant section of PEPUDA that deals with the 
onus of proof.  The learned Judge stated that:- 
 Section 13 of PEPUDA read with the definition in section 1 thereof provides that if the 
 complainant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, not disproven by the 
 respondent, therein, if the discrimination took place on the prohibited grounds of race and 
 gender, it is unfair, unless the respondent proves that it was fair.124  
The respondent in countering the averments made by the complainant, conceded that the 
shortlisting formula differentiated between the complainant and the other applicants on the 
grounds of race and gender, but submitted that this did not amount to discrimination.125  
Counsel for the respondent justified the discrimination employed in the shortlisting process 
on the grounds that the Constitution enjoins them to have regard to the racial and gender 
composition of South Africa when judicial officers are being appointed.126  Counsel 
proceeded on the basis that there is arguably a need for such a policy to be in place in order 
for there to be diversification in the judiciary.127  It was also submitted that transformation 
of the bench will, in addition, have the effect of promoting restorative affirmative action.128  
The learned Judge then went on to take into account the factors set out in section 14 (2) 
and (3) of the Act in order to establish whether the respondent discharged the onus cast 
upon it.  The learned Judge commented that the listed considerations contained in section 
14 (2) and (3) do not replace the test for the constitutionality of an affirmative action 
measure outlined in the Employment Equity Act but gives substance to that test.129 Quite 
importantly, the learned Judge stressed that not all the criteria mentioned are applicable in 
all cases.130  Continuing in the same vein the learned Judge stated that each case is to be 
decided on its own particular facts and circumstances by taking into account the impact of 
the discrimination as part of this assessment. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Albertyn when discussing how to determine whether 
discrimination was reasonably justifiable.131  The court then went on to state that the test as 
formulated in Harksen v Lane would also be of assistance.132   
The court found that the effect of the committee’s shortlisting formula was to raise an 
insurmountable obstacle for the complainant and that there was therefore an absolute 
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barrier to his appointment.133  Since the discrimination was built into a departmental policy, 
it was systemic in nature.134  In the circumstances, the court held that the respondent did 
not discharge the onus on them to prove that the discrimination was fair.135  The court 
ordered that the selection criteria be set aside and that the post be re-advertised.136 
Relief that can be claimed in terms of the Act is varied.  The Equality Court is empowered to 
make an order for the payment of damages in respect of any proven financial loss, including 
future loss, or in respect of impairment of dignity, pain and suffering or emotional and 
psychological suffering, as a result of the unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment 
in question.137  This order may be coupled with an appropriate costs order.138 As with all 
other court orders emanating from the Magistrates’ or High Courts, an order made by an 
Equality Court can either be reviewed or appealed against by an aggrieved party to the High 
Court or Supreme Court of Appeal having jurisdiction.139  An appeal directly to the 
Constitutional Court is also possible provided that their rules have been complied with.140  
Another notable feature of PEPUDA is that it allows for class actions.141 
A somewhat unique order that can be made by the Equality Court is found in section 21 (1) 
(o)142  where an order can be made directing the clerk of the Equality Court to submit the 
matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the possible institution 
of criminal proceedings in terms of the common law or relevant legislation.  It is evident that 
the drafters of PEPUDA did not intend for this section to be without effect as section 28 
(1)143 states that if it is proved in the prosecution of any offence that unfair discrimination 
on the grounds of race, gender or disability played a part in the commission of the offence, 
this must be regarded as an aggravating circumstance for purposes of sentence. 
In the African National Congress v Sparrow 144 case, the respondent was held to have 
contravened section 10 of PEPUDA.145  The respondent was ordered to pay an amount of R 
150 000 (one hundred and fifty thousand rand) in damages to the Oliver and Adelaide 
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Tambo Foundation together with the costs of the litigation by the Equality Court.146  In 
addition, the learned Magistrate directed that the Clerk of the Equality Court refer the 
matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions for consideration regarding the possible 
institution of criminal proceedings against Sparrow.147  This case did not deal with 
discrimination on the grounds of HIV but dealt with hate speech.  Reference to this case is 
made to illustrate the orders that the Court is empowered to make.  
If a woman living with HIV were to approach the Equality Court to complain that she was 
sterilised without her consent simply because she was HIV positive, the Court would only 
have jurisdiction over the discrimination aspect of her claim.  She would need to show on a 
prima facie basis that she received different treatment compared to other women who 
were giving birth in the same hospital.  She could do this by giving her own evidence or by 
calling witnesses.  She could also bring a copy of her medical records which would indicate 
she was HIV positive as this will show that the medical staff were aware of her HIV status.  
As HIV is a listed ground, the onus would then shift to the Minister of Health to show that 
she was sterilised for a reason not related to her HIV status or that sterilising HIV positive 
mothers is justifiable.    
5.3 Criminal law remedies 
The purpose of criminal litigation is for reparation by the accused person.  This is achieved 
by the State who has the power as the prosecuting authority to make offenders atone for 
their transgressions and punish them accordingly for it.148  This would have the effect of 
appeasing the victim and preventing the victim from taking the law into their own hands.149 
According to Pickles, the role of the criminal law cannot be ignored in cases of involuntary 
sterilisations, as this rights violation can be categorised as a form of public harm.150  The 
learned author holds the view that the act of sterilising women from a certain sector of 
society without informed consent amounts to a serious violation of their rights to bodily and 
psychological integrity that warrants punishment.151 
Criminal liability may be attracted in three ways for involuntary sterilisations.  The first being 
the common law crime of assault.  According to Strauss where there has been no consent to 
a medical procedure or where the consent was so ‘’uninformed’’ as to the nature of the 
procedure or consequences so that it cannot be said that there was a ‘’real’’ consent, the 
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patient can lay a charge of assault.152  Similar sentiments have been opined by the learned 
authors Carstens and Pearmain.153 
Snyman’s154 definition of the crime of assault is that an assault consists in any unlawful and 
intentional act or omission: 
(a) which results in another person’s bodily integrity being directly or indirectly impaired, or 
(b) which inspires a belief in another person that such impairment of her bodily integrity is  
      immediately to take place. 
 
The key elements of assault are that there must be conduct on the part of the accused 
either in the form of an act or omission that results in the impairment of another’s bodily 
integrity.  The conduct complained of by the complainant must be unlawful and the accused 
must have possessed the requisite intention to impair the complainant’s bodily integrity.  
The element of unlawfulness refers to the causing of the impairment of the complainant’s 
integrity which must be unlawful, in other words there must be no justification such as 
consent, for the conduct of the accused.155   
The element of intention refers to the fact that the accused must have wilfully applied force 
either directly or indirectly to the person of another.156  Dolus eventualis on the part of the 
accused must be proved in order to secure a conviction of assault.157 
Unlike a delictual claim where a person is free to waive his or her legal right if they choose 
to do so and excuse the wrongdoer from liability, this is not the position in criminal law.158  
A crime is less about harm to the victim and more about harm to the community as a 
whole.159  Burchell opines that the victim of a crime does not have the power to render an 
act not unlawful by consenting to suffer the harm involved.160  The general rule of criminal 
law is that consent on the part of the victim will not serve to excuse the crime of the 
offender.161  Consent by the victim in certain circumstances is an exception to this principle.  
This in effect means that a freely given and sufficiently informed consent by the victim will 
vitiate any finding of liability against the offender.162   In order to raise consent as a 
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successful defence the offender must satisfy the following requirements: (a) the crime and 
type of act in question must be of such a nature that the law recognises consent to the 
commission of such an act as a ground of justification;163 (b) the consent must be given 
voluntarily, without coercion.164  This will be established by undertaking a factual enquiry on 
how the consent was obtained.  Consent obtained as a result of fear or intimidation or 
through the application of violence does not satisfy the requirement of voluntary 
consent;165 (c) the person giving the consent must be mentally capable of giving consent;166 
(d) the consenting person must be aware of the true and material facts regarding the act to 
which she consents;167 (e) the consent may be given either expressly or tacitly;168 (f) the 
consent must be given before the otherwise unlawful act is committed169 and (g) consent 
must be given by the complainant.170   
Although it is a long established principle that the crime of assault could be used where a 
medical practitioner fails to obtain consent, there have been no recorded cases of its use.  
This may be because the evidentiary burden of showing an intentional act of harm to the 
patient is difficult to establish.  If a signed consent form exists in all likelihood it may indicate 
that the actions of the health care worker were not deliberate.  In such a case, a sterilised 
woman would bear the burden of a reverse onus to show that the consent was invalid.  In 
cases of forced sterilisation where there is no evidence of consent, written or verbal it is 
submitted that the element of intention could be established. 
The second way in which criminal liability can be attracted is if the provisions of the 
Sterilisation Act have been contravened.  Section 9 of the Sterilisation Act171 states that non-
compliance with the provisions of it and for our purposes more specifically the provisions of 
sections 2 and 4, will result in the commission of an offence.  Section 9172 provides for the 
sanction of a fine or a period of imprisonment for not more than five years in the event of 
there being a conviction arising from the commission of the offence. 
Although the Act creates an offence it is unclear how this would operate in practice.  For 
example section 9 of the Act173  is silent on whether negligence or intention as a form of 
fault is required to invoke criminal liability.  The learned, Pickles author further comments 
that when interpreting statutory offences there is a presumption that some degree of fault 
in the form of intention is required, unless there are express indications pointing to the 
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contrary.174  In this instance the legislature did not make use of the words ‘’negligently ‘’ or 
‘’without due care’’ but rather employed the use of the words ‘’ fails to comply’’ in section 
9.175  A health care provider will escape criminal liability under this section if he or she can 
show that the consent form was signed freely and voluntarily by the woman being sterilised 
after receiving information about the procedure to be performed.176 
It is argued by Pickles that it is not open for a woman who has been involuntarily sterilised 
to lay a charge of assault and contravention of the Sterilisation Act.177  Accordingly it is 
submitted that it would be preferable for the prosecutor to pursue a conviction in terms of 
the Sterilisation Act because of the sanction attached to the offence is more serious as 
opposed to the sanction attached to an assault.178  If the women rely on the statutory 
violation in terms of the Sterilisation Act, the sanction is a legislated one, which could even 
be a term of imprisonment for the medical practitioner.179  Even if imprisonment is not 
imposed, the medical doctor or nurse will face a lifetime of consequences for having a 
criminal record.  It is argued that it may be difficult to prosecute a medical practitioner in 
terms of the Act if a signed consent form exists.  In such a case, the Prosecutor would have 
to have evidence that either the signature was not obtained voluntarily or that the woman 
was not fully informed of the consequences of sterilisation as required by the Act. 
The third way in which the criminal law may be invoked to bring relief to women who have 
been involuntarily sterilised, would be to lay a charge of crimen iniuria against the 
wrongdoer who, in this instance may be a nurse or doctor or both.  This crime is defined as 
the ‘’unlawful, intentional and serious violation of the dignity or privacy of another.’’180  The 
commission of this crime is either by word or deed.181  Conduct that has been identified 
from the lived experiences of HIV positive women that could warrant a potential 
prosecution for crimen iniuria is verbal abuse, being degraded publicly for being HIV positive 
and being sterilised for a discriminatory reason.  The protected interest that is being 
violated is the woman’s dignity.182  Snyman submits that the ‘’seriousness’’ is determined by 
an objective test and factors that will be taken into account will be the relationship between 
the parties, whether the conduct complained of is ongoing, the social positions between the 
two parties and how this conduct is perceived within a particular community.183  The 
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wrongdoer must know that by their words or actions he or she is violating the complainant’s 
dignity and no consent was given by the complainant to justify the offensive conduct.184   
It is argued that the crime of crimen iniuria could be used to remedy the violation of a 
women’s dignity relating to the conduct that she had to endure surrounding the consent 
procedure.  Although such conduct must be intentional it is submitted that the narratives of 
women clearly indicate that it would be difficult to argue that such verbal abuse was not 
intentional.  Furthermore, on an objective basis it would be difficult for a nurse or doctor to 
argue that treating a woman in labour with such disdain is not violating their dignity.  It is 
submitted that the courts would frown upon public servants in positions of authority 
verbally abusing women in such vulnerable circumstances, particularly when this is contrary 
to the values in the Constitution.    
5.4 Administrative remedies 
5.4.1 Chapter 9 Institutions 
In the case of Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re-Certification of the 
Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the court stated that the 
Constitution  makes provision for a multi-party system of democratic government, with 
provision for three levels of authority to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.185  This provides a protective framework for civil society, which is enhanced by 
institutional structures such as the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities, and the Commission on Gender Equality.186 
The Constitution187 has established the above mentioned state institutions together with 
the Auditor General and Electoral Commission which have collectively become colloquially 
known as chapter 9 institutions.  As stated eloquently in the case of SABC v DA188 by Judges 
Navsa and Poonan ‘’in constitutional democracies, public administrators and State 
institutions are guardians of the public weal’’.  The purpose of the chapter 9 institutions is to 
strengthen constitutional democracy.189  In order to achieve this mandate section 181 (2)190 
authoritatively asserts the independence of these institutions which are subject only to the 
Constitution and law.  Organs of state are also called upon through legislation and other 
measures to assist in protecting the independence, impartiality and effectiveness of these 
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institutions.191  According to Murray192 both the Human Rights Commission and Commission 
on Gender Equality, could be described as specialist human rights institutions that are 
modelled on the Paris Principles.193  The learned author Murray194 also opines that the 
shared roles of these two institutions are of monitoring Government and contributing to the 
transformation of South Africa into a society in which social justice prevails.   
Three notable features of these institutions have been identified.  Firstly, even though they 
are state institutions, they are not a branch of government and are outside of 
government.195  Secondly, their mandate requires them to be independent and impartial 
like our courts.196  Thirdly, they can be described as ‘’intermediary institutions’’, that serve 
to provide a link between the people on one hand and government and Parliament on the 
other, especially for those people who are indigent and have limited access to legal 
services.197  
Collectively, the work of the Human Rights Commission and Commission on Gender Equality 
are concerned with the investigation of the implementation of rights and to engage with 
government and Parliament when there is a lack thereof. 198 This task is made easier by their 
enabling legislation.199     
5.4.1.1 The South African Human Rights Commission 
The South African Human Rights Commission is a state institution that is established in 
terms of section 181 (1) (b) of the Constitution.200 The constitutional mandate of the Human 
Rights Commission is to promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights;201 
promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights;202 and monitor and 
assess the observance of human rights in the Republic.203  In furtherance of the aims and 
objects of the Human Rights Commission the South African Human Rights Commission 
Act204 sets out the powers and functions of the Commission. The salient features of the 
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Act205 are the power of the Commission to monitor implementation of, and compliance 
with, international and regional conventions and treaties, international and regional 
covenants and international and regional charters relating to the objects of the 
Commission.206   
The Commission may on its accord or upon a complaint being lodged investigate such a 
complaint.207 Should the Commission find merit in the complaint lodged by a complainant, 
the Commission must assist by securing appropriate redress and in certain instances provide 
the financial means necessary for a complainant to approach a court having jurisdiction to 
hear the matter for appropriate relief. The Commission may also direct a complainant to an 
appropriate forum for necessary relief.208 
The complaint form has three parts to it with the first part requesting biographical details of 
the complainant.  (See Appendix A) The second part should only be completed if the 
complainant is not bringing the complaint in their own name or it is being brought on behalf 
of a class of persons.  The last part of the form deals specifically with the complaint.  It 
enquires from the complainant whether the complainant is aware of which right or rights in 
the Bill of Rights have been violated.  Details of the person who committed the violation are 
also required.  Similar to the complaints form of the Commission for Gender Equality, 
information about whether the matter has been reported to any other body, what steps 
have been taken to resolve the matter and what relief the complainant seeks is also 
requested.  The completed form must then be submitted to one of the nine offices of the 
South African Human Rights Commission offices.   
5.4.1.2  The Commission for Gender Equality  
The Commission for Gender Equality was established by section 181 (1) (d) of the 
Constitution.209  The functions of the Commission for Gender Equality as set out in section 
187 (1) of the Constitution is to promote respect for gender equality and the protection, 
development and attainment of gender equality.210  
Further to the functions listed in terms of section 187 (2) of the Constitution, the 
Commission on Gender Equality Act211 enumerates the powers and functions of the 
Commission.  The Commission is empowered to monitor and evaluate policies and practices 
of organs of state at any level; statutory bodies or functionaries and public bodies and 
authorities in order to promote gender equality and make any recommendations that are 
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deemed necessary.212 The Act also makes provision for advocacy and training around issues 
of gender equality.213  Section 11 (1) (e) mandates the Commission to investigate complaints 
regarding gender-related issues which the Commission must strive to resolve by way of 
mediation, conciliation or negotiation214 or alternatively refer the complaint to the South 
African Human Rights Commission215 or Public Protector.216 
The Commission is also tasked with monitoring the compliance with regards to international 
conventions, international covenants and international charters in so far as they relate to 
gender issues.217 
In order to set an investigation by the Commission for Gender Equality into motion the 
complainant is required to complete a complaint form.  (See Appendix B for a copy of this 
form).  The complaint form has two parts with the first part requesting the biographical 
information of the complainant. It then goes on to obtain information about the 
complainant’s socio-economic conditions.  The complaint form also enquires from the 
complainant whether the matter has been reported to any other body and whether the 
complainant is represented.  It also seeks to find out what relief the complainant seeks from 
the Commission.   
Part B of the complaint form requests a detailed explanation of the complaint and the 
nature of the discrimination to be stipulated.  It also requires the details of the person or 
organisation that the complainant is lodging a complaint against. 
In assisting the Commission with the investigation of complaints, the Commission may issue 
a subpoena to any person to appear before it, and also issue a subpoena duces tecum to 
any person to bring specified documentation which is under their control, to the hearing.218 
The Commission also has the authority to request for a warrant to be issued by a Magistrate 
or Judge if the Commission is of the opinion that they require documents that are necessary 
for their investigation and cannot secure the documents by any other means.219  The issued 
warrant will enable the Commission to enter premises in which it believes the documents 
are stored.220 
The Commission plays more of a public watchdog role and will be effective in lobbying for 
change in practices and policies relating to gender equality.  The Commission’s role must not 
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be underestimated as it serves to educate, enlighten and eradicate discrimination based on 
gender.  
5.4.1.3 The Public Protector 
Sections 181 to 183 of the Constitution make provision for the establishment of the office of 
the Public Protector and sets out its powers and functions.221 The powers of the Public 
Protector originate from the Constitution and the Public Protector Act.222  Amongst its many 
functions, it is meant to protect the public from conduct that could result in impropriety or 
prejudice emanating from officials undertaking State affairs or from any sphere of 
Government.223  This is done by undertaking an investigation into a complaint that she has 
received from a member of the public or through her own volition.224  Thereafter, he/she is 
required to report on the conduct and take appropriate remedial action if warranted.225  
The Constitution is silent on the issue of the effect that his/her constitutional power to take 
remedial action has on the person or organ of State that it is made against.  The Economic 
Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others226 case sought clarification on this issue and 
whether such remedial action is legally binding in light of the President’s non-compliance 
with the Public Protector’s directive.  Chief Justice Mogoeng in penning the judgment 
referred to the powers and functions of the Public Protector and held that it could not be 
conceived that decisions made by this institution are supposed to be ineffectual having 
regard to its mandate of strengthening our constitutional democracy.227  The Court further 
held that decisions of the Public Protector could not have been envisaged to be 
inconsequential taking into account the time, money and energy expended on the 
investigations and findings.228  Therefore, compliance with remedial action suggested by 
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him/her is not optional.229  These wide-ranging powers that the Public Protector has are not 
unchecked and an aggrieved party may take the directive of remedial action on review but 
in the absence of requiring further judicial scrutiny it must be complied with.230  
The office of the Public Protector is central to contributing to good governance in our 
constitutional dispensation and it has been described as an invaluable gift to our country.231  
The Court held that the directives of remedial action made by the Public Protector were 
binding and could not be disregarded, doing so would contribute to undermining its 
independence, impartiality, effectiveness and dignity.232  By the very nature of its office and 
the source of its power a complaint to the Public Protector may be unusual but very 
effective in tackling the root causes of complaints of the systemic rights violations in these 
sterilisations cases.  This is needed in dealing with the issue of HIV positive women being 
involuntarily sterilised as health care workers acting in a manner contrary to this will not be 
sanctioned by the rule of law.233  
The third category of remedies are those that can be collectively grouped together under 
the banner of administrative remedies.  These new forms of relief can be described as being 
blended.  They are remedial in nature but less formal and aim at resolving the cause of the 
underlying disputes.  These purposes are important as they remind us that as a society we 
must address systemic rights violations to avoid the undermining of the rule of law.   
Accessing the Chapter 9 institutions does not pose a significant challenge in terms of costs.  
The South African Human Rights Commission and Commission on Gender Equality are 
situated in all nine provinces and the complainants may approach their offices directly or 
alternatively lodge a complaint in writing. Lodging a complaint with the Chapter 9 
institutions does not attract any charges and there is no need for a legal representative.  A 
positive feature of lodging a complaint with the Human Rights Commission in particular is 
that in terms of their mandate there is a possibility that funds will be provided to access 
legal services in selected matters.   
Similar to the South African Human Rights Commission, a complaint to the Commission for 
Gender Equality is initiated by filling out a complaint form. Likewise, there are not costs 
attached to approaching the Commission for Gender Equality and no legal representation is 
required.  The Commission for Gender Equality has the power to evaluate the practices and 
policies of the Health Ministry upon receiving a complaint from HIV positive women who 
have been sterilised on the basis of their sex and HIV positive status.234  In 2015, Her Rights 
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Initiative, together with the International Community of Women Living with HIV Southern 
Africa (two NGO’s) and forty eight women who were coercively sterilised lodged a complaint 
with the Commission for Gender Equality.235  The complaint called for an investigation into 
the practice of coercive sterilisations in State hospitals, law reform and redress for this 
group of women.236  In 2016 Her Rights Initiative disbanded due to a lack of funding and no 
further information has been found on the referral of this complaint to the Commission for 
Gender Equality. 
To date no complaint on this issue has been submitted to the Public Protector.  
Nevertheless, it is submitted that given the binding nature of their remedial action and its 
ability to investigate the discriminatory conduct of a state official, this may be an avenue for 
positive women to consider in the future.   
5.4.2 Professional Bodies Regulating the Conduct of Health Professionals 
5.4.2.1 Health Professions Council 
The Health Professions Council of South Africa (hereafter referred to as the HPCSA) is a 
statutory body that was created in terms of the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974.  All 
health care practitioners who practice in South Africa are obliged to register with the Health 
Professions Council.  Their registration then serves to subject them to the Ethical Guidelines 
for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions. 
The first set of guidelines that are important for our purpose is ‘’Seeking Patient’s Informed 
Consent: The Ethical Considerations.’’237  The guidelines clearly recognise that the ethical 
notion of informed consent is codified in the National Health Act, various other statutes, the 
common law and Health Professions Council South Africa Guidelines.238 
Many of the guidelines on informed consent are in accordance with the provisions of the 
National Health Act.239  It is worth mentioning that the guidelines reiterate that it is the duty 
of the health care practitioner to obtain a patient’s informed consent before treatment is 
given.240 The definition of a ‘health care practitioner’ does not include a nurse in terms of 
the guidelines.241  Even though the guidelines do make provision for the delegation of the 
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task of obtaining informed consent242 the guidelines unequivocally state that the 
responsibility for obtaining a patient’s informed consent to treatment, investigation or 
procedure will remain the responsibility of the health care practitioner.243 
In instances where a patient’s informed consent was obtained by a third party, a health care 
practitioner cannot rely on the form that has recorded the patient’s consent.244  The 
guidelines require the health care practitioner to ascertain from the patient how well they 
understand the proposed procedure and the attendant risks attached to it.245  
Besides guidelines on consent, the HPCSA has issued The General Ethical Guidelines for 
Reproductive Health.246 These recognise that because none of the current methods of 
fertility control fully satisfies the ideal of safety, effectiveness, reversibility, ease and 
religious acceptance, contraceptive counselling is needed.247  Medical practitioners are 
urged to respect and have regard to the autonomy of the woman when discussing 
contraceptive methods.248  This requirement extends to health care personnel as well who 
are required to take into account the input and opinions of women wishing to access 
contraceptives.249  
The guidelines also require that a range of appropriate contraceptive methods be discussed 
with a woman, with appropriate counselling services being at hand.250   Choosing 
sterilisation as a form of contraception is significantly different from choosing other 
methods of contraceptives because of the permanency of the procedure and the potential 
irreversibility of the procedure. The rationale behind having ethical considerations for 
sterilisation procedures stems from the fact that decisions about sterilisation involve 
personal values and therefore may be subject to inappropriate practitioner bias.251  A 
medical practitioner’s personal values should not be thrust upon the patient when making a 
decision about sterilisation.  The ethical considerations that have been put forth by the 
Health Professions Council are that a medical practitioner should strive to encourage the 
patient to include other appropriate persons including her partner in the decision making 
process as a decision to opt to be sterilised may significantly affect the lives of others.252   
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A medical practitioner cannot withhold other medical care in lieu of the patient agreeing to 
undergo sterilisation.253  This would be regarded as coercive and is unacceptable in terms of 
the Guidelines. Furthermore, the medical practitioner’s personal values or sense of societal 
objectives should never be a basis for urging a patient to undergo sterilisation.254  The 
patient’s race, ethnicity, socio-economic status255 and the number of children256 should also 
never be grounds for encouraging a patient to be sterilised. Informed consent on the part of 
the patient is vital.  With the assistance of counselling, patients are much better placed to 
make an informed decision as the patient would have been made aware of the permanency 
of the procedure; that her life circumstances may change and that she may regret her 
sterility.257 
Any person who alleges unethical conduct by a medical practitioner may lodge a complaint 
with the Health Professions Council of South Africa.  The complaints form requires full 
details of the patient, the medical practitioner and the nature of the complaint to be 
specified fully.  (See Appendix C for a copy of this form). 
Once the complaint has been submitted to the Registrar of the Health Professions Council of 
South Africa the Registrar must within 7 days refer such complaint to the medical 
practitioner and request a written explanation from him/her.  The medical practitioner may 
refuse to provide a response to the complaint.  Thereafter the statement of the patient and 
medical practitioner’s response, if submitted, will be sent to the Professional Board for 
consideration. 
Should the Professional Board be of the opinion that there are merits in the complaint a 
professional conduct enquiry will be held by the Professional Conduct Committee.  The 
Professional Conduct Committee will hear oral evidence of the parties and expert witnesses.  
The media and members of public are permitted to be present at these hearing unless 
prohibited by the chairperson of the Professional Conduct Committee.   
Should the medical practitioner be found guilty of misconduct the medical practitioner may 
appeal against this decision.  The Professional Conduct Committee may impose the 
following penalties on a medical practitioner who has been found guilty of misconduct:- 
(i)   A caution or a reprimand or both; 
(ii)  A fine; 
(iii)  Suspension for a specified period from practising his/her profession; 
(iv)  Removal of his/her name from the relevant register; 
(v)   A compulsory period of professional service; or 
(vi)  Payment of the costs of the proceedings.258 
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Complaints to the HPCSA by patients, and in our case HIV positive women, who have been 
sterilised without their informed consent either in a State or private hospital may be made 
in writing. There are no cost implications for the patient and assistance is provided to the 
patient by the HPCSA when she is presenting her case.  Even though there is no time limit 
within which to lodge a complaint, a difficulty that may be encountered by women who 
have been sterilised in State hospitals, is establishing the identity of the medical practitioner 
due to the passage of time.   
 
Research that has been conducted in South Africa shows that only African women have 
been subjected to this gross human rights violation.259  According to the HPCSA, racial 
discrimination is considered to be unprofessional conduct and disciplinary steps may be 
taken by the Council against a medical practitioner for discriminating on the basis of a 
patient’s race.260  It is submitted that if a medical practitioner is found guilty of 
unprofessional conduct, the sanction that is imposed will have the effect of letting the 
women know that the unprofessional conduct they were subjected to was unacceptable 
and unlawful.  In some instances, a medical practitioner may be prevented from practising 
for a specified period of time or alternatively struck off the roll of the HPCSA. 
 
5.4.2.2 The South African Nursing Council 
The South African Nursing Council (hereafter referred to as the SANC) is a professional body 
that sets and maintains the standards of nurses in terms of the Nursing Act 50 of 1978. The 
Council has listed certain acts or omissions committed on the part of nurses that are 
regarded as unprofessional conduct.  Contained on the list is ‘’forcing a patient to sign a 
consent for a surgical procedure.’’261  Should a patient be subjected to conduct contained on 
the list of misconduct then that patient must under oath and in writing set out the details of 
the alleged misconduct; the nature of the conduct complained of; details of the nurse(s) and 
names of any witnesses involved.262  Once a complaint is received it is investigated and all 
relevant information is collected.263 This information is then submitted to the Preliminary 
Investigation Committee which has the power to either impose a fine on the nurse or refer 
the complaint to the Professional Conduct Committee.264  If the latter option is chosen the 
Professional Conduct Committee will hold a formal enquiry where evidence will be heard 
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and a ruling made.265  The sanctions that can be imposed on the nurse do not offer any 
monetary or other relief to the patient and only serves to punish the nurse.266  
Unprofessional conduct by a nurse may be reported to the professional body governing the 
conduct of nurses.  The reporting procedures are simple and do not require the services of a 
legal representative nor are there any cost implications.  HIV positive women may lodge a 
complaint against a nurse for forcing them to sign a consent form to be sterilised.  A finding 
of guilty can attract a sanction of suspension or a removal from the roll of nurses. A key 
problem however may be identifying the nurse on duty at the time of the sterilisation 
procedure being performed.   
None of the administrative remedies discussed above make provision for monetary 
compensation to be paid to the complainants. Relief obtained from these bodies aims at 
reprimanding the health workers concerned or bringing about change which will benefit 
other HIV positive women who seek family planning options.  This is a significant 
disadvantage as the women in the Strode et al study all expressed a desire for financial 
compensation.267  Although complaints to a professional body may not bring much relief to 
individual women, they may assist in attempts to change the institutional culture within the 
health care system.  Holding health care workers to account for their failure to respect the 
dignity of patients under their care may result in a valuable shift from patient paternalism to 
autonomy.  
5.5 Discussion  
An evaluation of the remedies indicates that a civil claim for damages appears to be the 
most appropriate in the circumstances.  Although other remedies exist none of these are 
able to address the problem in a holistic manner.  However, it is submitted that the focus on 
the civil law remedy would only be successful if it was driven by NGOs or Human Rights 
Organisations as was done in the LM268 and Sithole269 cases.  The reasons advanced for the 
submission that a civil damages claim is most suited to the women who have been sterilised 
forcibly or coercively for a discriminatory reason are the following.  Firstly, a solid legal 
framework on the substantive and procedural law applicable to a damages claim is in place.  
Secondly, using this route allows us to address both the claims of bodily and psychological 
integrity, dignity and equality.  Thirdly, the Court has the power to award a range of 
remedies including damages and specific performance.  Fourthly, given that this specific 
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type of civil matter can only be heard in the High Court, any judgment could potentially be 
of precedent value and this increases media attention on the issue and could possibly place 
pressure on the Department of Health to address the causes of the problem.  Fifthly, none 
of the other remedies have been successful in other jurisdictions.  Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that for a civil claim to be successful it will require strong institutional support for 
individual litigants through an NGO and further research and documentation of 
circumstances under which the forced and coerced sterilisations continue to thrive.  
When considering the use of the civil law as a remedy there would be two primary causes of 
action, one relating to consent and the other to violations of dignity and equality.  It appears 
from chapter 2 and 3 that the consent would be easier to prove.  In order to ensure that 
sterilised HIV positive women have access to justice the discriminatory and judgemental 
attitudes on the part of health care providers need to be addressed.  It is particularly 
difficult to cope with the emotional abuse which has the effect of making HIV positive 
women reluctant to access sexual reproductive health care services.270   In the words of 
Gruskin, ‘’HIV-related stigma and discrimination have restricted the success of HIV 
prevention, care and treatment programmes and reduced the willingness of people with HIV 
to disclose their status or to seek out sexual and reproductive health services.’’271   The end 
result of this is that HIV positive women shy away from approaching health care providers 
for advice on child-bearing and reproductive health issues.272   The consequences of this are 
dire as HIV positive women have different reproductive health related needs from those of 
HIV negative women and require care from health care providers.273  In particular, HIV 
positive women are more susceptible to contracting pre-cancerous cervical cell 
abnormalities, they require medication during the period of gestation and during child-birth, 
medication also needs to be administered to babies after their birth, in some instances a 
caesarean section is performed and the nursing of babies must not be through 
breastfeeding.274  The severe negative reaction that HIV positive women receive from health 
care providers may lead to this group of women concealing their status from family and 
health care providers and therefore not accessing antiretroviral treatment timeously.275  
Addressing the abusive and discriminatory attitudes and conduct of health care workers is 
complex.  Nevertheless, there are a range of legal remedies that can be used including 
firstly, individual civil claims that may be brought against health care workers and or the 
institution that employs them.  This approach may well be difficult as proving the wrongful 
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conduct will be hard as the plaintiff will in all likelihood have to rely on her own testimony.  
In the LM276 case this was the approach that was used and it appears to have been 
insufficient even though the High Court did not expressly comment on the deficiencies of 
their evidence.   Secondly, they could lay a criminal charge of crimen iniuria but they would 
have to overcome the hurdle of showing that that the health care worker’s conduct was 
intentional.  Thirdly, they could lay a complaint with the Equality Court and in all likelihood 
this would be the best forum for a discrimination dispute as it is speedy, cheap, accessible 
and its jurisdiction is limited to these types of matters, see chapter 4 for more details.  
Finally, they could use an administrative remedy, that is, a complaint to a professional body 
or complaint to a Chapter 9 institution.  It is submitted that using the first two remedies 
would help to achieve an individual sense of justice for the women whilst the administrative 
remedies are more likely to help with systemic change to the health care system.   
A significant problem with any civil matter which aims at remedying a violation of a 
woman’s dignity or discrimination against her on the basis of her HIV status would be the 
evidentiary burden of proving unfair discrimination.  Once it has been established that the 
HIV positive women who have been sterilised without their informed consent are afforded 
protection by domestic laws, regional and international covenants and conventions, it 
becomes important to ascertain how exactly these rights have been violated.  Once this is 
ascertained, a strategy needs to be developed to show how evidence supporting this 
contention will be presented to the Court.  The manner in which this will be done is by 
leading oral testimony of the women and through the use of documentary evidence to 
support the oral evidence.  Documentary evidence in our case will take the form of hospital 
records.  This includes the patient’s outpatients encounter form (if applicable), the 
admission form, labour admission chart, obstetrical clinical records, consent to operation 
form, sterilisation consent by patient form, operating cases layman’s form, pre and post –
operative nursing care form containing detailed notes by the nurses, doctors and midwives’ 
clinical notes, labour admission chart, caesarean section form, examination of the neonate 
form, summary of labour form, control chart, observation nursing care chart, results flow 
chart, and discharge summary form.277   
Further important documentary evidence that will be required from the hospital will be a 
statement/incident form which reflects the events surrounding the sterilisation.  Depending 
on whether the patient is aware of all the names of the health care practitioners involved in 
the sterilisation procedure, a request for the duty roster must be made.  Without obtaining 
the above information it will be virtually impossible to commence with the institution of 
legal proceedings.  The HPCSA Guidelines recommend that medical records be stored for a 
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period of six years from the date of the patient’s file becoming dormant.278  However, the 
loss of these medical records could become a real impediment for women wishing to 
institute a claim against the health ministry and its servants responsible for the unlawful 
sterilisation. 
No jurisdiction either nationally or internationally has made a finding of discrimination in 
litigation around the forced or coerced sterilisation of women for a discriminatory reason.  
Despite there being findings on the lack of full and informed consent in the Slovakian279 and 
Namibian280 decisions, the Courts in both instances did not find that the sterilisations took 
place for a discriminatory reason.  The judgments in these cases remained silent on what 
evidence would be required to show that the medical practitioners sterilised the women for 
discriminatory reasons.  In the LM case the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to lead 
evidence about the discriminatory treatment that they were subjected to and hence this 
aspect of their claim was dismissed.281  
In a dissenting judgment penned in the VC case, the learned Judge’s disbelief that the 
majority of the Court found that it was not necessary to examine the allegations of 
discriminatory treatment that the Roma women were subjected to, was tangible.  The Judge 
was of the firm belief that the discriminatory treatment based on the Roma women’s 
ethnicity was widespread and the last remnants of the existence of a State policy into the 
sterilisation of Roma women was still being felt.282  According to the learned Judge this view 
is supported by the fact that cases of a similar nature are pending before the Courts.283   The 
mere fact that ‘’patient is of Roma origin’’ was written on the hospital file was not 
coincidental.  The Government argued that this was necessary as Roma women needed 
‘’special attention’’ with regards to their health care.  The learned Judge was of the firm 
view that the ‘’special attention’’ referred to earmarking these women to be sterilised. The 
coerced sterilisation of Roma women could not have been ‘’accidental’’ as the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovakia documented ongoing sterilisation of 
the Roma women and found that the public attitude towards this minority group remained 
generally negative.284    
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Likewise it would be argued that the sterilisation of HIV positive women during caesarean 
sections is not coincidental.  The LM case showed that the women’s HIV status was noted in 
their files and it is clear that the medical practitioners would have been aware of this 
information.285  In the Strode study many of the women reported that they were told by the 
health care workers that they needed to be sterilised for reasons relating to their HIV 
status.286  In a broader context of stigma and discrimination of people living with HIV it is 
argued that this ought to be sufficient to show prima facie evidence of HIV discrimination.   
The advantages of using the criminal law as a remedy is that there are no legal costs 
attached to the use of this remedy.  The women will be represented by the State and 
therefore the use of a legal representative is not required.  The issue of prescription will not 
be a challenge in this instance as the complainant has a period of twenty years from the 
date of the sterilisation to lay a complaint against a medical practitioner.287  There are 
however, drawbacks in using the criminal justice system which cannot be dismissed.  Where 
a medical practitioner faces a charge of assault, intention must be proved.  It is submitted 
that the State may encounter difficulties with this element of the crime if there is a signed 
consent form.  With regards to contravention of the Sterilisation Act,288 it is submitted that 
the Act289 is silent on whether proof of negligent or intentional conduct on the part of the 
medical practitioner will suffice to secure a conviction.  Thus far, there has been no 
successful prosecution of a medical practitioner for assault or alternatively the 
contravention of the Sterilisation Act.290  It is submitted that public policy issues may deter 
the State from prosecuting or in the event of there being a prosecution, imposing a 
custodial sentence on a medical practitioner who has been charged with crimes arising out 
of sterilising HIV positive women without their informed consent.    
It appears from a review of the other sterilisation cases discussed in chapter 2, and the 
South African legal remedies discussed above, with this type of issue, which is broad based 
in nature there is a greater possibility of success if a legal response is driven by an NGO.  In 
terms of the remedies described above an NGO may appoint a legal representative to lead a 
civil claim on behalf of the plaintiff and they are able to undertake a watching brief in any of 
the other remedies proposed.   NGOs undertaking litigation of a human rights nature will be 
able to make the litigation simply one element of a larger strategic intervention to address 
the underlying issues.  In this case we submit that the coerced or forced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women was founded on discriminatory attitudes and the law cannot on its own 
change such views.  We argue that this broader concept of justice was particularly 
successful in Namibia as it has brought about systemic change.  The Sithole case 
                                                            
285 Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM and Others (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19 (3 November 2014). 
286 Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9.  
287 See discussion at 5.5.1 in Chapter 5. 
288 44 of 1998. 
289 Ibid.  
290 Ibid.  
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demonstrates that the NGO could litigate even on the basis of a single claimant.  There is no 
need to show that the practice is systemic.  The advantages of the civil, criminal and 
administrative remedies are discussed further chapter 6. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In South Africa there is a constitutional right to have any legal dispute ventilated in Court, 
tribunal or another forum.291  In furtherance of this guaranteed right South Africa has a 
broad range of legal remedies.  There are three possible legal avenues which HIV positive 
women can use in order to obtain legal relief.  They may invoke the civil law or criminal law 
which would involve litigation.  They also have the option of approaching the three Chapter 
9 institutions and the professional bodies for medical practitioners and nurses which is non-
litigious in nature.  All of these avenues have advantages and disadvantages attached to 
them.  It is submitted, that where the cause of action is a failure to obtain informed consent, 
all three avenues can be pursued.  However, where discrimination is the cause of action the 
criminal law remedy can only be used in terms of the crime of crimen iniuria.  In such a case 
the victim would need to be able to show her dignity was violated intentionally through the 
discriminatory conduct.   A criminal charge of assault, crimen iniuria or contravention of the 
Sterilisation Act and complaints to the South African Human Rights Commission, 
Commission for Gender Equality, Public Protector and the Health Professional Bodies can 
run parallel to the civil claim.     
This thesis has adopted a broad definition of access to justice that evaluates legal and 
administrative remedies on the basis of a range of factors.  It is submitted that given the 
range of options, women are able to identify what would be appropriate relief in their 
individual capacity or as part of advocacy by a Non-Governmental Organisation.   
                                                            
291 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Chapter 6 
Achieving access to justice for HIV positive women alleging forced 
or coerced sterilisation 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically discusses the facilitators and barriers to access to justice.  It breaks 
down the concept of access to justice into five factors which are measured against the lived 
experiences of HIV positive women who desire legal and other redress.  This chapter starts 
with a discussion on the law on prescription as this is a fundamental legal bar to any civil 
matter and will apply regardless of the merits of the matter.  It concludes with an evaluation 
of the extent to which sterilised HIV positive women could access the legal remedies 
described in chapter 5.    
6.2 Prescription 
Time bars and legislation that have the effect of limiting the time within which legal action 
may be instituted are referred to as prescription.1  Prescription has been defined as 
occurring when various types of obligations may be extinguished or rendered unenforceable 
by the effluxion of time.2  Failure to institute legal action timeously, ultimately equates to 
the interests of justice being compromised with the prolonged delays leading to uncertainty 
in the affairs of those concerned.3  Prescription is a particularly significant issue for the 
South African women who participated in the Strode et al study.4  In this research there was 
only one participant whose case had not prescribed which effectively indicated that it was 
highly unlikely that any of the others could utilise any of the civil law remedies.   
Case law has provided us with an array of convincing reasons which cannot easily be 
disregarded, regarding the purpose of having prescriptive periods in our law.  In Mohlomi’s 
case Judge Didcott held that in instances where witnesses are available their recollection of 
events may be unreliable.5 In addition, prescription serves the purpose to protect a debtor 
                                                            
1 Road Accident Fund and Another v Mdeyide (CCT 10/10) [2010] ZACC 18; 2011 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2011 (2) SA 26 
(CC) (30 September 2010) at para 101. 
2 J S Saner The Law of South Africa (21) (2010) 2 ed at 103.  
3 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence (CCT41/95) [1996] ZACC 20; 1996 (12) BCLR 1559; 1997 (1) SA 124 (26 
September 1996) at para 11 and JS Saner ‘Prescription’ in The Law of South Africa 2 ed (2010) at 103. 
4 A Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9. 
5 Ibid.  Similar sentiments have been expressed in the case of Road Accident Fund and Another v Mdeyide (CCT 
10/10) [2010] ZACC 18; 2011 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) ; 2011 (2) SA 26 (CC) (30 September 2010) at para 8 where Van 
der Westhuizen J stated that ‘’the quality of adjudication by courts is likely to suffer as time passes, because 
evidence may have become lost, witnesses may no longer be available to testify, or their recollection of events 
may have faded.  The quality of adjudication is central to the rule of law.  For the law to be respected, 
decisions of courts must be given as soon as possible after the events giving rise to disputes and must follow 
from sound reasoning, based on the best available evidence.’’ 
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from old claims against which it cannot effectively defend itself because of a loss of records 
or witnesses caused by the lapse of time.6  In essence, the rules of prescription prevent 
procrastination and the harmful consequences of it which cannot convincingly be ignored.7  
In Links v MEC, Department of Health, Northern Cape Province, the court held that the other 
side of this principle is that if it is applied too strictly it can violate a litigant’s rights in terms 
of section 34 of the Constitution.8  This point is of particular importantance in the context of 
forced or coerced sterilisations where most plaintiffs are likely to be poor and unaware of 
their rights and the need to institute legal action within certain time periods. 
Prescription applies across all areas of our civil and criminal law.  The prescription period for 
criminal offences is 20 years.9  The prescription periods that relate to civil claims are listed  
in the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.  The periods described in this Act would apply to any 
delictual claim or any claim in terms of PEPUDA.  The table below sets out the various 
periods.  
Table 6.1:  Extinctive prescription periods as set out in the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 
Prescription  
Period 
30 Years 15 Years 6 Years 3 Years 
Nature Of The 
Claim 
-For a debt 
secured by a 
mortgage bond; 
-Any judgment 
debt; 
-Any debt in 
respect of a 
taxation; 
-Any debt owed 
to the state in 
respect of 
claims relating 
-Any debt owed 
to the state in 
respect of 
claims relating 
to the advance 
of money or 
sale or lease of 
land.   
-In respect of a 
debt arising 
from a 
negotiable 
instrument or 
notarial 
contract. 
-In respect of 
any other debt. 
                                                            
6 Uitenhage Municipality v Molloy 1998 2 SA 735 (SCA). 
7 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence (CCT41/95) [1996] ZACC 20; 1996 (12) BCLR 1559 (CC); 1997 (1) SA 124 (CC) 
(26 September 1996) at para 11. 
8 Links v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Northern Cape Province (CCT 29/15) [2016] 
ZACC 10; 2016 (5) BCLR 656 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 414 (CC) (30 March 2016) at para 22. 
9 Section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 states that the right to institute a prosecution for any 
offence will prescribe after a period of 20 years from the date on which the offence was committed unless it is 
an offence of murder, treason, robbery with aggravated circumstances, kidnapping, rape, the crime of 
genocide; crimes against humanity and war crimes and human trafficking for sexual purposes. 
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to the mining of 
minerals. 
 
A departure from the prescriptive periods contained in the Prescription Act10 is permissible 
in certain instances.  In these deserving instances, the Court will grant condonation which 
will then have the effect of allowing the litigant access to justice.11  For the purposes of this 
dissertation the three year period is of relevance to us which in effect means that women 
who have been sterilised either without their informed consent or coercively, have a period 
of three years to institute action for a claim for damages.  The crucial question is then when 
does prescription begin to run, taking into account the provisions of section 12 (3) of the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969.  Section 12 (3) provides ‘’A debt shall not be deemed to be due 
until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the debtor and of the facts from which 
the debt arises: Provided that a creditor shall be deemed to have such knowledge if he could 
have acquired it by exercising reasonable care.’’ 
With the advent of the Constitution, and more especially section 39 (2)12 it is now 
mandatory for Courts when interpreting legislative provisions to do so through the prism of 
the Constitution.13  This mandatory interpretation is activated when the legislative provision 
concerned affects a right or rights in the Bill of Rights.14  For our purposes, the right being 
affected is the right to access to the Courts in terms of section 34.15 In such instances, the 
Court will be duty bound to promote the object, spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights.16  
According to Jafta J ‘’the objects of the Bill of Rights are promoted by, where the provision is 
capable of more than one meaning, adopting a meaning that does not limit a right in the Bill 
of Rights.’’17   
It is trite that section 10 (1) read with sections 11 and 12 of the Prescription Act has the 
effect of limiting a litigant’s right to access the courts which has been guaranteed by the 
Constitution.18  However, section 39 (2) mandates courts to invoke this section when 
discharging their judicial function of interpreting legislation which involves a right in the Bill 
                                                            
10 68 of 1969. 
11 Road Accident Fund and Another v Mdeyide (CCT 10/10) [2010] ZACC 18; 2011 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2011 (2) SA 
26 (CC) (30 September 2010) at para 103. 
12 This section makes it mandatory for a Court, tribunal or forum when interpreting legislation; and when 
developing the common law or customary law, to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.   
13 Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd (CCT52/15) [2016] ZACC 13; 2016 (6) BCLR 709 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) (26 
April 2016) at para 87. 
14 Ibid at para 88. 
15 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
16 Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd (CCT52/15) [2016] ZACC 13; 2016 (6) BCLR 709 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) (26 
April 2016) at para 88. 
17 Ibid at para 89. 
18 Ibid at para 90. 
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of Rights.19  Therefore, on the authority of Makate20 an interpretation of the word debt that 
must be preferred is the one that has the least intrusive effect on the right of access to 
courts.21  The learned Judge stated that: 
Constitutional rights conferred without express limitation should not be cut down by 
reading implicit limitations onto them, and when legislature provisions limits or intrudes 
upon those rights they should be interpreted in a manner least restrictive of the right if the 
text is reasonably capable of bearing that meaning.22   
The Prescription Act is silent on the definition of debt.  In order to seek out the true 
meaning of debt turning to recent case law for assistance would be helpful.  The narrow 
definition of debt as set out in the ESCOM23 case has come to be accepted in the 
Constitutional Court case of Off-Beat Holiday Club,24 as opposed to the broad definition of 
debt as set out in the Desai case.25  The debate on whether to accept the broad or narrow 
definition of debt was settled in the Makate case.26  The ESCOM case held that a debt is 
‘’that which is owed or due; anything (as money, goods or services) which one person is 
under obligation to pay or render to another.’’27 
It is important at this point to examine what is meant by a ‘debt’ being due.  In the Supreme 
Court of Appeal case of Truter v Deysel,28 Van Heerden JA stated that: 
 For the purposes of the Act, the term ‘debt due’ means a debt, including a delictual debt, 
 which is owing and payable. A debt is due in this sense when the creditor acquires a 
 complete cause of action for the recovery of the debt, that is, when the entire set of facts 
 which the creditor must prove in order to succeed with his or her claim against the debtor is 
 in place or, in other words, when everything has happened which would entitle the creditor 
 to institute action and to pursue his or her claim.29  
The concept of cause of action was expounded in the case of Evins v Shield Insurance Co 
Ltd30  where it was held that ‘’every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to 
                                                            
19 Ibid.  
20 Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd (CCT52/15) [2016] ZACC 13; 2016 (6) BCLR 709 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) (26 
April 2016). 
21 Ibid at para 91. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Electricity Supply Commission V Stewarts and Lloyds of SA (Pty) Ltd 1981 (3) SA 340 (A). 
24 Off-Beat Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Shareblock Limited and Others (CCT106/16) 
[2017] ZACC 15; 2017 (7) BCLR 916 (CC) (23 May 2017). 
25 The term debt was held to mean ‘’a wide and general meaning, and includes an obligation to do something 
or refrain from doing something.’’  Desai NO v Desai NNO and Others (718/93) [1995] ZASCA 113; 1996 (1) SA 
141 (SCA); (22 September 1995) 9. 
26 Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd (CCT52/15) [2016] ZACC 13; 2016 (6) BCLR 709 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) (26 
April 2016). 
27 Electricity Supply Commission v Stewarts and Lloyds of SA (Pty) Ltd 1981 (3) SA 340 (A) 344. 
28 2006 (4) SA 168 (SCA).  
29 Ibid. 
30 1980 (2) All SA 40 (A) 57.  
177 
 
prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment of the Court.  It does not 
comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which 
is necessary to be proved.’’ 
In addition, the court stated that the proper legal meaning of the expression ‘cause of 
action’ is the entire set of facts which gives rise to an enforceable claim and includes every 
fact which is material to be proved to entitle a plaintiff to succeed in his claim.  It includes all 
that a plaintiff must set out in his declaration in order to disclose a cause of action.  Such 
cause of action does not ‘arise’ or ‘accrue’ until the occurrence of the last of such facts and 
consequently the last of such facts is sometimes loosely spoken of as the cause of action.31  
In a unanimous judgment by the Constitutional Court in the case of Links v MEC, 
Department of Health, Northern Cape Province,32 clarity was given on how the provisions of 
section 12 (3) of the Prescription Act33 must be interpreted.  The Court went on to state that 
this case concerns the constitutionally protected right to security of the person as 
entrenched in section 12 of the Constitution.34 
The issue before the Court in this matter was whether the applicant’s claim had prescribed 
by the 6 August 2009 when the summons was served on the respondent.35  In such a 
matter, the onus rests on the respondent to prove that a period of three years had elapsed 
                                                            
31 Ibid.  
32 Links v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Northern Cape Province (CCT 29/15) [2016] 
ZACC 10; 2016 (5) BCLR 656 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 414 (CC) (30 March 2016).  The salient facts of the case are that 
the applicant Mr Links, sought medical treatment on the 26 June 2006 at the Kimberley Hospital for a 
dislocated thumb on his left hand.  A plaster of Paris cast was put on the applicant’s left hand and forearm.  
The applicant was sent home and was asked to return after 10 days in order to have the cast removed.  
Around the 30 June 2006 the applicant went back to the hospital complaining of severe pain and discomfort in 
his left hand.  The applicant was then given pain medication and requested to return in five days.  The 
applicant returned to the hospital before the expiry of the five days and on the 5 July 2006 he was operated on 
and his left thumb was amputated.  The applicant had to then undergo further operations for the removal of 
dead, damaged and infected tissue.  In November 2006 the applicant approached a private firm of attorneys to 
establish why he had lost the use of his left hand and why his thumb had been amputated.  The applicant 
being indigent, approached the Legal Aid Board in Kimberley for assistance in December 2006.  The Legal Aid 
Board neglected to institute action against the respondent on behalf of the applicant for almost three years.  
Prior to the expiry of the three year period the applicant was referred to his attorneys of record for assistance.  
Within a matter of days the applicant sent out a section 3 notice to the respondent as required by the 
Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2000.  This was followed through 
with the issue of summons against the respondent.  The summons was served on the respondent on the 6 
August 2009.  Upon receipt of the summons two special pleas were raised by the respondent.  The first special 
plea was that the section 3 notice failed to comply with the provisions of the Act and the second being that the 
applicant’s claim had prescribed because the summons was served after the lapse of the three year period 
from the date on which the applicant’s thumb was amputated namely the 5 July 2006.  The full bench of the 
Northern Cape High Court pronounced that the applicant’s claim had prescribed and therefore could not 
condone his failure to give notice as contemplated in section 3 of the Institution of Legal Proceedings against 
Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2000.   
33 68 of 1969. 
34 Links v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Northern Cape Province (CCT 29/15) [2016] 
ZACC 10; 2016 (5) BCLR 656 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 414 (CC) (30 March 2016) at para 22. 
35 Ibid at para 24. 
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from the date the debt became due and in addition the respondent must show what facts 
the applicant was required to know before prescription could commence running.36  In this 
case, the respondent had to show that the applicant had full knowledge of those facts on or 
before the 5 August 2006.37  Judge Zondo stated that: 
 The provisions of section 12 seek to strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the need 
 for a cut-off point beyond which a person who has a claim to pursue against another may 
 not do so after the lapse of a certain period of time if he or she has failed to act diligently 
 and on the other the need to ensure fairness in those cases in which a rigid application of 
 prescription legislation would result in injustice. As already stated, in interpreting section 
 12(3) the injunction in section 39(2) of the Constitution must be borne in mind. In this 
 matter the focus is on the right entrenched in section 34 of the Constitution.38 
The applicant’s contention remained that he did not have the requisite knowledge on or 
before the 5 August 2006 which, would place him in good stead to institute a claim against 
the respondent.39  The Court further stated that: 
 In cases of this type, involving professional negligence, the party relying on prescription 
 must at least show that the plaintiff was in possession of sufficient facts to cause them on 
 reasonable grounds to think that the injuries were due to the fault of the medical staff. Until 
 there are reasonable grounds for suspecting fault so as to cause the plaintiff to seek further 
 advice, the claimant cannot be said to have knowledge of the facts from which the debt 
 arises.40 
The provisions of section 12 (3) of the Prescription Act41 were then examined by the court.  
The respondents in discharging the onus placed on them stated that ‘’the applicant’s cause 
of action arose on 26 June 2006 and the applicant had knowledge of all the relevant facts on 
that day.”42  To this averment, the Court stated that ‘’in a claim for delictual liability based 
on the Aquilian action, negligence and causation are essential elements of the cause of 
action. Negligence, and, as this Court has held, causation have both factual and legal 
elements. Until the applicant had knowledge of facts that would have led him to think that 
possibly there had been negligence and that this had caused his disability, he lacked 
knowledge of the necessary facts contemplated in section 12(3). 
                                                            
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid  
38 Ibid at para 26. 
39 Ibid at para 28.   
40 Ibid at para 42. 
41 Act 68 of 1969. 
42 Links v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Northern Cape Province (CCT 29/15) [2016] 
ZACC 10; 2016 (5) BCLR 656 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 414 (CC) (30 March 2016) at para 44. 
179 
 
The Court unequivocally pronounced that the applicant had no knowledge of what had 
caused his left hand thumb to be amputated as at the 5 August 2006.43  In explaining why 
such a finding was made the Court stated that: 
 The opinion given by Dr Reyneke was that the amputation of the applicant’s thumb and loss 
 of function of the left hand “was most probably due to the plaster of paris that was too tight, 
 and not removed soon enough . . .when ischemia occurred”. That opinion was given years 
 after the events in issue. Without advice at the time from a professional or expert in the 
 medical profession, the applicant could not have known what had caused his condition. It 
 seems to me that it would be unrealistic for the law to expect a litigant who has no 
 knowledge of medicine to have knowledge of what caused his condition without having first 
 had an opportunity of consulting a relevant medical professional or specialist for advice. 
 That in turn requires that the litigant is in possession of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable 
 person to suspect that something has gone wrong and to seek advice.44 
The Constitutional Court appears to have departed from the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
position in Truter in that, rather than finding that prescription runs from the point from 
which there is knowledge of the debt, Zondo J held that the creditor / litigant must be aware 
of some wrongdoing on the part of the debtor.  In this context of sterilisation abuse this 
more liberal approach would mean that the cause of action is not the date of the 
sterilisation per se but rather the date that a woman became aware that her rights had been 
violated. However, it is submitted that this generous interpretation of section 12 (3) of the 
Prescription Act would only apply when it is alleged that a debt arises from the violation of a 
constitutional right.  This means that potential litigants would have to rely on for example a 
violation of the right to bodily integrity, dignity and equality in terms of section 12 of the 
Constitution.   
This dissertation focuses on women who have been sterilised either without their informed 
consent or coercively in public hospitals.  In essence this means that action must be 
instituted against the Minister of Health who is vicariously liable for the actions of the 
doctor who performed the sterilisation and the health professional who failed to take the 
informed consent.  Instituting action against an organ of state is governed by the Institution 
of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002.  Section 3 of the Act45 
provides for the giving of notice to an organ of state from which a debt is claimed, prior to 
the institution of proceedings.  In essence, the requirement is now that written notice must 
be given within six months from the date on which the debt became due.46  The notice is 
peremptory and legal proceedings cannot be instituted prior to such notice being given 
subject to the provisions of section 3 (4) of the Act.47 The notice requires that the facts 
                                                            
43 Ibid at para 46. 
44 Ibid at para 47. 
45 Section 3 of the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002.   
46 Ibid. 
47 40 of 2002. 
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giving rise to the debt and the particulars of the debt that are within the knowledge of the 
creditor must be set out.48 
Failure to serve notice timeously may be condoned, on application to a court, if the court is 
satisfied that the debt has not already been extinguished by prescription,49 if good cause 
exists for the failure to serve notice timeously and if the organ of state was not 
unreasonably prejudiced by the failure.50 
This procedural requirement which only applies to claims made against an organ of state 
appears to be out of line with the constitutional court’s focus on ensuring that litigants are 
not denied their constitutional rights to have their disputes settled by a competent court. 
For example, in the Sithole coerced sterilisation matter, the sterilisation was performed on 
the 4 June 2009.  The date on which Sithole became aware of the material facts giving rise 
to her claim was on the 17 November 2011.  Thereafter, Sithole’s legal representatives 
despatched the required notice in terms of section 3 (1)(a) of the Institution of Legal 
Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act on the 21 December 2011 to the MEC for 
Health and Social Development, two medical practitioners and the nurse involved in the 
sterilisation.  Summons was then served on the 30 May 2012.  The defendants raised a 
special plea51 pleading that the debt became due on the 4 June 2009 and the notice 
required in terms of the Act should have been sent to the defendants within six months 
from that date.  In response, Sithole’s legal representatives made an application for 
condonation for the non-compliance of sections 3 (1 ) (a) and 3 (2) (a) of the Act.  In 
Sithole’s case, the defendants initially opposed the application but at a later stage acceded 
to the coerced sterilisation matter and condonation was granted for the late filing of the 
required notice.      
There is no on-going evidence of the continued sterilisation of HIV positive women.  This 
may be due to the State’s roll out of antiretroviral medication and the longer life expectancy 
of persons living with HIV.  As stated above the data in the Strode et al study showed that 
most of the cases were more than three years old.  These would all be cases against the 
Ministry of Health and there are stricter time limits that apply in this regard.  It is submitted 
that the only argument that could be made in a condonation application would be that the 
women did not know that their sterilisation was without informed consent, for a 
                                                            
48 Section 3 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of Act 40 of 2002. 
49 For our purposes section 11 (d) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 is applicable. 
50 Section 3 (4) (b) (i), (ii) and (iii). 
51 A special plea is a plea that raises a special defence regarding a legal problem in the plaintiff’s case.  It does 
not concern itself with the merits of the plaintiff’s case.  A special plea that is raised successfully can have the 
effect of bringing the plaintiff’s case to an end regardless of the merits of the case.  It can also have the effect 
of delaying the plaintiff’s cause of action.  A special plea of extinctive prescription is raised when a plaintiff 
institutes action against the defendant after the prescriptive period for a particular type of claim has lapsed.  In 
instances, where a Court upholds a special plea of prescription the defendant will no longer be legally liable to 
the plaintiff.  S Pete & D Hulme et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 3 ed (2017) 211, 213.   
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discriminatory reason and was wrongful.  Based on the Links52 case above it is argued that 
they could show that they only became aware of it on the date that they first heard of the 
forced or coerced sterilisations being wrongful.   
6.3  Strengths and weaknesses of the legal framework for sterilisations  
South Africa has an extensive legal framework dealing with sexual and reproductive rights.  
The Constitution sets the landscape for women to have autonomy over the decisions 
relating to their reproductive choices.53  Although there is a statutory framework which is 
based on the Constitutional principles, there are a number of gaps and weaknesses in this 
framework.  The section below highlights the strengths within the current law and then 
identifies some key weaknesses.   
The strengths and weaknesses of the South African legal framework have been evaluated on 
the basis of 5 core principles; the functionality of the justice system, affordability of legal 
services, accessibility of legal remedies and their acceptability to the complainants and 
whether the legal remedies hold individuals and the State accountable for wrongdoing.54   
6.3.1  Functionality of the justice system 
In order to have a legal system that facilitates access to justice rather than the individual 
resolution of disputes there must be a functioning legal system in place.  In South Africa, the 
State provides for a system of courts to adjudicate both on civil and criminal matters.  In 
criminal matters the State takes an active role in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating 
cases, whilst in civil matters which are private in nature the State simply provides access to 
adjudication services.  The State regulates the actions of health professionals through the 
creation of a number of statutory bodies, and one of the core functions of such professional 
bodies is the resolution of disputes.  Finally, in the constitutional era the Constitution has 
created the Chapter 9 institutions.  These are all State funded statutory bodies which have 
wide ranging powers to investigate complaints, report on their findings and make 
recommendations for the resolution of the dispute.  The advantage of the way in which the 
South African legal framework is structured is that complainants have a wide range of 
options available to them in resolving disputes.  For example, our Chief Justice has always 
gone to great lengths to promote access to justice for the poor in South Africa and has taken 
the opportunity by stating that: 
 Litigation is prohibitively expensive and therefore not an easily exercisable 
 constitutional option for an average citizen.  For this reason, the fathers and mothers of  our 
                                                            
52 Links v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Northern Cape Province (CCT 29/15) [2016] 
ZACC 10; 2016 (5) BCLR 656 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 414 (CC) (30 March 2016) at para 44. 
53 Section 12 (2) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
54 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of 
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 Constitution conceived of a way to give even to the poor and marginalised a voice, and 
 teeth that would bite corruption and abuse excruciatingly.  And that is the Public Protector. 
 She is the embodiment of a biblical David, that the public is, who fights the most powerful 
 and very well-resourced Goliath, that impropriety and corruption by government 
 officials are. The Public  Protector is one of the true crusaders and champions of 
 anti˗corruption and clean governance.55   
This quote shows that even if funds are an obstacle to pursuing a matter there are a number 
of statutory bodies that could be utilised to resolve the matter.  In this regard, the South 
African framework is unique as the remedies do not focus only on punishment and redress 
only, as in certain circumstances the remedies allow for the ordering of transformative 
change.  For example in the TAC56 case the Court ordered the Department of Health to roll 
out the prevention of mother to child transmission programme across the country.   
Many of the issues that relate to whether the legal system is functioning in a way that 
promotes access to justice are procedural in nature.  The first procedural hurdle that is 
required to be overcome by the litigant before instituting action against the Health Ministry 
and its servants is to send a legal notice to the possible defendants in terms of the 
Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act.57  The Act58 requires 
that such notice must be sent within six months of the debt becoming due.  This is a 
significant hurdle for many potential litigants who have faced sterilisation abuse, as the 
literature has revealed that many of the women only become aware of their rights many 
years later. 
It is possible to argue that the date on which the cause of action arose will be the date on 
which the material facts from which the claim arose becomes known to the claimant. This 
means that prescription would run from the date of knowledge of wrongfulness and not the 
date of sterilisation.  If this argument is accepted it may well be possible for some of the 
women to institute civil claims against the Ministry of Health.  It is possible that the Health 
Ministry’s legal representative would oppose the approach and argue that the matter 
prescribed if they were not notified of a possible claim six months after the date on which 
the sterilisation was performed.  In the Sithole59 case, the date of the sterilisation was the 
4th June 2009 and the date on which Sithole became aware that her rights had been violated 
was on the 17 November 2011.  This was almost two and a half years after the date of the 
sterilisation.   
Once a period of thirty days expires and there is no response from the defendants, the 
plaintiff’s legal representative will proceed with the issuing of a summons.  Presumably, a 
                                                            
55 Ibid para 52. 
56 (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (5 July 2002). 
57 40 of 2002. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no.                                   
19744/2012 – High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. 
183 
 
notice of intention to defend the action will be filed by the defendants, as a failure to do so 
will result in default judgment being taken against the defendants.  The next procedural 
step that may be taken by the defendants would be to file their plea.  Before pleading on 
the merits of the case, the defendants may in all likelihood raise a special plea of 
prescription alleging that the claim has prescribed because of the late filing of the notice as 
required in terms of section 3 of the Act.60  This procedural step was taken in Sithole’s61 case 
by the defendants.  At this stage the plaintiff will have to make an application for 
condonation for the late filing of the notice.  This can be a setback for the plaintiff should 
the court not grant the application for condonation as it has the effect of dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claim.  Where a woman becomes aware of her rights three years after the date of 
the sterilisation she would have to apply for condonation for the late filing of the notice. The 
defendant may raise a special plea of prescription which would in all probability be opposed 
by the plaintiff as she will raise as her defence the date on which she became aware of the 
material facts giving rise to her claim.  It is of concern that all of the violations occurred in 
State hospitals and the six month rule applies.  It is argued that section 3 of the Institution of 
Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act62 is in conflict with section 12 (3) of 
the Prescription Act63 and in our instance only serves to place an onerous burden on the 
plaintiff.  The rationale for this observation is that claims against the State are treated 
differently to claims against individuals or juristic persons which is not justifiable.  In our 
case the protection of the State against late claims adds an additional onerous burden on 
poor women, who are often illiterate and do not have access to legal advice.   
After pleadings have been exchanged and the close of pleadings is reached, the parties will 
apply for a trial date and commence with pre-trial preparations.  Pre-trial notices will be 
filed, medical examinations will take place and this will culminate in a pre-trial conference 
being held.  The filing of pleadings and notices are governed by strict time limits in terms of 
the Uniform Rules of Court.64  Preparation for trial will then take place and it is at this point 
that the plaintiff’s legal representative must consider who bears the burden of proof and 
what evidentiary burden must be satisfied to be successful with their claim.  
The substantive law will govern on whom the burden of proof rests depending on the 
nature of the claim.  In our case, the burden of proof will rest on the plaintiff since what is 
being alleged is negligence and the legal consequences of negligence are being attached to a 
fact.65  With regards to the discrimination allegation, the plaintiff will be relying on the 
                                                            
60 40 of 2002.  
61 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no.                                   
19744/2012 – High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. 
62 40 of 2002. 
63 68 of 1969. 
64 Available at http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/rules/UniformRulesCourt[26jun2009].pdf accessed on 1 
January 2018. 
65 P J Schwikkard & S E Van Der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4ed (2016) at 617. 
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ground of HIV which does not feature as a listed ground in the Constitution.66  The burden 
will be on the plaintiff once again to show that the discrimination was unfair.  The evidential 
burden refers to the duty of the plaintiff to make out a triable case and for the defendant to 
adduce evidence to rebut the case made out by the plaintiff.67  The plaintiff will therefore 
have to adduce evidence to the effect that either (a) even though she signed the consent 
form this was not done voluntarily or (b) the procedure was done without her written 
consent. This evidence will be adduced orally at trial by the plaintiff herself and any other 
witnesses that she may call to support her allegations.  The plaintiff will have to give oral 
testimony regarding the actions of the health care practitioners or other hospital staff 
towards her whether it was verbal or non-verbal in nature to make out a case for lack of 
informed consent and discrimination.  Whilst having a functional legal system is important, 
such a system has to be based on a series of procedural rules based both in the civil and 
criminal law to ensure that all parties are treated fairly.  These procedural rules are open to 
manipulation by the defendant and this can result in a high level of frustration by plaintiff’s 
who feel that justice is being delayed.68  This is illustrated by the Madida69 case where the 
Department of Health was able to delay the matter by failing to comply with procedural 
timelines.  The loss of hospital records by the defendants could also have the effect of 
impacting on the functionality of the court system.  It may impact on the patient’s ability to 
prove their case as the onus rests on them to prove negligence on the part of the doctors 
and health care workers.  In the absence of vital records of the patient, this task would be 
significantly more onerous.70 
Based on the discussion above it is submitted that we have a functional court system.  The 
functionality of the court system may however, be open for manipulation by defendants.  In 
this instance the women would have to proceed against a well-resourced Ministry of Health 
who in some instances may have little regard for procedural time lines.71 This once again 
contributes to the disadvantage suffered by individual women to obtain redress for their 
unlawful sterilisation.  The Strode et al study indicated that many women wanted reversals 
done as part of their relief.  In such cases, time delays would make such processes less likely 
to succeed.   
 
 
                                                            
66 Section 9 (3) of Act 18 of 1996. 
67 Schwikkard & Van Der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4ed (2016) at 622-623. 
68 Madida obo M v Mec for Health for the Province of Kwa-Zulu Natal (14275/2014) [2016] ZAKZPHC 27 (14 
March 2016) at para 23. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Khoza v Member of the Executive Council for Health And Social Development of the Gauteng Provincial 
Government (2012/20087) [2015] ZAGPJHC 15; 2015 (3) SA 266 (GJ); [2015] 2 All SA 598 (GJ) (6 February 2015) 
at para 47 and 70. 
71 Ibid at para 42. 
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6.3.2 Affordability 
Affordability is a key element to access to justice because if there is no State funding for 
legal services it means that the poor are excluded from these dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  The narratives of HIV positive women and other women who have been 
sterilised for other discriminatory reasons is clearly woven together by the underlying 
thread of poverty.72  One of the ripple effects of poverty is that it poses a significant barrier 
to access to justice as the possibility of hiring a legal representative is non-existent.  There is 
only one instance in which our Constitution merits payment of legal costs for civil litigation 
by the State.  These are instances where a child is concerned.  Section 28 (1) (h) makes 
provision for a state appointed legal practitioner to assist a child in civil proceedings in cases 
where a substantial injustice would arise.73  Section 28 (1) (h)74 is unlikely to assist in this 
instance as a child may not be sterilised and in the narratives referred to above the 
youngest participant was 19 years old.75   
Legal Aid South Africa will provide free legal assistance for a limited category of civil matters 
to litigants who cannot afford legal representation. These are confined to family matters, 
evictions, employment issues, contract matters and impact litigation.76  The envisaged 
outcome of impact litigation matters litigated by Legal Aid South Africa must have the effect 
of providing relief to a large group of persons or a broader community.77  In this instance it 
means that the only way HIV positive women who claim to be victims of sterilisation abuse 
could apply for legal aid is to lodge a civil claim where the anticipated outcome would have 
an impact on way the HIV positive women are treated during child birth.  It is argued that it 
would be hard to make a case for this issue to be dealt with by Legal Aid South Africa as 
there is no evidence of it having been carried out in terms of a policy and it is unlikely that it 
is continuing.   
The cost of civil litigation is governed by a tariff which dictates how a client will be billed for 
work done.  There are different tariffs for the superior and inferior courts.78  For an HIV 
                                                            
72 As reflected in studies conducted in South Africa, Kenya and Namibia. 
73 D McQuoid-Mason ‘Access to justice in South Africa: Are there enough lawyers?’ (2013) 3 (3) Oñati Socio-
Legal Series 561 at 565.  Another instance where free legal representation is provided at the expense of the 
State is to an accused in a criminal matter.  This is catered for in terms of section 35 (3) (g) of the Constitution.    
74 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
75 Essack & Strode ‘I feel like half a women all the time: The impacts of coerced and forced sterilisations on 
HIV-positive women in South Africa’ (2012) 26 (2) Agenda 24.  
76 Available at http://www.legal-aid.co.za/ accessed on 29 September 2017. 
77 Available at http://www.legal-aid.co.za/?p=929 accessed on 29 September 2017.  According to McQuoid- 
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78 See ‘Magistrates’ courts: Amendment of the rules of court; GNR 33, GG 38399, p 50ff, 23 January 2015, 
available at http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2015/20150123-gg38399_rg10349_gon33-
RulesBoard.pdf accessed on 29 September 2017 for the Magistrate’s Court tariff and ‘Amendment of the rules 
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positive woman who has been sterilised without her informed consent it is most likely that 
she will have to access private legal representation.  Therefore, it can be safely assumed 
that an HIV positive woman who has been sterilised without her informed consent, will 
utilise the High Court to obtain redress.  This will be done to claim damages and/or for an 
order for specific performance as the jurisdictional limit for claims is above four hundred 
thousand rand.  Should a reversal of the sterilisation be sought as relief, this would be 
regarded as an order for specific performance and this type of claim must be heard in the 
High Court.79 This in turn means that she will be responsible for legal costs at a higher rate. 
In addition to the exorbitant legal fees that will certainly be an obstacle in the path to 
accessing justice, there are other costs that must be taken into consideration.  A prudent 
attorney will not discount the possibility of a cost order being granted against an HIV 
positive woman who is not successful at trial.  Further, the cost of travelling to the legal 
practitioner for consultations, the possibility of losing income as a result of not being at 
work whilst attending consultations or medical examinations and the cost of consulting with 
medical experts cannot be ignored.   
It is undeniable that the issue of legal representation is linked intrinsically to affordability.  
According to McQuoid-Mason most attorneys and advocates practise in urban areas which 
serve the more affluent communities.80  The converse of this is that litigants from indigent 
communities struggle to secure competent free legal representation in civil matters of this 
nature.  Even though a matter can be brought before the Equality Court and High Court 
without legal representation and the plaintiff may act in their own capacity it will be argued 
that this is far from being ideal.  The complexities of litigation for an unrepresented litigant 
will only serve to compromise their case or alternatively having it dismissed by the Court.  
The women in all the cases discussed thus far, dealing with the forced or coerced 
sterilisation for a discriminatory reason were represented by non-governmental 
organisations.  The Women’s Legal Centre represented Sithole;81 in the Namibian case of LM 
& Others82 the women were represented by the Legal Assistance Centre; The Centre for Civil 
and Human Rights represented the Romani women with their litigation in Slovakia; and in 
Kenya the ongoing litigation is being driven by Kenya Legal & Ethical Issues Network on HIV 
and AIDS (KELIN).83   
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Given that there will be limited access to state legal aid unless the sterilisation matter is 
classified as a form of impact litigation there will be no state funding for it.  In this context it 
means that HIV positive women would have to fund the matter themselves or seek the 
services of a pro bono lawyer or NGO to assist them if they wish to use the civil law as a 
remedy. 
6.3.3 Accessibility 
The key issues which relate to the accessibility to legal remedies is knowledge of legal rights 
by the plaintiffs/complainants and the geographic access to courts.   
For our purposes, the awareness of the right to bodily and psychological integrity, the right 
to equality and dignity are key as they form the foundation of the HIV positive women’s 
cause of action.  It is awareness of these constitutionally protected rights that women who 
are sterilised without their informed consent for discriminatory reasons must be aware of 
before instituting legal action.  Apart from having knowledge of the protection afforded by 
various domestic laws women must also have knowledge of protection afforded by regional 
and international legal instruments.  Thus far, all the impact litigation around the forced and 
coerced sterilisation of women for a discriminatory reason, stemmed from findings 
conducted by human rights organisations.  In Namibia, the International Community of 
Women Living with HIV/AIDS raised awareness about the gross sexual reproductive health 
and human rights violations suffered by HIV positive women.  In the Slovakian cases, the 
women became aware of their rights after a fact finding mission was conducted around the 
reproductive health rights of Romani women.  In Kenya, The Africa Gender and Media 
Initiative Trust (GEM) uncovered sexual reproductive health and human rights violations 
after a study was conducted that had the exclusive focus on HIV positive women.  In the 
South African case of Sithole,84 she only became aware that her sexual reproductive and 
human rights had been violated after being interviewed as part of a study being conducted 
by Her Rights Initiative. It is therefore indisputable that timeous knowledge of rights is a 
prerequisite to access to justice.85   
Apart from knowledge of the laws conferring rights on HIV positive women, they are also 
required to have knowledge of institutions that offer ancillary relief apart from relief that 
can be offered by the courts.  These institutions are the Health Professions Council of South 
Africa, South African Nursing Council, South African Human Rights Commission, Commission 
for Gender Equality and the Public Protector.    
The lack of knowledge of laws and rights or alternatively becoming aware of these laws and 
rights after an effluxion of time will result in procedural hurdles being encountered by the 
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litigant.  In this particular instance, there has been a lack of awareness around the issue of 
forced or coerced sterilisations of HIV positive women, as a human rights issue. It is 
submitted that this issue has to compete with many other key issues that impact on 
women’s well-being either directly or indirectly.  Some of these issues are domestic 
violence, maintenance for their children, health related matters and other socio-economic 
rights issues such as access to housing or social grants.  These issues seem to command 
more awareness.  This lack of knowledge around the forced or coerced sterilisations results 
in a low number of women coming forward to access impact litigation services.   
The physical location of courts may have the effect of restricting access to justice.  There are 
fourteen High Courts in South Africa all of which are situated in the major cities.  The 
amount of money being claimed by a plaintiff is one of the factors that dictate at which 
Court legal proceedings will be instituted.  In all likelihood, the amount that will be claimed 
for damages relating to the coerced or forced sterilisation of HIV positive women would 
require that action be instituted in a High Court.   
It is submitted that there is limited accessibility to the legal system by HIV positive women 
who have been sterilised without their consent.  This is illustrated by the fact that there has 
only been one matter that has been brought before a South African court even though the 
latest stigma index study in South Africa showed that at least one hundred HIV positive 
women felt that they had been victims of sterilisation abuse.86  It appears that the key 
reason that women are not coming forward for legal assistance is because of their lack of 
knowledge of their rights.   
6.3.4 Acceptability 
There are a number of factors that impact on whether plaintiffs or complainants feel that 
justice has been done.  These include amongst others the time it takes to resolve the 
matter, the associated costs (discussed above) and achieving their desired outcome. 
The law’s delays have been the subject of complaints from litigants for many centuries, and 
it behoves all courts to make proper efforts to ensure that the quality of justice is not 
adversely affected by delays in dealing with cases which are brought before them, whether 
in bringing them on for hearing or in issuing decisions when they have been heard.87  This 
observation, by our Chief Justice Judge Mogoeng Mogoeng captures the effect that time 
delays have on litigants.  Time delays in litigation cannot lay at the feet of one role-player 
alone.  Delays on the part of the parties, legal representatives and the court system 
contribute to lengthy delays.  Too few courts and presiding officers are often the causes of 
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postponements.  The approximate time it takes to obtain a trial date is between six months 
and two years in the KwaZulu-Natal High Courts.88  Unfortunately, the rules of the Court 
offer endless opportunity for the shrewd litigant or legal representative to drag out a matter 
almost endlessly.89  The results of inordinate delays in civil litigation proceedings have the 
effect of increasing the already high cost of civil litigation.90  Long periods of delays in having 
matters heard may contribute significantly to the poor quality of evidence that will be given 
by witnesses.91  Poor litigants who are often unemployed and who do not have the funds to 
make phone calls to their lawyers or to see them may be further prejudiced by the long and 
lengthy delays.92  The overall result will be that the justice system will be held in a low 
esteem by litigants.93  
This difficulty is being addressed by the introduction of an initiative by the Office of the 
Chief Justice in the form of a case flow management system.  The introduction of the judicial 
case flow management in civil matters is as a result of the ‘’ongoing criticisms related to 
excessive delays in the finalisation of cases that are experienced in courts around the 
country.’’94  This new concept to the judiciary has been described as the process ‘’through 
which courts move cases from inception to ultimate conclusion.’’ 95  The aim in civil litigation 
is to reduce the time delays from the issuing of a summons to the delivery of judgment, and 
hence effectively ensuring that the pace of the litigation is not controlled by the parties and 
their legal representatives.96  This is a move away from litigant driven litigation towards 
judicial management of cases where judicial officers are expected to set and enforce 
procedural time limits.97   
It is hard to state unequivocally whether HIV positive women are satisfied with the justice 
system because this issue has not been researched.  Nevertheless, it appears from other 
literature that there is dissatisfaction with the time delays as it places an extra financial 
burden on poor litigants.  It was beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess the extent to 
which the system is effective.   
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6.3.5 Accountability 
There is only access to justice if the legal system is able to hold those liable for the alleged 
wrongdoings accountable.  In South Africa the civil law can be used to hold health care 
practitioners individually accountable and their employers vicariously liable.  The civil law 
can order payment of damages and specific performance such as in vitro fertilisation 
treatment.  In terms of the criminal law, health care practitioners could also be held 
individually accountable for their unlawful actions.  The criminal law can hold individuals 
accountable through imposing a range of sentences such as imprisonment or a fine. The 
criminal law cannot hold the institution where the abuse occurred liable.  Finally, the 
administrative remedies can impose individual or collective accountability.  It can also order 
systemic changes to be implemented. 
It is submitted that there is the possibility of HIV positive women holding the medical 
practitioners, their employees and the Ministry of Health accountable.  This is evidenced by 
the range of different sanctions that could be imposed.    
6.4  Conclusion  
South Africa has emerged from a fragmented past that has moved from denying the 
majority of its citizens the franchise,  separate public health care facilities, different 
education systems, demarcated recreational facilities and different laws many of which 
promoted segregation like the Immorality Act of 1957 and Group Areas Act of 1950.  
Further, under apartheid, access to justice was not a principle that featured strongly in its 
legal system.  We have however, bravely navigated our country into being a constitutional 
state where access to justice is a fundamental right for all of its people.  In addition, the 
creation of specialist courts has also played a role in ensuring access to justice for all.  A 
good example of these are the Equality Courts.  It is insufficient to declare that we have a 
functional system of courts without taking into account factors that may actually lead to a 
conclusion that access to justice is a distant reality for poor, illiterate, vulnerable, HIV 
positive women.  The concept of access to justice in this thesis is measured against the 
ability of this class of women to obtain legal relief that suits their individual needs.  The 
potential causes of action that have been identified are violations of equality, dignity and 
bodily and psychological integrity.  The equality violation may be ventilated in the Equality 
Court.  Although this forum requires no legal representation it may be argued that it would 
be extremely difficult for illiterate women to approach this forum, institute and understand 
the nature of legal proceedings without the assistance of an NGO.  The remaining two 
causes of action are best suited to be canvassed in a High Court.  In this instance, the 
challenge would be to secure competent free legal representation.  It cannot be ignored 
that all the litigation that was instituted on behalf of HIV positive women who were 
sterilised without informed consent nationally and regionally was not undertaken by private 
legal practitioners.  Further, NGOs may be well equipped to deal with this human rights 
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violation but a drawback for the women is actually finding out about them and their 
services.   
This dissertation has used a matrix of five factors to assess the extent to which HIV positive 
women could obtain justice when pursuing legal claims for sterilisation abuse.  However, it 
is accepted that there are other factors that may impact on their ability to obtain the relief 
they desire.  These include for example whether they have competent legal representation.  
Further, whilst the outcome of a matter may not necessarily be the most important issue for 
an NGO, for individual women looking for financial compensation a successful outcome may 
be the only way that they would measure access to justice.                
It is paramount that the factors, barriers, strengths and weaknesses of each of these 
remedies need to be assessed in a context specific manner as the challenges experienced by 
HIV positive women who have been sterilised without their full and informed consent is 
unique to them.  This also rings true for other women who have been sterilised for other 
discriminatory reasons.98  The common denominator that characterises this group of 
women is that they are poor, illiterate, they desire more children and they have the need to 
be accepted by their partners, families and communities.  These serve to make them a 
vulnerable and marginalised group in society and therefore deserving of the utmost 
protection of the law.  Although, an adequate legal framework exists to protect the rights of 
women who been sterilised for a discriminatory reason, this does not equate to them 
obtaining justice.  This chapter has shown that five enablers are needed in order to ensure 
that justice is achieved.  Unfortunately, in the South African context, state legal services are 
granted in very limited instances outside of the criminal justice system.  This means that 
access to courts and affordability of legal practitioners will always be an issue for the poor.  
Further, the acceptability of legal remedies to the women can be best described as a 
double-edged sword.  Apart from the women receiving financial compensation they strongly 
desire to be placed in the same situation they were in prior to the sterilisation, which may 
not become a reality for many of them.  Holding health care workers and doctors 
accountable is possible in a range of ways however, it appears to be underutilised thereby 
having limited effect on dealing with the root cause of the problem.  Therefore, it is 
submitted that all five enablers need to be connected to each other before HIV positive 
women who have been sterilised can access justice successfully. 
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192 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the study and examines the key findings of this 
dissertation on the forced or coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women for discriminatory 
reasons, in South Africa in particular.  It then deals with the complexities associated with 
these findings and concludes by setting out recommendations to address some of these 
complexities and issues. 
The interest in the topic arose largely out of research undertaken by Strode, Mthembu and 
Essack who, in 2011, documented the experiences of South African women who had been 
subjected to forced or coerced sterilisations.  Whilst forced sterilisations happen globally, 
sterilisations in the context of women living with HIV is still a relatively new area of 
research.  It is important in our context as South Africa has one of the highest HIV rates in 
the world. Whilst various types of legal and administrative remedies are available, there are 
relatively few instances of these remedies being used to address sterilisation abuse in South 
Africa.  This may be due to the complexities surrounding the use of the law to resolve 
discriminatory practices which are often based on differing value systems.  The research 
problem addressed in this thesis is that there are complexities associated with applying the 
civil, criminal and administrative law remedies to address the coerced and forced 
sterilisation of women living with HIV.  These complexities may impact on the ability of the 
women to access justice.  This was undertaken by measuring each of the various remedies 
against a matrix of factors which were identified from the Economic Freedom Fighters1 case 
as being the central pillars underpinning the concept of access to justice.    
The main research question that was derived from the research problem is: 
Are the legal and other remedies to address the forced or coerced sterilisation in South 
Africa adequate to ensure access to justice for the affected women as described in the case 
study by Strode, Mthembu and Essack?  
The associated sub questions were: 
i) Which of the existing legal remedies are most appropriate to address the rights 
violations within this context? 
ii) What are the strengths, weaknesses and gaps within the current legal framework, 
which are exposed by this particular rights violation? 
                                                            
1 (CCT 143/15; CCT 171/15) [2016] ZACC 11; 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC); 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) (31 March 2016). 
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iii) Is the law on informed consent flowing from bodily and psychological integrity 
adequate to address the coerced and forced sterilisation of HIV positive women? 
iv) Is it possible to prove that individuals or classes of women are being discriminated 
against on the basis of their HIV status when they are coerced or forced into being 
sterilised? and 
v) Is law reform needed to comprehensively address this rights violation?  
In order to answer these questions this study undertook a critical examination of the 
relevant legal framework in South Africa and referred to cases from Slovakia, Namibia and 
Kenya where remedies were/are being sought which not only highlight the availability of 
and access to remedies but also show the complexities of such actions and associated 
problems. Secondary source material was also consulted to provide analysis and insights. 
Chapter 1 provided background to the topic, definitions of the terms such as forced and 
coerced sterilisation, key legislation, the research problem and questions and methodology. 
Chapter 2 critically examined the experiences of Slovakian women who have used a wide 
range of advocacy and legal remedies to address the forced and coerced sterilisation of 
Romani women.  They ultimately used the regional human rights system by approaching the 
European Court of Human Rights. The chapter also discussed a key case currently before the 
courts in Kenya and two cases in Namibia and South Africa. 
Chapter 3 discussed the issues around informed consent and right to bodily and 
psychological integrity with reference to international, regional and South African 
instruments and legislation. Chapter 4 focussed on the rights to equality and dignity in terms 
of international, national and regional law.  It set out in detail the relevant South African 
constitutional provisions and cases as well as describing the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.  Chapter 5 considered the various types of remedies 
in detail.  Chapter 6 looked at access to justice and the extent to which each of these 
remedies used in this context would facilitate or hinder access to justice. 
7.2  Findings 
(i)    Documentary evidence shows that the forced and coerced sterilisation of  
       women living with HIV existed 
 
The forced and coerced sterilisation of women with HIV has occurred in South Africa.  
However, the extent of the problem and whether it is continuing is unclear.  It is argued that 
it is deeply ingrained by stereotypes of intersectional discrimination based on race, sex and 
HIV which devalues these human characteristics and aims at discouraging this group from 
reproducing.   
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(ii)  There is no state sanctioned policy requiring HIV positive women to be sterilised 
The sterilisation of HIV positive women either forcibly or coercively was not based on a 
policy.  In fact the 2012 National Contraceptive Guidelines expressly state that no one 
should be sterilised for a discriminatory reason.  In this context it is clear, given the research 
and litigation, that these sterilisations can be regarded as a practice based on prejudices and 
stereotypes.  It remains unclear whether this practice is continuing.     
 
(iii)  The practice of forced or coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women appears to have  
        occurred because of discriminatory attitudes of health care workers  
 
It is submitted, that this practice has deeply embedded roots in past and present prejudices 
and stereotypes.  In South Africa, it has its roots in race, gender and class discrimination as 
all case studies from Sub-Saharan Africa show that only African women, using Public Health 
care facilities, have been forcibly or coercively sterilised with their HIV positive status being 
a catalyst in the process.  The nature of the problem is evidenced by the two studies 
conducted in South Africa.   
(iv)  The forced or coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women violates a number of rights 
The forced or coerced sterilisation of women with HIV involves two key human rights issues.  
These have crystallised through the recent civil litigation in Namibia, Kenya and South Africa.  
These issues are the violation of two rights namely (i) the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity (informed consent) and (ii) the rights to equality and dignity (not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of a person’s HIV status).   
(v)  Local research indicates that affected women desire a range of legal and other forms    
      of redress 
 
The studies conducted in South Africa reveal that the affected women want legal redress for 
the fact that their bodies were violated and that they are no longer able to have children.2  
Fortunately, the right to access the courts and claim compensation is protected in our legal 
framework.3  
(vi)  There are three broad categories of redress that could be used to address the forced 
        or coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV 
 
There are three broad categories of remedies available to address the issue of the forced or 
coerced sterilisation of HIV positive women.  They can been clustered into civil, criminal and 
administrative remedies.  None of these are specific to the issue at hand but they are broad 
enough to accommodate claims of forced or coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV.  
                                                            
2 A Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9. 
3 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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In order to obtain such redress, reliance will have to be placed on the rights contained in the 
Constitution4, Sterilisation Act5, National Health Act6 and PEPUDA7 to drive litigation of this 
nature.   
(vii)  The use of civil litigation to redress this violation of rights appears to be the most  
         appropriate way in which justice can be achieved  
 
Civil litigation stemming from one of the studies and driven by the Women’s Legal Centre 
Trust was successful and resulted in an out of court settlement.8   As indicated, this practice 
is not confined to the shores of South Africa and cases of forced or coerced sterilisation of 
HIV positive women have been reported in other African countries.  Presently, civil litigation 
is underway in Kenya to highlight this gross human rights violation and obtain compensation 
through the justice system for the affected women.9  Litigation was recently concluded in 
Namibia where the Supreme Court found that the Ministry of Health must be held liable for 
the damages incurred when three HIV positive women were coerced into being sterilised 
against their will.10   
Based on the above, it is submitted that the most suitable legal remedy in South Africa for 
HIV positive women who have been sterilised either forcibly or through coercion is the use 
of the civil law.  It has thus far been used once in South Africa where a successful out of 
court settlement was reached.11  The basis of the claim hinged on the lack of informed 
consent which was supported by the Sterilisation Act12 and the Constitution.13  It was 
further submitted that the documented informed consent obtained could not be considered 
as being reflective of Sithole’s wishes since her HIV status was used to coerce her into 
                                                            
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
5 Act 44 of 1998. 
6 Act 61 of 2003. 
7 Act 4 of 2000. 
8 These are the studies conducted by Strode, Mthembu and Essack which is documented in Strode et al ‘‘‘She 
made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary sterilization in two South 
African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9 and the Human Sciences Research Council 
report ‘The people living with HIV stigma index: South Africa 2014’ (2015), available at 
http://www.stigmaindex.org/sites/default/files/reports/Summary-Booklet-on-Stigma-Index-
Survey%20South%20Africa.pdf accessed on 18 December 2017. 
9 African Gender and Media Initiative ‘Robbed of choice: Forced and coerced sterilization experiences of 
women living with HIV in Kenya’ (2012), available at http://kelinkenya.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/Report-on-Robbed-Of-Choice-Forced-and-Coerced-Sterilization-Experiences-of-
Women-Living-with-HIV-in-Kenya.pdf accessed on 1 July 2015. 
10 LM and Others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008 available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
11 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no.                                   
19744/2012 – High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. 
12 Act 44 of 1998. 
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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signing the consent form.14  Similarly, in the Namibian case of LM,15 the women’s claims 
were pegged on the lack of informed consent and discrimination based on their HIV positive 
status.  In both jurisdictions it was accepted that the women’s signed informed consent 
forms was not free from any coercion.   
(viii)  Most civil litigation challenging the failure of health care workers to obtain informed   
          consent has been successful 
 
It is clear from the litigation in Slovakia, Namibia and South Africa that the courts will be 
sympathetic to civil claims regarding the failure of health care workers to obtain proper 
informed consent to a sterilisation procedure.  These cases have even been successful 
where there has been documentary evidence of signed consent forms.  The courts have 
made it clear that consent to a sterilisation can only be given in circumstances in which 
women are informed and are able to act voluntarily. 
(ix) Legal action addressing equality only will require strategic decision-making in the  
      most  appropriate forum 
 
The dilemma that faces women who have been sterilised forcibly or coercively for a 
discriminatory reason is whether to litigate in the Equality Court or High Court.  The Equality 
Court has a distinct advantage over the High Court because using the Equality Court firmly 
places the issue in the context of stigma and discrimination.  Discrimination on the ground 
of HIV would also be easier to prove as HIV is listed as one of the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination in terms of the PEPUDA.16  The onus of proof in this instance shifts to the 
Department of Health or the individual health care worker to prove that the discrimination 
is fair.  The use of this Court would however mean that claiming a violation of the right to 
informed consent would not be possible in the action, as the Equality Court’s domain is 
exclusively for claims based on harassment, discrimination and hate speech.17  A further 
consideration to note is that our procedural law does not allow for the splitting of one cause 
of action into separate claims.  This effectively means that only the discrimination leg of the 
claim can be brought before the Equality Court. 
The High Court is equipped to hear a claim premised both on informed consent and 
equality.  There appears to be no difficulty with the high courts making a finding of the 
absence of full and free informed consent.  Litigants in this regard may rely on the common 
law, Constitution, Sterilisation Act and National Health Act to advance this type of claim.  
The courts have awarded monetary compensation for this violation in three jurisdictions 
which is in line with one of the findings namely that women seek legal redress.  In addition, 
                                                            
14 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no.                                   
19744/2012 – High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. 
15 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008 available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
16 Act 4 of 2000. 
17 Ibid. 
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the High Court is the only competent court of first instance that can grant an order for 
specific performance.  In certain cases it may be ordered that the Department of Health 
reverse the sterilisation procedure.   
Although we have good laws in the Constitution and PEPUDA18 to support a claim based on 
equality, section 9 (3) of our Constitution does not list HIV as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.19  When relying on an unlisted ground to prove discrimination the onus will 
rest on the HIV positive women to show on a balance of probabilities that the discrimination 
was unfair.20  It is this onus that women who have been forcibly or coercively sterilised for a 
discriminatory reason, failed to discharge in two matters that have come before the 
courts.21  The courts in both instances have not given any indication in their judgments of 
what further evidence would be required to be adduced, to enable a finding of 
discrimination to be made.   
(x) The criminal law is not a viable legal remedy to address the forced or coerced  
      sterilisation of women living with HIV 
 
Although it is theoretically possible to charge a health care worker with assault or the 
contravention of the Sterilisation Act,22 this is not practically feasible or acceptable to the 
victims.  Proving intention to deliberately violate a woman’s body will be virtually impossible 
and it is unlikely that a conviction will be seen as addressing the redress concerns of 
affected women.   
(xi)  A strength of the framework is that there are a range of administrative remedies      
       which may be useful if combined with civil litigation 
 
The administrative remedies are a useful tool to highlight the practice of forced or coerced 
sterilisation of women living with HIV.  In addition, the institutions concerned can engage 
robustly in raising awareness around legal literacy and medical ethics.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
18 Ibid. 
19 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  Whilst HIV remains as an unlisted ground of 
discrimination in terms of our Constitution there is progress, in that it now features as a listed ground in 
PEPUDA.  
20 W Freedman ‘Understanding the right to equality’ (1998) 115 (2) South African Law Journal 243-251 at 246. 
21 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015 and V. C. v Slovakia Application 
no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights, available at http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/ orig/ 11_6/ 
V.C..pdf accessed on 1 July 2015. 
22 Act 44 of 1998. 
198 
 
 
(xii)  There are many complexities to the legal and administrative remedies that may act 
         as barriers or weaknesses in the legal framework 
 
Addressing the issue of the forced and coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV is a 
complex legal problem.  Accessing justice through litigation is just one of a number of 
different ways that it should be tackled: 
(aa)  The element of legal literacy is key to instituting legal proceedings.  In our instance, 
knowledge of the two main human rights are required before a woman realises that it is 
unlawful and wrongful to be sterilised without her full and informed consent because she is 
HIV positive.  Without being aware that a rights violation of protected rights has taken 
place, women will not be in a position to seek legal advice and obtain legal relief.     
(bb)  The issue of prescription is a real challenge as a civil claim must be instituted within 
three years of a woman being sterilised.  The two South African studies have shown that 
due to a lack of legal literacy of their human rights and the trauma that may be 
accompanied by the life changing procedure performed on them, many women do not seek 
legal advice in time resulting in their claims prescribing.23  Prescribed claims, even though 
they may have merit in them, have limited means of redress and can largely only be 
resolved through either the criminal or administrative remedies.  Both criminal law and 
administrative law remedies have limitations, see below.   
(cc)  The difficulty that arises when women become aware of their rights after a significant 
lapse of time after the sterilisation is accessing medical records in order to initiate litigation. 
Missing hospital files are a common problem and the difficulties associated with this has the 
effect of preventing litigation from even commencing hence extinguishing any legitimate 
claim that this group of women may have.24      
(dd)  There has been no finding of discrimination either in the LM25 case or the international 
case of V.C26 where discrimination was alleged on the ground of ethnicity.  In as much as it is 
cause for concern for a number of reasons as elucidated by Patel, we have not been given 
any guidance from the courts on what needs to be proved on a balance of probabilities for a 
finding of discrimination to be made.27  Patel is of the view that a finding in support of the 
prohibition of discrimination is important for the following reasons.  Firstly, a finding that 
the forced or coerced sterilisation of the litigants took place because they were HIV positive 
                                                            
23 ‘SA’s forced sterilisation shame’ News24, 6 August 2014, available at https://www.news24.com/ 
Archives/City-Press/SAs-forced-sterilisation-shame-20150429 accessed on 7 January 2018. 
24 ‘SA’s forced sterilisation shame’ News24, 6 August 2014, available at https://www.news24.com/Archives/ 
City-Press/SAs-forced-sterilisation-shame-20150429 accessed on 7 January 2018.  
25 LM and others v The Government of the Republic of Namibia case no 1603/2008, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html accessed on 1 July 2015. 
26 V. C. v Slovakia Application no. 18968/07 European Court of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/orig/11_6/V.C..pdf accessed on 1 July 2015. 
27 P Patel ‘Forced sterilization of women as discrimination’ (2017) 38 (15) Public Health Reviews 1-12. 
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and deserving of non-discrimination protection by the court, recognises the existence of 
such practice.28  Secondly, a judgment finding that the forced or coerced sterilisation of HIV 
positive women took place and violated their right to equality is important to highlight the 
marginalisation of this specific group of women in society.29  Thirdly, a finding of 
discrimination by the courts will assist in addressing the hidden reasons for the practice so 
that it may be addressed effectively.30  Lastly, the failure to investigate this discriminatory 
practice indicates that there is a misunderstanding by the judiciary regarding the core 
nature of forced or coerced sterilisation which is inherently a discriminatory practice.31  The 
courts must accept that the motivating reason behind the forced or coerced sterilisation of 
HIV positive women is to ‘’deny them the ability to procreate due to a perception that they 
are less than ideal members of our society.’’32  It is further submitted, that future civil cases 
ought to be pleaded under the actio iniuriarum as a violation of a person’s dignity.  
 (ee)  The criminal law has never been successfully used in any jurisdiction either nationally 
or internationally, to prosecute health care practitioners who have sterilised women 
without obtaining their full, free and informed consent.  There are two main impediments 
that stand in the way of achieving successful criminal convictions when using the common 
law crime of assault or the violation of the provisions of the Sterilisation Act33 respectively.  
The first is the requirement that the element of intention must be proved to secure a 
conviction of assault. This requirement will be easily defeated by the presence of a ‘’signed’’ 
consent form.  The Sterilisation Act,34 makes it possible for a criminal prosecution to be 
instituted presumably in instances where consent was not obtained freely, voluntarily and in 
writing after the nature of the procedure had been explained to the patient.  The second 
difficulty, is establishing whether negligence or intention on the part of the person 
responsible for recording the consent is required in terms of the Act.35  It is unclear whether 
a court would accept that the offence of failing to obtain consent in terms of the 
Sterilisation Act could be met if the health care worker’s actions were negligent rather than 
deliberate.   
(ff)  The downside to using the administrative remedies although accessible and free, is that 
they do not fulfil the needs of the women who have expressed their desire to claim 
monetary compensation.36   
 
                                                            
28 Ibid at 7. 
29 Ibid at 8. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid at 9. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Act 44 of 1998. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9. 
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(xiii)  Five factors can be used to evaluate whether remedies will provide access to justice  
         for this group of women 
 
This thesis argues that the five broad categories are: functionality of the justice system, 
affordability of legal services, accessibility of legal remedies, their acceptability to the 
complainants and whether the remedies hold individuals or the State accountable, can be 
used as benchmarks for accessing justice 
 
(xiv)  Law reform is needed to address gaps in the legal framework 
 
South Africa has a good legal framework which facilitates redress of these types of human 
rights violations. However, there are two significant gaps that emerge from the Sterilisation 
Act.37  These are that the Act is silent on the issue of discrimination and on whom the 
responsibility rests to obtain the voluntary and written informed consent.38   
(xv)  Programmes to address the root causes of stigma, discrimination and violations of  
        dignity are needed 
 
The role of health care workers cannot be underestimated in contributing to the decrease in 
the vertical transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus to a new born baby.39  Some 
health care providers may allow their strong personal views regarding HIV positive women 
conceiving to impact heavily on the type of care and advice that they dispense to them.40  In 
instances where these health care providers feel that HIV positive women should not be 
sexually active, counselling on issues of reproduction and contraception may be neglected.41   
Sterilisations and abortions may be heavily promoted without adequate attention being 
paid to the woman’s own personal desires.42   
HIV positive pregnant mothers have been at the receiving end of disparaging and 
judgemental remarks from health care practitioners as is evidenced by the narratives of 
women in the Strode et al study.  One woman said that her obstetrician/gynaecologist told 
her that ‘’she should be careful when having sex and that she should not even think about 
getting pregnant.’’43   Upon becoming pregnant, the obstetrician/gynaecologist was not 
                                                            
37 Act 44 of 1998. 
38 This issue was discussed at length in the Pandie v Isaacs (A135/2013, 1221/2007) [2013] ZAWCHC 123 (4 
September 2013) case.  Unfortunately, the Court did not make a finding on whether it was the responsibility of 
the gynaecologist or nursing staff to procure informed consent.   
39 V Paiva et al ‘The right to love: The desire for parenthood among men living with HIV’ (2003) 11 (22) 
Reproductive Health Matters 91-100 at 91.   
40 L Meyer et al ‘Focus on women: Linking HIV care and treatment with reproductive health services in the 
MTCT-Plus Initiative’ (2005) 13 (25) Reproductive Health Matters 136-146 at 137.   
41 Ibid.   
42 Ibid.    
43 MG van Dijk et al ‘Health care experiences of HIV-infected women with fertility desires in Mexico: A 
qualitative study’ (2014) 25 (3) Journal of the Association of Nurses in Aids Care 1-9 at 6. 
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willing to deliver her baby and told her that ‘’he refused to bring children with AIDS to the 
world.’’44   Another woman lamented that ‘’I had to put up with the judgemental attitude of 
the health care staff, including their disbelief that a woman with HIV would get pregnant.’’45  
Other disapproving comments made to HIV positive expectant mothers by health care 
providers were that ‘’there is no need to have a child when you know that you are HIV 
positive…They told me I should abort.’’46    
Judgemental attitudes towards HIV positive pregnant women are not confined to the 
exclusive domain of health care workers and health care practitioners, they extend to 
government officials and auxiliary hospital staff.47   This is highlighted by the utterance of ex-
President Thabo Mbeki’s spokesman Parks Mankahlana who stated: ‘’the mother is going to 
die and that HIV negative child will be an orphan.  That child must be brought up, who is 
going to bring that child up?  It’s the state.  That’s, resources you see?’’48  This attitude 
highlights the view that children orphaned by HIV are a burden to the State.  In Sithole’s 
case, a cleaner in the ward where she was, made degrading remarks about her perceived 
sexual proclivity.49   The cleaner obtained knowledge of Sithole’s HIV status from a ward 
nurse who discussed this openly in the presence of other patients as well.50    
Apart from trying to weed out discriminatory attitudes and stereotypes that health care 
providers have, another challenge is to transport their mind set from a curative care services 
approach to a more preventative approach which is required for sexual and reproductive 
health care.51   The type of care that HIV positive women require is long term continuous 
care which assists in the fostering of long term relationships between patients and health 
care providers which aids in facilitating desirable health outcomes.52   The expectation is 
that there is early detection of symptoms by health care workers, strict regimen of taking 
medication by patients and a strict commitment to obtaining continuous care by patients.53    
                                                            
44 Ibid. 
45 A Ramkissoon et al ‘Options for HIV-positive women’ (2006) 1 South African Health Review 315 – 332 at 317. 
46 D Cooper et al ‘Life is still going on: Reproductive intentions among HIV-positive women and men in South 
Africa’ (2007) 65 Social Science and Medicine 274-283 at 280. 
47 D Cooper ‘In pursuit of social development goals and HIV-infected women’s reproductive rights – South 
Africa as a case study’ (2008) 75 Agenda 4 at 8 and E Bell et al ‘Sexual and reproductive health services and HIV 
testing: Perspectives and experiences of women and men living with HIV and Aids’ (2007) 15 (29) Reproductive 
Health Matters 113-135 at 124. 
48 C McGreal ‘The shame of the new South Africa’ The Guardian 1 November 2012, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/01/aids.southafrica accessed on 17 November 2017 
49 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no.                                   
19744/2012 – High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg para 17.8.2 of plaintiff’s 
amended particulars of claim. 
50 Sithole v The MEC for Health and Social Development & 3 Others – unreported case no.                                   
19744/2012 – High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg para 17.10 of plaintiff’s 
amended particulars of claim. 
51 Meyer et al ‘Focus on women: Linking HIV care and treatment with reproductive health services in the 
MTCT-Plus Initiative’ (2005) 13 (25) Reproductive Health Matters 136-146 at 138.   
52 Ibid 137.    
53 Ibid.   
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A major contributory factor to the abusive manner in which birthing mothers are treated is 
the conduct of health care workers towards them.  This does not exist in isolation but is 
supported by other negative factors like the over-burdened and under-resourced public 
health care facilities.54  This is further intensified by the huge power differential that exists 
between poor, often illiterate women and nurses in particular.55  The study conducted by 
Jewkes et al found that the dominant thread of the narratives of birthing mothers reflected 
the high levels of abuse and neglect inflicted on them by the nurses.56  A matter for concern 
is that even though the narratives report abuse and poor treatment, women do not feel 
empowered to complain about the conduct of nurses and therefore this leaves little room 
for their conduct to be sanctioned, improved or reformed.57  Women have indicated that 
they are afraid to complain as they fear that they may be ostracised on future visits to the 
health care centres and that they have been told that the treatment is beneficial to them.58  
Freedman and Kruk submit that the presence of physical or psychological abuse in a health 
care setting is indicative of a health system in crisis where, quality and accountability are 
compromised.59  The end result of health systems that tolerate this abuse devalues women 
which has negative consequences for their health.60   
It is submitted that an effective way to deal with this festering issue is to (i) acknowledge 
the existence of this unethical conduct on the part of nurses by being guided by the lived 
experiences of birthing mothers;61  (ii) recognise that there is a broader need for change, 
with management leading the dialogue by insisting on acceptable staff patient interactions; 
(iii) fortify their efforts by reporting errant behaviour of nurses to the South African Nursing 
Council;62 (iv) hold the Department of Health accountable for the conduct of nurses through 
vicarious liability;63 (v) sensitise, train and conduct educational campaigns on patient’s rights 
for nurses64 and (vi) improve working conditions and provide staff support for nurses.65  In 
addition, many of the suggestions made by Pickles66 can be mirrored in order to improve the 
experience of birthing mothers in public health care institutions.  Amongst these are a call 
                                                            
54 R Jewkes, N Abrahams and Z Mvo ‘Why do nurses abuse patients? Reflections from South African Obstetric 
Services’ (1998) 47 (11) Social Science and Medicine 1781 – 1795 at 1781. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid at 1785. 
57 Ibid at 1792. 
58 Ibid at 1785 and 1792. 
59 LP Freedman and ME Kruk ‘Disrespect and abuse of women in childbirth: challenging the global quality and 
accountability agendas’ (2014) 384 The Lancet  e 42 – e 44 at e43.    
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Jewkes, Abrahams and Mvo ‘Why do nurses abuse patients? Reflections from South African Obstetric 
Services’ (1998) 47 (11) Social Science and Medicine 1781 – 1795 at 1793. 
63 C Pickles Eliminating abusive ‘care’ A criminal law response to obstetric violence in South Africa’ (2015) 54 
SA Crime Quarterly 5 – 16 at 10. 
64 Ibid at 11.  
65 Ibid. 
66 C Pickles ‘Lived experiences of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996: Bridging the gap for 
women in need’ (2013) 29 The South African Journal on Human Rights 515 – 535 at 535. 
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for the Department of Health to adopt a leading role by ‘’providing clear direction 
concerning policy implementation plans’’ and to hold ‘’values-clarification workshops’’ that 
probe the systemic nature of the problem.67  An initiative that is in existence in the Cape 
Town Metro District Health Services may also be simulated at other health care facilities 
around the country to promote respectful maternity care of birthing mothers.68  The 
Patient-Centred Maternity Care Code in the Cape Metro was introduced in response to the 
disrespectful behaviour by maternity staff and the poor quality of care that birthing mothers 
were subjected to.69  The code has a zero tolerance for abusive and disrespectful behaviour 
and most importantly addresses health system problems that may contribute to such 
behaviour by nurses.70  The objectives of the code are that every birthing mother (i) has the 
right to be treated with dignity and respect;71 (ii) has the right to receive information about 
obstetric care and pregnancy;72 (iii) has the right to have a personal companion present for 
emotional support whilst in labour73 and (iv) has the right to maternity facilities that are 
responsive to their needs.74 
The forced or coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV carries a double burden for 
them.  Coming forward to institute legal proceedings against the wrongdoers may be a 
sensitive matter as they will now be identified by their families and communities as being 
barren and HIV positive.  This may have the effect of deterring women from accessing 
justice for a grave human rights violation. 
The stigma and discrimination that HIV positive women face comes from many sectors.  This 
has the potential to prevent them from coming forward to access legal advice for fear of 
being victimised as many of the women will rely on the same hospital for future medical 
care.75  The health care sector carries it owns set of stereotypes against HIV positive women 
who wish to become mothers.  Studies have shown that in many instances the personal 
negative views of health care practitioners come into play when dealing with this group of 
affected women regarding their reproductive health rights.76  Families and communities 
who mistreat and ostracise women who have been sterilised also play a vital role in 
discouraging women from accessing legal assistance. 
                                                            
67 Ibid. 
68 S Honikman ‘Abuse in South African maternity settings is a disgrace: Potential solutions to the problem’ 
(2015) 105 (4) South African Medical Journal 284-286 at 284-285. 
69 Ibid 284. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 C Pickles ‘Lived experiences of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996: Bridging the gap for 
women in need’ (2013) 29 The South African Journal on Human Rights 515 – 535 at 535. 
76 Strode et al ‘‘‘She made up a choice for me’’: 22 HIV-positive women’s experiences of involuntary 
sterilization in two South African provinces’ (2012) 20 (39S) Reproductive Health Matters 1-9. 
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7.3  Conclusions 
On the basis of the findings above this thesis concludes: 
(i)  The forced and coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV has been shown to be a                     
      significant human rights issue  
 
At least 100 women in South Africa have reported that they were sterilised because they 
were HIV positive.  This indicates that this practice is a significant human rights issue which 
needs to (a) be comprehensively addressed by the Department of Health, (b) further 
facilitate access to justice for women who qualify to institute civil claims and (c) further 
investigation into whether any other form of compensation should be paid in situations 
where civil claims have prescribed.  This particular issue forms part of a broader set of rights 
violations that has been documented in many jurisdictions and is referred to as obstetric 
violence.       
(ii)  South Africa has a well-established legal framework  
There is dedicated legislation dealing with sterilisations which protects women from  
involuntary sterilisations.  There is also dedicated legislation dealing with equality.  There 
are also well developed legal remedies in the legislation mentioned as well as in the civil and 
criminal law.  This is complimented by a range of administrative remedies.  
(iii)  Civil claims are the most appropriate legal remedy to address the forced or coerced   
        sterilisation of women living with HIV in South Africa 
 
Based on the research conducted by Strode, Mthembu and Essack and the assessment of 
the advantages and disadvantages of each of the three major remedies, this thesis finds that 
that a claim for damages using the civil law is the most appropriate form of legal redress.  
Despite the difficulty that we are presently faced with regarding proving discrimination, 
instituting a civil claim appears to be the most effective way of obtaining legal relief which 
meets the needs of the affected population.  However, such claims can only proceed if the 
courts accept that prescription runs from the moment that the plaintiff became aware of 
the cause of action and not the date of the sterilisation. 
(iv)  A well-established legal framework is insufficient to ensure access to justice 
 Access to justice is a broad concept that aims at ensuring individuals or classes of litigants 
are able to use the legal system to resolve their disputes.  This thesis has used five factors as 
a benchmark for reviewing the extent to which these external factors impact on the ability 
of HIV positive women who allege sterilisation abuse are able to access the justice system.  
This review has shown that firstly the five factors identified are indicators of whether access 
to justice is achievable.  It is argued that these factors are broad enough to be applied to 
other human rights litigation involving marginalised groups.  Secondly, that although a wide 
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range of legal remedies exist and are available, HIV positive women will face a number of 
hurdles in attempts to vindicate their rights and hold those responsible accountable.    
(v)  Limited law reform and extensive value based training is needed to improve access to    
       justice for HIV positive women who have been forcibly or coercively sterilised   
 
Minor changes to the Sterilisation Act77 could significantly improve patient protections and 
potentially facilitate the holding of health care workers accountable through the civil or 
criminal law.  More extensive work is needed to ensure that the values of health care 
workers mirror those in the Constitution78 to ensure that all patients are treated with 
dignity but especially those in childbirth.   
 
7.4  Recommendations 
Based on the findings and conclusions of this dissertation, the following recommendations 
are made.  These aim at:  
(i)  Law reform 
In order to strengthen the legal framework and ensure that coerced or forced sterilisations 
do not occur in the future, the following changes are needed to the Sterilisation Act,79 that 
is by whom the consent must be taken and that it should not be done for a discriminatory 
reason.  These changes will be broadly beneficial as they will protect all persons considering 
sterilisation as a form of birth control.  They will also strengthen the current provisions in 
the Act dealing with consent. Finally, through the insertion of discrimination in the South 
African Sterilisation Act, this Act will be unique as it will clearly re-inforce the constitutional 
principle on equality thus sending a strong message that the forced or coerced sterilisation 
of men or women because of their race, gender, ethnicity, HIV status or any other arbitrary 
ground will be unlawful.   In this regard, the proposed recommendations are additions to 
sections 2 and 4 of the Sterilisation Act80:  
Persons capable of consenting 
2. (1) No person is prohibited from having sterilisation performed on him or her if he 
or she is— 
(a) capable of consenting;  
(b) 18 years or above and 
 (2) A person capable of consenting may not be sterilised without his or her consent. 
                                                            
77 44 of 1998. 
78 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
79 Act 44 of 1998. 
80 Ibid.  
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(3) (a) Sterilisation may not be performed on a person who is under the age of 18 
years except where failure to do so would jeopardize the person’s life or seriously impair 
his or her physical health. 
(4) No person may be asked to consent to a sterilisation procedure based on a 
discriminatory reason.81 
(b) Section 3 (1) (a) and (2) will apply with the necessary changes 
 
Consent 
4. For the purposes of this Act, ‘‘consent’’ means consent given freely and voluntarily 
without any inducement and may only be given if the person giving it has— 
(a) been given a clear explanation and adequate description of the— 
(i) proposed plan of the procedure; and 
(ii) consequences, risks and the reversible or irreversible nature of the sterilisation 
procedure; 
(b) been given advice that the consent may be withdrawn any time before the 
treatment; [and]82 
(c) signed the prescribed consent form and 
(d) written consent may only be obtained before the onset of labour by a surgeon or 
gynaecologist performing the procedure.83 
 
(ii) Undertake research  
Further research is needed to (i) document other cases and establish whether the practice is 
continuing and (ii) inquiring into some of the reasons that health care workers think are 
behind this practice.   
 
 
                                                            
81 The underlined words indicate the insertion to the Sterilisation Act, 44 of 1998. 
82 This is an omission from the Sterilisation Act, 44 of 1998. 
83 The underlined words indicate the insertion to the Sterilisation Act, 44 of 1998. 
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(iii)  Support legal literacy 
Further research and litigation will not be possible unless HIV positive women are aware of 
their rights.  Legal literacy is needed to ensure that health care workers are aware that this 
practice is illegal and women understand that their rights may have been violated.  
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